



TEXTS ADOPTED

P10_TA(2025)0254

UN Climate Change Conference 2025 in Belém, Brazil (COP30)

European Parliament resolution of 23 October 2025 on the UN Climate Change Conference 2025 in Belém, Brazil (COP30) (2025/2666(RSP))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol thereto,
- having regard to the agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),
- having regard to the 29th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP29), the 19th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 19), the sixth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 6), and the Glasgow Climate Pact adopted at the 26th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP26) in Glasgow on 13 November 2021,
- having regard to the agreement made at the 27th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP27) to create a specific fund for loss and damage, the establishment of a transitional committee on the operationalisation of the new funding arrangements for responding to loss and damage at the 28th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP28), and to the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage,
- having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2024 on the UN Climate Change Conference 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan (COP29)¹,

¹ OJ C, C/2025/808, 11.2.2025,
ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/808/oj>.

- having regard to the agreement made at COP29 on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance and the objective to triple financing for developing countries to USD 300 billion annually by 2035 and secure efforts from all actors to work together to scale up financing for developing countries, from public and private sources, to USD 1,3 trillion per year by 2035,
- having regard to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals,
- having regard to its resolution of 9 July 2025 on implementation and delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals in view of the 2025 High-Level Political Forum²,
- having regard to the 2018 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) special report on the impacts of global warming of 1,5 °C above pre-industrial levels, its special report on climate change and land, its special report on the ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate and its sixth assessment report (AR6),
- having regard to the UNFCCC synthesis report of 28 October 2024 on nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement,
- having regard to the report of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) of 19 March 2025 entitled 'State of the Global Climate 2024',
- having regard to the report of 15 April 2025 compiled by the Copernicus Climate Change Service and the WMO, entitled 'European State of the Climate - Report 2024',
- having regard to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Emissions Gap Report 2024, published on 24 October 2024,
- having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 entitled 'The European Green Deal' (COM(2019)0640),
- having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled 'The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation' (COM(2025)0085),
- having regard to the EU legislation translating the EU's targets of reducing net emissions by at least 55 % by 2030 compared to 1990 levels and towards reaching the binding EU climate neutrality target by 2050 ('Fit for 55' package) into concrete policies across various sectors,

² Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0159.

- having regard to Decision (EU) 2022/591 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2030³, as well as to the report of 20 February 2025 by the European Environment Agency monitoring progress towards the 8th Environment Action Programme (EAP) objectives, and to the Commission report of 13 March 2024 on the 8th EAP mid-term review (COM(2024)0123),
- having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the climate and environment emergency⁴,
- having regard to the Commission communication of 6 February 2024 entitled ‘Securing our future – Europe’s 2040 climate target and path to climate neutrality by 2050 building a sustainable, just and prosperous society’ (COM(2024)0063),
- having regard to the Commission communication of 12 March 2024 entitled ‘Managing climate risks - protecting people and prosperity’ (COM(2024)0091),
- having regard to the Commission communication of 27 May 2025 entitled ‘EU-wide assessment of the final updated national energy and climate plans – Delivering the Union’s 2030 energy and climate objectives’ (COM(2025)0274),
- having regard to the report of 11 March 2024 by the European Environment Agency entitled ‘European Climate Risk Assessment’,
- having regard to the report of 15 June 2023 by the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change entitled ‘Scientific advice for the determination of an EU-wide 2040 climate target and a greenhouse gas budget for 2030-2050’,
- having regard to the report of 2 June 2025 by the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change entitled ‘Scientific advice for amending the European Climate Law - Setting climate goals to strengthen EU strategic priorities’,
- having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 28 June 2023 entitled ‘A new outlook on the climate and security nexus: Addressing the impact of climate change and environmental degradation on peace, security and defence’ (JOIN(2023)0019), and to the joint staff working document from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 17 February 2025 entitled ‘Progress

³ OJ L 114, 12.4.2022, p. 22,
ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2022/591/oj>.

⁴ OJ C 232, 16.6.2021, p. 28.

Report on the implementation of the Joint Communication - “A New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus” (SWD(2025)0049),

- having regard to the Global Framework on Chemicals – For a Planet Free of Harm from Chemicals and Waste, adopted at the fifth International Conference on Chemicals Management, organised by UNEP in September 2023,
- having regard to the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, adopted at the 15th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD COP15) in December 2022, and to the 16th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD COP16), which concluded in February 2025,
- having regard to the Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement or High Seas Treaty), adopted on 19 June 2023,
- having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1991 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2024 on nature restoration and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/869⁵ (Nature Restoration Law),
- having regard to its position of 10 April 2024 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Soil Monitoring and Resilience⁶,
- having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/3012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 establishing a Union certification framework for carbon removals, carbon farming and carbon storage in products⁷,
- having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1787 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on the reduction of methane emissions in the energy sector and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942⁸,
- having regard to the resolution adopted by the UN Human Rights Council of 12 July 2019 on human rights and climate change (A/HRC/RES/41/21),

⁵ OJ L, 2024/1991, 29.7.2024,
ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1991/oj>.

⁶ Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0204.

⁷ OJ L, 2024/3012, 6.12.2024,
ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3012/oj>.

⁸ OJ L, 2024/1787, 15.7.2024,
ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1787/oj>.

- having regard to the declaration entitled ‘Supporting the Conditions for a Just Transition Internationally’ of 4 November 2021, adopted at COP26,
 - having regard to the Council conclusions on climate finance of 10 October 2025 in view of the 30th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP30) in Belém,
 - having regard to the questions to the Commission and to the Council on the UN Climate Change Conference 2025 in Belém, Brazil (COP30) (O-000028/2025 – B10-0011/2025 and O-000029/2025 – B10-0012/2025),
 - having regard to Rules 142(5) and 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
 - having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety,
- A. whereas it has declared a climate and environmental emergency and has committed to urgently fight and contain this threat; whereas recent scientific studies⁹ indicate that human-induced global warming and increases of sea-levels are accelerating at an even faster pace than previously anticipated;
 - B. whereas the Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016; whereas 2025 marks the ten-year anniversary of the adoption of the Paris Agreement;
 - C. whereas according to the UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2024¹⁰, fully implementing unconditional NDCs made under the Paris Agreement for 2030 would put the world on course for limiting temperature rise to 2,8 °C this century, and fully implementing conditional NDCs would lower this temperature rise to 2,6 °C;
 - D. whereas the 2024 NDC synthesis report¹¹ states that the total global greenhouse gas (GHG) emission level in 2030 is projected to be 2,6 % below the 2019 level; whereas the IPCC concludes that in scenarios limiting warming to 1,5 °C, GHG emissions need to be 43 % below the 2019 level by 2030;
 - E. whereas the EU should remain a leader in international climate negotiations; whereas a collective effort is needed by all parties to achieve global climate targets; whereas decarbonisation in the EU

⁹ Forster, P. M., Smith, C., Walsh, T., Lamb, W. F., Lamboll, R. et al., ‘Indicators of Global Climate Change 2024: annual update of key indicators of the state of the climate system and human influence’, *Earth System Science Data*, Vol. 17, Issue 6, 19 June 2025.

¹⁰ United Nations Environment Programme, *Emissions Gap Report 2024*, 24 October 2024.

