



TEXTS ADOPTED

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Situation in Colombia after the wave of recent terrorist attacks

European Parliament resolution of 11 September 2025 on the situation in Colombia after the wave of recent terrorist attacks (2025/2855(RSP))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to its previous resolutions on Colombia,
- having regard to the remarks by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Kaja Kallas at the European Parliament plenary session of 17 June 2025, after Colombian Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay was shot from behind during a rally, on the threat to democratic processes and peace in Colombia,
- having regard to the statement by the Spokesperson of the European External Action Service of 11 August 2025 following the death of Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay in Colombia,
- having regard to the statement by the Spokesman for UN Secretary-General António Guterres of 11 August 2025,
- having regard to the statement by the Bureau of the Delegation for relations with the countries of the Andean Community of 12 August 2025, on the recent wave of political violence in Colombia, including the murder of Colombian Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay,
- having regard to the statements of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) on Colombia and, in particular, the statement of 15 August 2025 entitled 'IACHR condemns the assassination of Miguel Uribe Turbay in Colombia and calls on the State to guarantee the safety of political leaders',
- having regard to the statement by the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States of 11 August 2025 on the passing of Colombian Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay,

- having regard to Rule 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,
- A. whereas for decades, and especially now as a result of the current escalation, Colombia has witnessed persistent and shifting dynamics of armed and terrorist violence, while the security situation, public order and humanitarian conditions have steadily deteriorated in rural and urban areas alike, with increased rates of forced displacement, confinement, child recruitment and massacres;
- B. whereas despite the 2016 Peace Agreement, the current escalation of violence and terrorist attacks is alarming and is closely linked to illegal armed groups such as the ELN (National Liberation Army) and the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) dissidents, including the powerful *Segunda Marquetalia* faction, the *Estado Mayor Central* faction led by alias Iván Mordisco and the organised crime group *Clan del Golfo*, which continue to expand their control across Colombia; whereas these groups profit from drug trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, illegal mining and cross-border smuggling, using this revenue to finance terrorism and attacks against the civilian population, and employing increasingly sophisticated methods such as explosive-laden drones; whereas military data show that there were 108 drone attacks in Colombia in 2024, while 118 have been reported so far this year; whereas the drones are used both to drop explosives and to monitor army troops and drug shipment areas;
- C. whereas throughout the year, a series of terrorist attacks has struck both security forces and civilians, including a wave of massacres in January 2025 in the Catatumbo region of the Norte de Santander sparked by clashes between ELN units and dissident FARC factions, which killed at least 80 people, including civilians, and displaced thousands; whereas other more recent attacks in August 2025 included a car bomb in Cali – the third largest city in Colombia – that killed six people and injured more than 60 others, and a terrorist attack in Antioquia, where FARC dissidents of the *Estado Mayor Central* led by alias Iván Mordisco shot down a helicopter, killing at least 12 police officers who were conducting a coca eradication operation;
- D. whereas on 7 June 2025, Miguel Uribe Turbay, a prominent opposition Senator and pre-presidential candidate of the *Centro Democrático* Party, was the victim of an assassination attempt during a rally in Bogotá; whereas despite medical efforts, he died from his injuries on 11 August 2025; whereas in the months preceding the attack, Uribe and his legal team had submitted more than 20 formal requests to the National Protection Unit (UNP) for an increase in his security detail, warning of credible threats to his life, with the final request made just two days before the shooting; whereas the UNP repeatedly refused to increase his security, and on the very day of the attack, he only had three agents in his security detail; whereas

the masterminds behind, and the motives for, the crime remain unknown;