¹¹ UNFCCC Secretariat, *2024 NDC Synthesis Report*, 28 October 2024.

alone will not be enough; whereas the United States accounts for 23,8 % of global cumulative CO₂ emissions, the EU Member States account for 16,5 %, China for 15 %, Russia for 6,7 % and the UK for 4,4 %; whereas the EU is currently the world's fourth largest annual emitter of CO₂, representing around 6 % of worldwide emissions, after China, the United States and India; whereas the EU represents 5,7 % of the global population and 14,7 % of global GDP¹²;

- F. whereas pathways limiting global warming to 1,5 °C require reaching net-negative emissions post-2050;
- G. whereas most climate change mitigation actions featured in the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, published in 2023, include carbon capture and storage, and carbon removal;
- H. whereas the IPCC estimates that the global carbon budget for a 67 % likelihood of limiting global warming to 1,5 °C is approximately 400 gigatonnes of CO₂ from 2020 onwards¹³; whereas, at current global emission levels, this global carbon budget is expected to be exhausted by 2030;
- I. whereas methane has been responsible for around 30 % of the rise in global temperatures since the industrial revolution; whereas the EU co-launched the Global Methane Pledge (GMP) at COP26 to reduce methane emissions, by 2030, to 30 % of 2020 levels; whereas the report by the International Energy Agency of May 2025 entitled 'Global Methane Tracker 2025' shows that methane emissions are still on the rise and that the implementation of the Global Methane Pledge remains weak;
- J. whereas the IPCC's finding state that land and ocean sinks have absorbed 56 % of human-induced CO₂ emissions over the past six decades¹⁴;
- K. whereas six out of nine planetary boundaries analysed by the Stockholm Resilience Centre have been exceeded¹⁵, including the planetary boundary for climate;

¹² Eurostat, *Key figures on the EU in the world – 2025 edition*, 2025.

¹³ IPCC, 'Summary for Policymakers', in *Climate Change 2021 – The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, 2021.

¹⁴ IPCC, 'Sections' in *Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups 1, II and III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, 2023.

¹⁵ Richardson, K., Steffen, W., Lucht, W., Bendtsen, J., Cornell, S. et al., 'Earth beyond six of nine planetary boundaries', *Science Advances*, Vol. 9, Issue 37, 13 September 2023.

- L. whereas UNEP describes the interconnected environmental emergencies of climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss as ‘the triple planetary crisis’, given that climate change worsens biodiversity loss, pollution accelerates both climate change and ecosystem collapse, and biodiversity loss weakens climate resilience;
- M. whereas protecting, conserving and restoring biodiversity and ecosystems, including through greater efforts to halt and reverse deforestation and forest degradation, are necessary actions for achieving the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement;
- N. whereas the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) contains concrete measures to halt and reverse nature loss, including targets to restore 30 % of all degraded ecosystems by 2030 and a target to conserve 30 % of land, waters and seas;
- O. whereas 2024 was the hottest year ever recorded and the first time global temperatures exceeded 1,5 °C above pre-industrial levels; whereas Copernicus data for the first half of 2025 shows some of the highest temperatures on record, with only 2024 being hotter for the month of May¹⁶; whereas each of the past ten years also ranks among the top ten hottest years on record; whereas Europe is the fastest warming continent in the world, warming at roughly twice the global average rate since the 1980s, according to Copernicus data¹⁷;
- P. whereas the UN General Assembly has recognised the right to access a clean, healthy and sustainable environment as a universal human right¹⁸ and Article 37 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union enshrines the principle that environmental protection must be integrated into the policies of the Union;
- Q. whereas air pollution is a major environmental and public health threat and is inextricably linked with the climate crisis, both in terms of shared energy sources such as fossil fuel combustion and the need for integrated policy solutions; whereas short-lived climate pollutants, such as methane and black carbon, are responsible for

¹⁶ Copernicus, ‘Copernicus: Exceptionally dry spring in parts of north-western Europe - Second-warmest May globally’, Copernicus website, 10 June 2025.

¹⁷ Copernicus, *Copernicus Global Climate Report 2024*, Copernicus website, 10 January 2025.

¹⁸ UN General Assembly Resolution 76/300 of 28 July 2022 entitled ‘The human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment’.

nearly half of current global warming levels and cause severe health impacts, particularly among vulnerable populations¹⁹;

- R. whereas the United States has decided for the second time to unilaterally withdraw from the Paris Agreement; whereas the US retreat from multilateralism and from providing development assistance, humanitarian aid and international climate finance will leave a significant gap; whereas the EU has a responsibility and strategic interest in helping to fill that gap;
- S. whereas making global financial flows consistent with a pathway towards a net zero and climate-resilient economy is an essential goal for the green transition, in accordance with Article 2 of the Paris Agreement;
- T. whereas the UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance's report of 2021, entitled 'First report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties', states that national reports submitted by developing country Parties to the UNFCCC demonstrate that the costs for meeting their needs until 2030, in relation to implementing the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement, cumulatively amount to USD 5,8-5,9 trillion²⁰; whereas the UNFCCC's NCQG on climate finance includes a commitment to scale up finance to the amount of at least USD 1,3 trillion per year by 2035;
- U. whereas the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty Initiative is inspired by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and calls for a binding international treaty to stop fossil fuel expansion, to phase out existing production and to support a just global transition; whereas only 17 countries have so far endorsed the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty, and none of these is an EU Member State²¹;
- V. whereas the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change recommends the urgent and full phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies in the EU, in line with existing commitments; whereas the 8th EAP

¹⁹ Szopa, S., Naik, V., Adhikary, B., Artaxo, P., Berntsen, T., 'Short-Lived Climate Forcers' in *Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, June 2023.

²⁰ UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance, 'First report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement', UN Climate Change website, 2021.

²¹ Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty Initiative, 'Governments participating in discussions on a fossil fuel treaty', Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty Initiative website.

requires the establishment of a clear deadline for ending such subsidies, in line with this climate ambition;

- W. whereas children are especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, including by way of deadly diseases, pollution, food and water insecurity, and extreme weather events; whereas nearly 1 billion children live in 33 countries classified as ‘extremely high-risk’ due to a combination of exposure to climate and environmental hazards and high levels of vulnerability²²;
- X. whereas ambitious multilateral climate frameworks, and the actions aligned with them, serve the strategic interests of the EU and present opportunities for the EU as a global frontrunner in the green transition;

Global stocktake, NDCs and the COP30 in Belém

1. Highlights the fact that the outcome of the first global stocktake (GST) at COP28 recognises that pathways limiting global warming to 1,5 °C with no or limited overshoot and to 2 °C require a peaking of global GHG emissions by 2025, and that limiting global warming to 1,5 °C with no or limited overshoot requires deep, rapid and sustained reductions in global GHG emissions of 43 % by 2030 and 60 % by 2035 relative to the 2019 level, reaching net zero GHG emissions by 2050;
2. Takes note of the relative progress made in some areas at COP29 in Baku, especially as regards the NCQG on climate finance, the progress on making the loss and damage fund operational, and the carbon market agreement; regrets, however, the lack of sufficient progress on mitigation;
3. Notes with concern that the aggregated emissions reductions from the submitted NDCs fall significantly short of the emission pathways required to respect the Paris Agreement target and the conclusions of the first GST; urges COP30 to reaffirm the commitment to the 1,5 °C target and to agree on the need to continue to strengthen ambition, and to take concrete decisions to support the implementation of the NDCs; considers that GSTs should take place more frequently and calls for all parties that are not on track to achieving the Paris Agreement goal to update and strengthen their NDCs every second year, in addition to the five-yearly review cycle;
4. Stresses that a collective effort and further action by all parties is required to close the emissions gap and implement the actions included in the first GST through concrete targets, and to scale up nationally determined action; underlines the particular responsibility of all major emitters, including emerging economies and the G20