- E. whereas on 7 September 2025, the Colombian army announced that 72 soldiers had been taken hostage in the Cauca region, an area taken over by guerrilla and narco-trafficking groups; whereas they have since been released;
- F. whereas these events form part of an escalating pattern of coordinated assaults across the country, demonstrating the ability of illegal armed groups to directly threaten Colombia's institutions and democracy, with the clear intention of creating instability in the run-up to the 2026 elections;
- G. whereas the country's presidency and other political actors have heightened polarisation through divisive and aggressive discourse; whereas such rhetoric has intensified political polarisation, drawn widespread condemnation and resulted in a violent political climate; whereas a formal criminal complaint has been filed by Senator Uribe's legal team as a result of Senator Uribe's democratic credentials being questioned and his family legacy invoked; whereas the president denied these allegations;
- H. whereas drug cartels and transnational crime structures, including the *Cártel de los Soles* in Venezuela and other illegal groups, support terrorism by sustaining armed groups within and outside Colombia, and supplying arms, financial flows and safe havens across the border, thereby worsening regional instability and undermining Colombia's sovereignty and democracy;
- I. whereas the *Cártel de los Soles*, an alleged Venezuelan criminal network led by Nicolás Maduro and other high-ranking military regime officials including Diosdado Cabello, Jorge Rodríguez, Delcy Rodríguez and General Padrino López, among others, has been designated by the US Department of the Treasury as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group for its role in facilitating narco-terrorism, including the trafficking of cocaine produced by FARC dissidents to the United States and Europe, providing material support and leveraging state institutions to corrupt military and judicial functions;
- J. whereas according to the latest UN data, cocaine production in Colombia has reached record levels, with ripple effects across Latin America, the United States and Europe;
- K. whereas some armed groups operating in Colombia, such as the ELN, are already designated on the EU's list of terrorist organisations; whereas, although the FARC was removed from that list following the 2016 Peace Agreement, the evolution of the security context has led to the emergence of new violent actors, which, under the criteria established by EU law, clearly qualify as

terrorist organisations; whereas this notably includes the FARC's dissident factions, especially the *Estado Mayor Central*, which have carried out systematic attacks against civilians and security forces, as well as transnational criminal structures such as the *Clan del Golfo* and the *Cártel de los Soles*, which facilitate terrorist activities and provide shelter and safe havens across borders;

- L. whereas after the 'total peace strategy', there has been a paradoxical increase in the activity of these illegal groups and in organised crime gaining territory and power in areas with historically limited state presence; whereas the Colombian authorities have been trying to improve security operations with the aim of fighting illegal dissident factions;
- M. whereas illegal armed groups, including guerrillas, dissidents and groups descended from paramilitaries, continuously violate international humanitarian law and are directly linked to the increase in the widespread violence and impunity in Colombia, which affects political parties, human rights defenders, journalists and social leaders, among others; whereas the current wave of violence is affecting more people across a wider and growing range of locations than in previous phases of the armed conflict;
- N. whereas the Colombian Ombudsperson's Office (*Defensoría del Pueblo*) confirmed that a total of 81 human rights defenders and social leaders were killed nationwide in the first five months of 2025; whereas Global Witness and Front Line Defenders have reported that Colombia is the most dangerous country in the world for human rights defenders and that of the 324 human rights defenders killed worldwide between January 2024 and September 2025, 157 were killed in Colombia; whereas the presidency intends to propose a budget cut to the Colombian Ombudsperson's Office, which has documented over 1 500 killings of human rights defenders and other individuals since its establishment in 1992; whereas this will have a direct impact on the protection of human rights in the country as violence increases and critical elections approach;
- O. whereas during the first half of 2025, 1,45 million people were affected by violence in Colombia – four times as many as during the same period in 2024 – and over 70 200 people were forcibly displaced, 30 % more than in the whole of 2024; whereas reports indicate increased child recruitment and the use of anti-personnel mines;
- P. whereas, in 2025, the Indepaz Observatory documented 52 massacres, with a total of 172 victims, and the Colombian Ombudsperson's Office identified at least 11 critical humanitarian emergency hotspots arising from the increase in armed violence driven by the internal fragmentation and expansion of at least 10 illegal armed groups, which are now present in over 73 % of the

country (809 municipalities); whereas according to a military intelligence report cited by one of the nation's leading newspapers, *El Tiempo*, in the first half of 2025, illegal groups grew in size by more than 1 000 members, reaching a total of nearly 22 000 nationwide; whereas these groups may now be present in 562 municipalities across 29 of Colombia's 32 departments;

- Q. whereas the EU and Parliament have been very supportive of the 2016 Peace Process in Colombia; whereas the EU has reaffirmed its political and financial commitment to the Colombian Peace Process, and continues to monitor its implementation; whereas the Colombian people rejected the proposal in a referendum;
- R. whereas a strong and democratic Colombia is vital for regional stability and security in Latin America;
1. Condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the assassination of Colombian Senator and pre-presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay and expresses its condolences to his family and loved ones;
 2. Stresses that Uribe's assassination is not an isolated tragedy, but part of a wider climate of political intimidation and violence in Colombia; reiterates its support for all Colombians who reject violence and demand a future free from corruption and criminal collusion;
 3. Further condemns and deplores the recent wave of terrorist attacks, and the killings of, and general escalation in violence against, political actors, public figures, human rights defenders, journalists, social leaders and security forces, which have rocked Colombia and had a highly damaging effect on the country's social cohesion and stability;
 4. Expresses its condolences to the families of the numerous victims, many of whom were members of the security forces, and to the people of Colombia;
 5. Calls on the authorities to investigate these terrorist attacks, including the assassination of Miguel Uribe Turbay, to the fullest extent possible so that the perpetrators can be brought to justice; highlights that in order to bring the perpetrators to justice, the authorities must investigate not only the individuals who carried out the acts, but also the instigators and facilitators behind them;
 6. Urges the Colombian authorities to identify the motives and all factors behind the worrying escalation of violence and the terrorist attacks, continue to address the underlying causes of the conflict, ensure the full protection of human rights throughout Colombia, and build a culture of peace and dialogue for conflict resolution;
 7. Notes, with grave concern, the proliferation and consolidation of

organised crime and indiscriminate terrorist group activities in Colombia's regions bordering Venezuela; stresses that these territories have become corridors for drug trafficking, arms smuggling and money laundering facilitated by transnational structures such as the *Cártel de los Soles*, and that the United States has charged and sanctioned the highest-ranking Venezuelan regime officials as a result of their documented complicity; underlines that this cross-border nexus not only fuels terrorism and strengthens Colombian insurgent and dissident groups, but also poses a direct threat to regional stability, democratic governance and Colombia's sovereignty; urges the Colombian authorities to investigate cartel financing and prosecute collaborators within Colombia, in particular by following and disrupting the transnational financial flows used by cartels that move through banks, gold mining and front companies, modernise surveillance and intensify counter-drug operations, and enhance regional cooperation and shared intelligence mechanisms;

8. Welcomes the EU Member States' concrete contributions in this regard, such as the Italian 'Falcone-Borsellino' initiative, which is designed to help countries in Latin America and the Caribbean combat transnational organised crime, providing technical support and assistance, training and good practices in the fields of justice and security;
9. Considers that inflammatory statements spread by the presidency and other political actors have contributed to increased polarisation, political violence, hate speech and instability in the country; calls on the Colombian authorities, political leaders and civil society in general to do their utmost to prevent the escalation of the violence, by increasing security measures and refraining from exacerbating the polarisation in the country through inflammatory statements; reminds the Colombian authorities of the urgent need to protect political actors, public figures, human rights defenders, journalists and all citizens exercising their democratic rights, and calls for immediate measures to be taken to strengthen their protection;
10. Expresses concern over the documented rise in political violence against candidates and leaders in 2025, which may risk undermining electoral guarantees and public trust in governing institutions; calls for transparent communication from institutions, adequate resourcing of the electoral authorities, and robust security measures to ensure that the upcoming 2026 elections are conducted in a free and safe manner;
11. Expresses its concern at the persistence of impunity and obstacles to accessing justice in cases of serious human rights violations and abuses; stresses that fighting impunity is key to preventing a recurrence of criminal acts and terrorist attacks, and to guaranteeing the full exercise of political rights;

12. Calls for the presence of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to be strengthened in Colombia and for the mandate of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia to continue;
13. Calls on the Council and the VP/HR to update the EU's list of terrorist organisations so as to reflect the current realities in Colombia and the wider region; urges the Council to include – alongside existing listings such as the ELN – in particular the *Clan del Golfo*, the FARC dissident factions, notably the *Segunda Marquetalia* and *Estado Mayor Central*, and the *Cártel de los Soles*, an organisation that provides support, shelter and logistics to Colombia's armed terrorist groups; stresses that recognising these actors as terrorist organisations under EU law is essential to strengthen international cooperation, cut their financial networks, and enhance support for Colombia's institutions and democracy and the protection of civilian populations;
14. Acknowledges the positive impact of the now-concluded European Trust Fund for Peace in Colombia and calls for the VP/HR, the Commission and the Member States to reaffirm and reinforce the EU's political, financial and technical support for the Colombian peace process, reflecting this in the forthcoming multiannual financial framework, continued high-level political engagement, and the ongoing work of the EU Special Envoy for the Peace Process in Colombia;
15. Expresses its concern over the budget cut proposed to the Colombian Ombudsperson's Office and reiterates that funding is crucial to protect human rights; calls for the EU, particularly the European External Action Service and its delegation in Colombia, to actively support respect for international humanitarian law and the government's obligation to protect civilian populations;
16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Parliament of Colombia, the United Nations, and the Organization of American States.