²² UNICEF, ‘The climate crisis is a child rights crisis - Introducing the Children’s Climate Risk Index’, August 2021.

countries, to demonstrate leadership, in this regard; calls for the EU and like-minded partners to spearhead a coalition of high ambition and work collaboratively with all parties to secure a successful outcome at COP30;

5. Strongly regrets the decision by the US Government to withdraw, for the second time, from the Paris Agreement; calls for the United States to re-consider its withdrawal, and to contribute its fair share to the global effort to tackle climate change and to global climate finance in line with the Paris Agreement, especially in regard to its responsibility, based on its cumulative past emissions; encourages US states and non-governmental actors to continue to engage in international climate cooperation, including at UN climate change conferences; notes that no other country has followed the United States in withdrawing from the Paris Agreement; underlines the particular responsibility and strategic interest of the EU to provide leadership and restore trust in global climate action, including through measures to prevent any further withdrawals from the Paris Agreement; considers that all aspects of the EU's external action, including trade policy and development policy, can contribute to these aims;
6. Reiterates the principle of policy coherence for development, to which the EU and its Member States have committed, and which aims to minimise contradictions and build synergies between different EU policies; insists on a coherent approach to the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in both internal and external policies;
7. Recalls that in the first GST, the Parties to the UNFCCC recognised the need for deep, rapid and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in line with 1,5 °C pathways and committed themselves to contributing to the global effort to triple renewable energy capacity globally and to double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030; remains concerned about the insufficient progress towards these targets; underlines that it is essential that COP30 build on these targets, take concrete decisions on their implementation and undertake additional measures should an ambition gap remain; reaffirms its commitment to deliver on the consensus reached in the COP28 Declaration on Climate and Health; takes note of the commitment to contribute to accelerating the development of zero- and low-emission technologies; recalls in this regards point (e) of paragraph 28 of the first GST as adopted at COP28;
8. Recalls that in the first GST, countries committed themselves to accelerating efforts towards the phase-down of unabated coal power and the phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, and to transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems in a just, orderly and equitable manner, with a view to accelerating action in this critical

decade so as to achieve net zero by 2050, in keeping with the science; calls on all Parties to step up efforts in this direction and to engage in the development of a fossil fuel non-proliferation treaty; expects COP30 to strengthen the commitment to the transition away from fossil fuels and insists on the urgent need for ambitious and time-bound plans to phase out fossil fuel subsidies and fossil fuel production;

9. Notes that 2025 is the deadline for countries to submit their NDCs for 2035, which are essential for raising climate ambition, tracking progress and enhancing resilience; considers it essential that the EU lead by example and calls for the EU and all Parties that have not yet done so to respond to the COP28 GST and submit economy-wide absolute, as opposed to relative, emissions reduction targets covering all greenhouse gases, sectors and categories and aligned with the 1,5 °C goal, as soon as possible and well before COP30; regrets that most parties failed to meet the deadline for submitting their updated NDCs, stresses the importance of respecting all UNFCCC processes and submission deadlines for the good functioning of multilateralism in climate politics;
10. Stresses the importance of granular and transparent reporting to assess progress on the NDCs;
11. Acknowledges progress on the implementation of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and emphasises that the use of Article 6 should always result in a guaranteed net benefit for the climate and thus calls on all Parties to ensure that projects accounted towards Article 6 do not deter domestic emission reductions; urges the Supervisory Body and all Parties to stand by the Glasgow Agreement, and hence ensure that all approved Clean Development Mechanism activities comply with Article 6.4 methodologies by the end of 2025 at the latest; calls on the Commission to advocate and support the development of a robust international governance framework for internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) at international level that includes binding standards on international carbon credits to guarantee environmental, climate and social integrity, fair sharing of the mitigation benefits, clear implementation rules to ensure transparency, additionality and permanence, strict reporting obligations, and effective oversight mechanisms for all Article 6 projects, in order to eliminate the risk of double-counting and safeguard the environmental integrity of the system; calls for clear rules on liability sharing for monitoring and reversal risks, to avoid undue burdens on host Parties; highlights the need for private carbon market initiatives to implement the highest standards of integrity;
12. Calls on all Parties to make meaningful progress at COP30 to ensure that the second GST, beginning in 2026, is guided by the best

available science and integrates cross-cutting issues such as gender equity, human rights and ecosystem protection;

International climate finance and sustainable finance

13. Emphasises that the provision of adequate climate finance is crucial for achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement; recalls that many developing countries' NDCs are conditional on international climate finance; stresses that, according to various UN reports, the global climate finance gap between what is needed and what is currently provided is large and growing, and that this growing gap stems from a number of factors, all of which should be adequately addressed;
14. Stresses that delayed mobilisation of climate finance will lead to increased costs, rising opportunity costs and diminishing climate returns; notes, in this regard, that the IEA estimates that, for every US dollar not invested in clean energy before 2030, four or five dollars may be needed subsequently to compensate;
15. Stresses that adaptation is underfunded, and that the NCQG does not respond sufficiently to adaptation finance needs; highlights the fact that, while all sources of finance – public and private – are needed, international public finance is needed in particular for responding to adaptation needs and addressing loss and damage;
16. Notes that the EU and its Member States provide roughly one third of global public climate finance, making them the largest providers globally, with EUR 28,6 billion provided from public sources in 2023 and EUR 7,2 billion in private finance also mobilised; reiterates that EU and national budgets should be adapted to meet the agreed NCQG, so that the EU delivers its fair share of international climate finance, including by mobilising private climate finance; considers that the NCQG represents the lower end/boundary for climate finance mobilisation;
17. Recognises that the EU played a significant role in brokering a deal to achieve agreement on the NCQG; calls on all Parties to contribute their fair share towards meeting the NCQG, which should include subgoals for finance for mitigation and adaptation and for loss and damage; calls for the EU and its Member States to scale up new and additional climate finance, through a dedicated and predictable EU public finance mechanism, to be in line with the agreed NCQG; recalls that, in order to achieve the necessary global climate finance levels, a broader contributor base reflecting Parties' evolving financial capabilities is needed; expects upper-middle income countries with high emissions to contribute their fair share and increase their contributions more than currently is the case; calls on all parties to identify new and innovative sources of public and private finance; calls for Parties, when financing the NCQG, to prioritise instruments and measures that are grant-based and non-

debt inducing in order to ensure that the recipient countries are able to implement necessary mitigation and adaptation measures without increasing their debt burden; expresses its concern about the NCQG being met by re-categorising other funds; points also to concerns about the ambiguity around the kinds of funding that contribute to the NCQG, in particular the issue of double-counting;

18. Calls on all actors to ensure that the Baku-to-Belém roadmap provides a clear and actionable plan for mobilising the relevant resources; urges all Parties to foster strong public-private cooperation and mobilise private investment at scale by strengthening regulatory frameworks for accountable and sustainable investment; notes that private investment will have to cover the largest share of the required investment in the global climate transition; stresses the need for the roadmap to include a robust and independent accountability mechanism to ensure transparency and track progress effectively;
19. Notes that many climate-vulnerable countries, including several least-developed countries, are in debt distress or at significant risk of debt distress and that climate finance should therefore be allocated in way that does not exacerbate their debt burden, giving priority to grant-based finance; calls on the Commission and the Member States to assess their options for contributing to alleviating this debt distress and to take relevant action without delay;
20. Stresses that there is consensus across UN bodies that climate finance cannot be scaled up equitably unless the debt crisis is addressed; highlights the importance, in this context, of debt relief instruments;
21. Calls on the Commission, the Member States and international partners to integrate climate microfinance as a core component of climate adaptation and mitigation strategies, by supporting local microfinance institutions to develop and scale up financial products for vulnerable populations, including microcredit for green technologies, micro-insurance against climate risks, and micro-savings for community resilience, with a particular focus on women, young people and rural communities;
22. Stresses the urgent need to simplify, accelerate and adapt climate finance procedures to the realities of developing countries, notably by establishing single-window access points, harmonising application criteria and providing technical assistance for project preparation, to ensure that climate finance is accessible, rapid and effective for local organisations and communities that are most affected by climate change;
23. Considers it essential to make progress at COP30 on the operationalisation of Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement and to

make this a standing point on the COP agendas; calls for the EU to engage in international initiatives such as the Bridgetown Initiative 3.0; calls for swifter reform of the international financial architecture, and calls on all the major international financial institutions and multilateral development banks to assume their role as climate banks and to align their portfolios and lending policies with the Paris Agreement in a way that is financially sustainable in the long term; calls also on domestic and international financial systems to better address the challenges of climate change by removing barriers to accessing climate finance for clean technologies and shifting public and private finance flows away from emission-intensive activities;

24. Considers that the European Investment Bank (EIB) should serve as the Union's climate bank and takes note therefore of its climate bank roadmap and updated energy lending policy, as well as the additional efforts of the European Investment Fund, as important steps in spearheading climate investment;

Adaptation, loss and damage, and a just transition

25. Underlines the need to step up climate adaptation, resilience and preparedness within the EU and globally to minimise the negative effects of climate change and biodiversity loss and to address this comprehensively at the COPs while emphasising the important role of local and regional authorities in designing and implementing these actions; recognises the importance of global cooperation and the exchange of know-how and of the best available science and of best practices in climate adaptation; stresses that the costs of adaptation will increase with inaction and delayed action, in terms of both mitigation and adaptation;
26. Reiterates its deep concern about the increasing intensity and frequency of extreme weather events in the EU and globally, including wildfires, droughts, heatwaves and floods, and their impact on human health and the increasing loss of lives; notes that sea levels are expected to rise more quickly throughout this century in all the IPCC scenarios, incurring financial costs and causing the loss of coastal areas all around the world;
27. Highlights the need, at COP30, to operationalise the framework for the global goal on adaptation, including through adopting impactful and manageable indicators and robust, comprehensive tracking systems and addressing means of implementation in order to enable effective monitoring of progress towards the adaptation targets set at COP28; points out that, while mitigation finance and implementation have progressed, adaptation efforts continue to lag behind, with a widening gap in both funding and concrete action;

28. Highlights the importance of national adaptation plans and stresses the need to align them with the Baku-to-Belém roadmap; calls on Parties that have not yet done so to put in place their national adaptation plans as soon as possible, and on all Parties to have progressed in implementing them by 2030, and to include a focus on nature-based solutions; calls on all Parties to integrate cross-cutting elements such as gender equality and human rights into their plans;
29. Calls for increased investment in early warning systems and risk management systems in vulnerable regions, highlighting their essential role in protecting lives, safeguarding livelihoods and strengthening resilience to climate risks;
30. Encourages greater support for the collection, sharing and analysis of climate and disaster risk data, as well as the deployment of appropriate technologies for these activities, in order to enhance the availability and quality of information for at-risk populations; recommends that all EU-supported early warning initiatives allocate dedicated resources to ongoing system maintenance and updates, especially in the light of global challenges to science-based observation and procedures;
31. Welcomes the decision at COP28 to establish the loss and damage fund and expects further progress on its implementation and financing; calls on all Parties to ensure transparent rules in this regard; stresses the importance of acknowledging the distinct character of loss and damage by treating it separately from adaptation, including in the GST framework;
32. Calls on all Parties to secure transparent pledges and predictable delivery mechanisms for loss and damage finance, including early disbursements from the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage; calls on all Parties to ensure that resources directed to the fund are in addition to existing contributions to climate finance; strongly believes that loss and damage funding should prioritise grants and be supplementary to, and distinct from, official development assistance;
33. Reiterates its call for loss and damage to be a standing agenda item at COP meetings;
34. Calls on all Parties to advance the Just Transition Work Programme by promoting concrete actions that address inequalities exacerbated by climate change; considers that the work programme should encompass the objectives of decent work creation and a just transition for all, and calls on all Parties to promote social dialogue with employers' and workers' organisations and stakeholder engagement as a basis for forging strong social consensus; calls on all Parties to work constructively to reach agreement on further

implementation of the work programme, recognising that the means of implementation must be delivered urgently;

35. Stresses that climate change is threatening the fundamental rights and well-being of children and young people; highlights the need to integrate child rights and intergenerational equity into all aspects of climate policy, including adaptation, mitigation, loss and damage, and climate finance;

EU climate policy aligned with the Paris Agreement

36. Highlights the fact that the EU's current climate legislation, if fully implemented, will reduce the EU's net GHG emissions by around 57 % by 2030 compared to 1990 levels; notes that the EU is currently on course to reduce net GHG emissions by only around 54 % by 2030, compared to 1990 levels, if the Member States fully implement existing and planned national measures and EU policies²³; calls on the Member States to take the necessary measures to address this gap, and on the Commission to take additional measures to support Member States in that effort; stresses the need for EU climate policy to continue to set ambitious goals, in line with the agreed targets, and to prioritise in its actions cost-effectiveness, the competitiveness of the European economy, social inclusion and a high level of environmental protection;
37. Stresses the importance of respecting the submission deadlines for updates to National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) to allow the Commission to conduct a proper review process; welcomes the Commission's assessment of the final 2030 NECPs of the Member States that have submitted them; urges the Commission and the Member States to act decisively to close the gap between the NECPs and the EU's binding targets, including through implementation plans;
38. Underlines the need to adopt a science-based EU climate target for 2040 in accordance with the European Climate Law²⁴, considering all the criteria of Article 4(5) thereof, and in keeping with the conclusions of the first GST; recalls the recommendations of the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change and notes the Commission's proposal of a 2040 climate target accompanied by enabling policies; regrets, furthermore, that the Council was not able

²³ Commission communication of 27 May 2025 entitled 'EU-wide assessment of the final updated national energy and climate plans - Delivering the Union's 2030 energy and climate objectives' (COM(2025)0274).

²⁴ Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 ('European Climate Law') (OJ L 243, 9.7.2021, p. 1, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1119/oj>).

to agree on an NDC for 2035 before the deadline of 23 September 2025; urges the Council to agree on an NDC that is at the upper end of the indicated range as soon as possible;

39. Recalls the need for the EU to remain a leader in international climate negotiations and climate action to contribute to a global level playing field and avoid the risk of carbon leakage for European companies, as well as to maintain public support for climate action and avoid carbon leakage;
40. Underlines the role of the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change (ESABCC), as established by the European Climate Law; calls on the Commission to provide justification, in impact assessment reports or other publicly accessible documents, of deviations from the ESABCC's advice and to address the policy trade-offs; calls on the Commission, moreover, to safeguard sufficient funding for the ESABCC in upcoming budgetary proposals to enable it to fulfil its legal mandate;
41. Reiterates the need to integrate climate ambition into all EU policies and the measures transposing them and underlines that Article 6(2) and 6(4) of the European Climate Law obliges the Commission to assess whether all current measures, draft measures and legislative proposals, including budgetary proposals, are consistent with the EU's climate targets; recalls that, according to the European Climate Law, the EU's and the Member States' actions should be guided by the precautionary and the 'polluter pays' principles established in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and should also take into account the 'energy efficiency first' principle of the Energy union and the 'do no harm' principle;
42. Underlines that effective access to justice in environmental matters, in line with the Aarhus Convention, is critical to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement; believes that the EU and the Member States should lead by example and apply the findings and recommendations of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, while respecting their own international commitments under the Aarhus Convention and the rule of law;
43. Calls on the Member States and the Commission to ensure that the national energy and climate plans and long-term strategies of the Member States include sufficient action and financial means to achieve EU targets for 2030 and beyond; calls on the Member States to increase their efforts to ensure that the EU meets its 2030 targets;
44. Points out that, at a time of rising geopolitical instability and volatile energy markets, decarbonisation is a powerful driver of strategic autonomy and economic competitiveness for the EU; recalls that this is acknowledged in the Clean Industrial Deal and its objective to

bring climate action and competitiveness together in one overarching strategy;

45. Notes with concern that fossil fuel subsidies rose in recent years, with fossil fuel consumption subsidies totalling USD 620 billion globally in 2023 and a substantial share of subsidies observed in emerging and developing economies; regrets that fossil energy subsidies in the EU remained high, at EUR 111 billion in 2023, despite a decrease from 2022 levels; recalls that subsidies for imported fossil energy place a burden on European economies and distort incentives for clean energy transitions; underlines the importance of reducing subsidies for the most polluting fuels at international level and of transparent reporting of those subsidies; reiterates the need for the Commission and the Member States to implement the requirement in the 8th EAP to 'set a deadline for the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies consistent with the ambition of limiting global warming to 1,5 °C'; regrets the lack of progress since the programme's adoption in 2022, and calls on the Commission to put forward its roadmap to further reduce and phase out fossil fuel subsidies, in line with the EU's climate commitments;
46. Stresses that the current geopolitical context underscores the urgent need to end the EU's fossil fuel dependence and accelerate the energy transition; welcomes progress under REPowerEU and calls for the EU and the Member States to act faster;
47. Looks forward to the upcoming EU climate adaptation plan, including legislative action, as appropriate, to ensure coordinated the EU's preparedness to confront increasing climate risks;
48. Calls for the EU to further investigate and address ways it contributes to climate change beyond its borders;

The triple planetary crisis: climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss

49. Underscores that the crises of climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss are interlinked and mutually reinforcing and that the responses to these crises need to be aligned; emphasises the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring biodiversity and ecosystems, including existing carbon-rich ecosystems, and of managing natural resources sustainably to enhance nature-based climate change mitigation and adaptation;
50. Recalls the importance of the land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector in meeting the EU's climate and biodiversity targets; recalls that the Nature Restoration Law is one of the EU's

tools for meeting its targets under the LULUCF Regulation²⁵ and its international biodiversity obligations, notably the Kunming-Montreal GBF;

51. Recalls the importance of environmental policies being designed and implemented in full alignment with the One Health approach, which aims to sustainably balance and optimise the health of people, animals and ecosystems;
52. Stresses the need to support and protect environmental defenders and to hold accountable those who threaten them;
53. Emphasises that soil is the largest terrestrial carbon store and plays an indispensable role in the global climate cycle; welcomes all efforts by governments and non-governmental organisations to maximise the potential of soils to mitigate climate change and improve water availability; underlines, in this regard, the agreement reached at EU level on the Soil Monitoring Law, which serves to improve capacities of the Member States and help the EU meet its international commitments;
54. Stresses the important role of forests in climate action and in climate change mitigation; stresses, in this regard, the importance of global efforts to combat deforestation, as forests provide one of the largest carbon sinks in the world and are essential reservoirs in terms of biodiversity; highlights the urgent need to protect the world's most vital forest territories, such as the Amazon rainforest, including in the EU's outermost regions; reaffirms the EU's commitment to the Glasgow Leaders' Declaration on Forests and Land Use (COP26); calls on all Parties to set targets to increase net removals of CO₂ equivalent through LULUCF activities;
55. Underscores the critical importance of wetlands – including peatlands, mangroves and other coastal and inland wetland ecosystems – as some of the planet's most effective natural carbon sinks; calls on all Parties to urgently scale up efforts to conserve, sustainably manage and restore wetlands as a central strategy for climate mitigation, adaptation, biodiversity protection and the sustainability of related social and economic activities;
56. Highlights the importance of identifying and maximising potential synergies between biodiversity and climate actions, including by prioritising the protection, restoration and management of ecosystems and species important in carbon cycles, as agreed at

²⁵ Regulation (EU) 2018/841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on the inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions and removals from land use, land use change and forestry in the 2030 climate and energy framework, and amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 and Decision No 529/2013/EU (OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, p. 1, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/841/oj>).

COP16 in Cali, Colombia; stresses the importance of implementing the Kunming-Montreal GBF; welcomes, in this regard, the submission of national biodiversity strategies and action plans by 55 Parties and of national targets by 139 Parties and urges all other Parties to swiftly follow suit;

57. Emphasises the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring water and water-related ecosystems; calls for more action on sustainable water usage, including through the use of innovative water technologies, especially in places that are severely impacted by droughts or water scarcity; highlights the devastating environmental, social and economic impacts of desertification, drought, floods and water pollution; welcomes the European water resilience strategy and calls on the Commission and the Member States to swiftly implement it; calls for further action to tackle pollution from per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances; calls for the Commission and the Member States to step up the enforcement of existing laws and ensure compliance with the Water Framework Directive²⁶;
58. Welcomes the adoption of the High Seas Treaty and calls for its swift ratification and implementation by the parties thereto; calls on the Parties to continue working on the Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue; stresses that the global climate system depends on the health of the ocean and marine ecosystems, which is losing its regulatory capacity as a result of global warming, pollution, overexploitation of marine biodiversity, acidification, eutrophication, deoxygenation and coastal erosion;
59. Stresses the importance of global efforts to combat the degradation of marine ecosystems, as the ocean absorbs 30 % of all carbon emissions, captures 90 % of excess heat and supplies over 50 % of the world's oxygen, and is an essential reservoir in terms of biodiversity; welcomes the outcome of the Nice Ocean Week on increased financing commitments for ocean conservation; calls for urgent action to restore marine ecosystems and to ensure the effective protection of marine protected areas; recalls target 3 of the Kunming-Montreal GBF to protect 30 % of seas by 2030;
60. Stresses the need to address the linkages between climate change, air pollution and public health in a comprehensive manner, including at the COP; welcomes the COP28 Declaration on Climate and Health, signed by over 150 governments; calls for air quality improvements to be integrated into climate policies and considered in NDCs; calls on all Parties to accelerate meaningful action contributing to air

²⁶ Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy (OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/60/oj>).

quality; urges the Parties to ensure that climate finance prioritises clean air solutions with measurable benefits for health, equity and climate;

61. Stresses that climate change will contribute to increased antibiotic resistance; reiterates, in this regard, the need for urgent action to tackle antimicrobial resistance and calls for further efforts by all Parties to achieve a reduction in and more prudent use of antimicrobials to combat the risk of resistance; calls, in this regard, for binding commitments in relevant international treaties; regrets the lack of action taken so far;
62. Stresses the need to combat the environmental impact of plastics over their life cycle, including their impact on the climate; stresses the need for adequate carbon pricing of raw materials to significantly reduce fossil fuels in the plastics sector; notes that work on the global plastics treaty is still ongoing and regrets that the parties were again unable to conclude the treaty in Geneva in August 2025 owing to disagreements over its scope; calls for the adoption of an ambitious agreement that addresses all stages of plastic production, consumption and waste management;
63. Regrets the high costs of worldwide chemical pollution, which is worsening the climate and biodiversity crises; calls on the Parties to implement measures to meet the strategic objectives and targets adopted under the UN Global Framework on Chemicals; underlines the need for the EU and its Member States to spearhead global efforts to tackle chemical pollution, including by revising its policies on chemicals, where necessary;

The rights of indigenous peoples

64. Stresses the need to protect the rights and interests of indigenous peoples and local communities as set out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; stresses the need to ensure the right to free, prior and informed consent; stresses that all projects under Article 6 affecting indigenous lands or communities must involve these indigenous peoples and respect their rights;
65. Underlines that indigenous peoples are not just stakeholders or vulnerable groups, but are rights holders recognised under the Preamble to the Paris Agreement; stresses the need for the political participation of indigenous peoples at the COPs and in other UNFCCC processes to promote meaningful engagement in all decision-making bodies; acknowledges the need to fund and facilitate the presence of indigenous peoples at the COPs and subsidiary body technical meetings;
66. Recognises that indigenous lands are biodiversity hotspots and that indigenous peoples play a vital role in conservation and sustainable management of resources; recalls that, according to the fifth

assessment report of the IPCC, indigenous, local and traditional forms of knowledge are a major resource for adapting to climate change; regrets that indigenous knowledge is not being effectively used; underlines in particular the role of this knowledge in avoiding maladaptation;

67. Stresses the need for indigenous peoples to have direct access to climate finance through international climate funds such as the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Fund and the Loss and Damage Fund;

Climate, peace and security

68. Recognises that increased focus has been given to the Climate, Peace and Security agenda at COP meetings, particularly evident at COP29 with the launch of the Baku Call on Climate Action for Peace, Relief and Recovery, and with the previous COP27 Climate Responses for Sustaining Peace Initiative and the COP28 Declaration on Climate, Relief, Recovery and Peace;
69. Notes that the Commission's progress report on the joint communication entitled 'A New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus', published in February 2025, recognises the links between climate change, environmental degradation and issues of peace, security and defence, underscoring their significance for foreign policy;
70. Stresses that climate change and environmental degradation are threat multipliers that can lead to food shortages and scarcities of natural resources, increase tensions in international relations and conflicts over natural resources, and cause natural catastrophes, all of which are major drivers of human displacement and migratory flows;
71. Stresses the need for increased international attention to the environmental impacts of conflicts; highlights the environmental devastation caused by military assaults and operations around the world and urges the cessation of these activities in line with international law; stresses that beyond the immediate destruction and loss of human lives, ongoing conflicts disrupt ecosystems, deplete natural resources, pollute the environment, and jeopardise the health of our planet for generations to come, while undermining climate mitigation and adaptation efforts; underlines in particular the latest UNEP reports on the frightening extent of environmental damage caused by the conflicts in both Ukraine²⁷ and Gaza²⁸;

²⁷ UN Environment Programme, [*The Environmental Impact of the Conflict in Ukraine: A Preliminary Review*](#), 14 October 2022.

²⁸ UN Environment Programme, [*Environmental Impact of the Conflict in Gaza: Preliminary Assessment of Environmental Impacts*](#), 18 June 2024.

recalls, furthermore, the Joint Research Centre report on the environmental damage caused by Russia's ongoing war of aggression in Ukraine²⁹, showing sharp spikes in toxic pollution, soil degradation and disruptions to monitoring systems; believes that entities recognised as being responsible for conflicts by the International Court of Justice must also be held accountable for the climate and environmental costs of war and occupation and post-conflict reconstruction;

72. Stresses that strengthened climate diplomacy under the UNFCCC is key to contributing to reaffirming multilateralism, especially amid rising geopolitical tensions and declining trust in global cooperation; highlights the symbolic significance of COP30 as the 10th anniversary of the Paris Agreement; calls for the EU and its Member States to support the COP30 Presidency in its commitment to multilateralism; highlights that with its presidency of both the BRICS and COP30, Brazil can leverage the opportunity to drive a stronger, more coordinated agenda to deliver progress on economic, political and environmental issues;
73. Stresses that climate goals cannot be achieved without the support and involvement of the public; calls on all Parties to raise awareness and public understanding of climate change and related issues and to work with public representatives to gain public support for mitigation and adaptation measures; is concerned by the increasing spread of climate misinformation and disinformation, including by state actors, and urges all governments to address this as a matter of urgency in view of the threat it poses to both meaningful climate action and democracy; highlights the importance of access to science-based information and of safeguarding independent media; stresses the importance of the work conducted by the IPCC to provide sound scientific advice and data; calls on the UNFCCC to intensify efforts to combat climate disinformation; calls on the Commission to join the Global Initiative for Information Integrity on Climate Change to fight climate disinformation;

Efforts across all sectors

74. Stresses that all sectors must contribute to reducing emissions and to achieving climate neutrality in line with the Paris Agreement;
75. Welcomes the fact that almost 160 countries have become signatories to the Global Methane Pledge; urges those EU Member States that have not yet joined the Pledge to do so before COP30; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take further action to meet the Methane Pledge target; calls on all Parties to adopt specific methane reduction targets and to include these in

²⁹ Joint Research Centre, [Status of Environment and Climate in Ukraine](#), 2025.

their NDCs; calls for a quantified, science-based assessment of the progress made since its adoption at COP26;

76. Recalls that methane has over 80 times the warming power of carbon dioxide during its first 20 years in the atmosphere and stresses therefore the importance of accelerating the reduction in methane; notes with concern the findings of the 2025 IEA report, highlighting the continued rise in methane emissions, the weak implementation of the Global Methane Pledge and the fact that countries are considerably underestimating their energy sector methane pollution, with the IEA estimating that emissions are around 80 % higher than the total reported by governments; recalls that methane emissions from the energy sector remain one of the easiest and most economically beneficial emission categories to abate globally; calls for the EU's support in establishing a methane reduction buyers' club together with other major importers of fossil fuels, inspired by the First Movers Coalition, adopting a common maximum methane intensity value, in line with Regulation (EU) 2024/1787, and thus accelerating the global reduction in methane;
77. Recalls the adopted Regulation (EU) 2024/1787 on the reduction of methane emissions in the energy sector, which will also apply from 1 January 2027 to EU importers of crude oil, natural gas and coal; stresses the critical role of this regulation and its implementation in driving upstream methane abatement, securing investor confidence and setting global standards;
78. Notes with concern that the transport sector is the only sector in which emissions have risen at EU level since 1990 and that a more substantial reduction will be needed to meet the EU's climate goals; stresses the importance of further measures to support the electrification of road transport as a way of reducing road transport emissions, in conjunction with further measures supporting the modal shift, intermodal transport and public transport in general; calls on the Commission to include emissions from international transport in NDCs; is concerned by the fact that the Commission's 2025 NECP assessment report showed that some Member States still have support schemes for fossil-fuel powered vehicles and calls on those Member States to phase them out;
79. Reiterates its call on the Commission to ensure the social fairness of transport decarbonisation measures, including by incorporating emissions from superyachts, private jets and business planes into EU climate policies; reiterates, furthermore, its call on all Parties, including the EU Member States, to take measures to discourage the use of private jets; highlights the disproportionate climate impact of private jets, which are up to 14 times more polluting per passenger than commercial flights; underlines the importance of leading by example and urges all participants attending COP30, including those from the EU institutions, to refrain from using private jets and to

choose the least polluting transport option possible to reach their destination³⁰;

80. Welcomes the progress made at international level to impose carbon levies on international shipping; considers nevertheless that there is still a gap between the agreement reached by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the long-term objectives set by the IMO; highlights the EU emissions trading system (ETS) in this regard, which applies to maritime traffic progressively from 2025 onwards;
81. Calls on the Commission to submit a report to Parliament, once the decarbonisation measures adopted by the IMO at the 83rd session of the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 83) are formally adopted, assessing their overall environmental integrity and their contribution to the objectives of the Paris Agreement, as well as a comparison with the level of environmental integrity provided by the EU ETS provisions;
82. Welcomes the analysis³¹ published by the Commission on 18 March 2025 showing that there is no evidence pointing to an increase in the use of smaller ships outside the scope of the EU ETS or ship-to-ship transfers as a way of circumventing the recent extension of the EU ETS to maritime transport; recalls the EU ETS 2026 review clause providing for the possibility of extending the scope to smaller ships, including offshore ships with a gross tonnage of between 400 and 5 000;
83. Notes that the agricultural sector accounted for 10-12 % of global anthropogenic emissions and 11 % of total EU emissions in 2020; acknowledges the significant potential for GHG emissions reduction in the agricultural sector; stresses that farmers and the agricultural sector are particularly vulnerable to climate change, with climate change posing a significant threat to food security worldwide; stresses that policies to achieve emission reductions in the agricultural sector should do the utmost to guarantee food security; stresses the need to implement a policy framework that incentivises sustainable farming methods and supports farmers, particularly small-scale farmers, in the shift to resilient practices and that rewards farmers who support mitigation efforts and protect biodiversity; highlights the environmental benefits of rewetting drained peatlands, and other measures that promote on-farm biodiversity, soil health and water quality while contributing to climate mitigation and adaptation;

³⁰ European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2024 on the UN Climate Change Conference 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan (COP29), (OJ C, C/2025/808, 11.2.2025, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/808/oj>).

³¹ COM(2025)0110.

84. Welcomes the fact that according to the World Bank, 28 % of global emissions are now covered by carbon pricing³²; regrets, nevertheless, that both the coverage and the average pricing levels remain far too low to meet the goals set in the Paris Agreement; highlights that carbon pricing raises revenues, which should be used for climate action and a just transition;
85. Welcomes the fact that Brazil is introducing an ETS, and that several EU trading partners have introduced or are planning to introduce carbon trading or other carbon pricing mechanisms, including in response to the introduction of CBAM; invites the Commission to further encourage and support other Parties in introducing or improving carbon pricing mechanisms, and to explore links and other forms of cooperation with existing carbon pricing mechanisms outside the EU; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to ensure that any links with the EU ETS will continue to deliver additional and permanent mitigation contributions and will not undermine the EU's domestic GHG emissions commitments;
86. Stresses that the GST highlights the importance of transitioning to sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of consumption and production, including through a more circular economy; stresses the need to intensify efforts to develop and improve the EU's circular economy; urges the Commission to propose a 2030 target as soon as possible, following an impact assessment, for the EU's material and consumption footprints, as per the 8th EAP commitment;
87. Stresses the need to address the climate and environmental impacts of the textile sector, which is responsible for around 8-10 % of global GHG emissions and substantial consumption of resources, particularly water and energy; reiterates that the textile industry needs to play an important role in the shift to a circular economy and that it needs to tackle challenges related to waste prevention, waste management, microplastic shedding, water usage, overproduction, ultra-fast and fast-fashion practices, the overall durability and non-toxicity of the production process, and recyclability in the textile sector; highlights, in this regard, the importance of the recent amendment to the EU Waste Framework Directive; stresses the need to urgently improve human rights standards throughout the textile value chain;
88. Stresses the impact of climate change on the tourism sector, as both a contributor and a vulnerable sector, and the need for destinations to adapt to climate risks and to develop climate-resilient tourism; calls for the promotion of a shift to more sustainable tourism, with environmentally responsible and low-carbon practices;

³² World Bank, *State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2025*, World Bank, Washington DC, May 2025.

89. Notes that there is growing scientific and political interest in solar radiation modification (SRM), a proposed set of climate engineering approaches, such as stratospheric aerosol injection, to artificially reflect sunlight and cool the planet; stresses that SRM does nothing to address the root cause of climate change, that there is no scientific certainty regarding its effects and that it endangers climatic and geopolitical stability, potentially in a catastrophic fashion; recalls that a UN resolution on global governance has been blocked; emphasises that, in the absence of robust scientific evidence regarding safety, effectiveness and governance, any pursuit of climate engineering must be guided by the precautionary principle;
90. Recalls the recommendations of the Group of Chief Scientific Advisors of the Commission published in December 2024 and accordingly calls on the Commission to take a proactive role in negotiating a global governance framework for SRM based on a firm stance of non-deployment, and to strengthen the capability to detect and quantify any undeclared deployment of SRM; further calls on the Commission and the Member States to agree on an EU-wide moratorium on the use of SRM, and to ensure that any potential public funding for responsible scientific research and comprehensive international assessments of the risks, potential effects and impacts of this technology, does not replace public funding for research on adaptation and mitigation;

Climate change and gender

91. Underscores the importance of gender perspectives and inclusive approaches in the UNFCCC process, including the Just Transition Work Programme; calls for all Parties, including the EU and its Member States, to increase efforts to integrate gender equality into their revised NDCs and national adaptation plans and into their climate and environmental policies, in particular those related to mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage; emphasises the need for more concrete actions by all Parties, including the EU and its Member States, to deliver on the commitments under the renewed Gender Action Plan agreed at COP25; urges the Member States and the Commission to increase efforts to achieve the goals set out in the EU Gender Action Plan III;
92. Calls for the development of a new ambitious gender action plan ahead of COP30 that is intersectional, inclusive, measurable, human rights-based and cohesive across all areas of climate action; calls on the Parties to ensure that climate funding becomes gender-responsive and that the gender action plan includes an adequate and dedicated plan for funding; calls on all Parties to support the adoption of a new gender action plan during COP30;

93. Reiterates that adaptive capacity and vulnerability differ across gender, age, ability, racial and occupational lines; calls, therefore, on all Parties to assess, respond to and prioritise the needs of vulnerable populations in their national adaptation plans, adaptation communications and NDCs;
94. Recognises the disproportionate impact of climate change on women and girls, exacerbating existing gender inequalities and posing unique threats to their livelihoods, health and safety; reiterates the need to accelerate action for gender-responsive disaster risk reduction and, therefore, for gender-responsive implementation of the Sendai Framework; calls for further efforts to be made to prioritise and account for gender in disaster preparedness, particularly through the use of disaggregated disaster risk reduction datasets;
95. Considers that women's access to inclusive climate finance must be increased and facilitated, noting that women receive disproportionately less access to financial resources for climate adaptation and mitigation projects; urges the EU and its Member States to report on the gender responsiveness of their climate finance contributions and to enhance the consistency between gender and climate support through external action instruments and the European Investment Bank;
96. Reiterates the importance of increasing women's participation in decision-making in the climate diplomacy context, including in COP delegations and in leadership at all levels of climate action; calls on all Parties to aim for gender parity in their delegations and at all levels of climate change decision-making and negotiations; urges all Parties to nominate a national gender and climate change focal point and to increase the associated resources, training and support, including within the EU;

Participation of stakeholders at COP30

97. Recalls the importance of the full involvement of all Parties in the UNFCCC decision-making processes in the spirit of sincere collaboration, and recognises that protecting space for civil society and local- and regional-level actors to operate and participate in climate governance is fundamental to accountability and transparency; acknowledges that there are many barriers to the participation of civil society organisations at COPs; stresses that civil society and local- and regional-level actors play a vital role in advancing the implementation of NDCs by ensuring actions are effective, locally tailored and responsive to community needs;
98. Calls on the COP30 presidency and future presidencies to better enable the participation of developing countries and delegates from the least developed countries and to allocate additional resources to

this end; encourages Parties to include young people in their delegations to ensure that future generations have an active role in shaping decisions that affect their future; welcomes the creation of the Youth Climate Champion role at COP28 as a step towards the stronger inclusion of young people in the UNFCCC process; calls for COP30 to institutionalise the meaningful participation of children and young people, including through structured dialogue mechanisms and official representation; calls for the increased use of virtual platforms at COPs to enhance global inclusiveness and participation of delegates and civil society representatives;

99. Demands that the organisers of the COPs ensure that human rights, fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of expression, full and unrestricted participation for citizens and civil society organisations, including the right to peaceful assembly and association, and equitable access to this and future COPs are fully enshrined and guaranteed in the Host Country Agreement, which should be made public as soon as possible after signing; calls on the UNFCCC secretariat to monitor compliance and to take action in the event of breaches of such human rights criteria;
100. Believes that the selection of the host city for any future COP meetings should take into account a set of predefined conditions including logistical and organisational capacity, safety and security as well as the environmental, economic and social impacts of the organisation of the event; stresses the importance of the sustainable organisation of COP30; regrets any negative impact that COP30 might have on the local ecosystem and local community of Belém; calls for precautionary measures in order to mitigate those risks;

Conflicts of interest, transparency and integrity

101. Expresses concern that more than 1 770 fossil fuel lobbyists were accredited attendees at COP29; calls for the UNFCCC and the Parties to ensure that the decision-making process is protected from interests that run counter to the goals of the Paris Agreement; urges the UNFCCC to take the lead in proposing an ambitious accountability framework that would protect the UNFCCC's work from undue influence, based on the model contained in the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control with regard to the tobacco industry; urges all Parties to agree, within the framework of this agreement, on a definition of 'conflicts of interest' for the purposes of strengthening disclosure requirements;
102. Calls for accreditation for observers to be made conditional on the submission of a formal declaration of represented interests to a UNFCCC registry, accessible to the public, in order to increase transparency over influence at the COP;

103. Welcomes the fact that the Commission did not provide accreditation for fossil fuel lobbyists to attend COP29 and calls for the continuation of this practice; regrets that 113 fossil fuel lobbyists were accredited by EU Member States at COP29 and calls for all Member States to refrain from providing accreditation to any fossil fuel lobbyists to attend COP30 or any future COP;

Industry, SMEs and competitiveness

104. Views the COP30 as a key milestone 10 years on from the Paris Agreement and underlines that the fight against climate change should be a powerful driver of growth, reduce energy poverty and boost resilience, sustainability and competitiveness of industries and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); calls on policymakers across all Parties to the Convention to implement ambitious, timely and targeted responses within a stable, predictable and supportive transition framework, in accordance with the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR);
105. Stresses that well-designed and implementable enabling policies can ensure that decarbonisation and climate goals go hand in hand with industrial growth, job creation and innovation; recalls that investing in sustainable and clean technologies contributes to environmental and economic and social objectives;
106. Deems it to be of the utmost importance for the EU to ensure a fair transition to climate neutrality by 2050, to maintain public support for climate action and to lead by example, which should ensure a first-mover advantage in clean technologies and sustainable industries; calls for strong and targeted measures to shield EU industry from the risk of carbon leakage and from unfair global competition, ensuring a global level playing field; stresses the urgency of tackling the persistently high energy prices that undermine the EU industry's competitiveness, including through investments in clean and renewable energy, energy efficiency, grids and flexibility;
107. Recognises that the EU's objective of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 while enhancing its competitiveness implies a deep industrial transformation, which requires massive and targeted public and private investments tailored to Member States' and industries' varying circumstances and scaling up support for clean technologies, innovation, skills and infrastructure; underlines that investing in industrial value chains for clean technologies is also key to reindustrialising the EU and boosting strategic autonomy;
108. Urges support for EU industrial companies, including SMEs and small mid-caps (SMCs), to preserve their global leadership, while they decarbonise and transition towards a net-zero economy; underlines the need to provide effective solutions to support them in

this transition phase in order to foster their innovation capacity and ensure competitiveness, to provide them with predictable and simplified administrative procedures, for example online permitting processes and access to finance, and to facilitate their participation in public procurement;

109. Calls for accelerated decarbonisation alongside strengthened competitiveness; welcomes the Net-Zero Industry Act³³, the Clean Industrial Deal³⁴ and the Action Plan for Affordable Energy³⁵ as key steps towards a resilient and climate-neutral economy, and the forthcoming Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act; welcomes the expanded EU Innovation Fund that supports the scaling up of new innovations and technologies in Europe aimed at decarbonisation and supply chain development;
110. Supports carbon management as part of industrial emission mitigation measures and underlines the key role played by carbon capture, utilisation and storage in the decarbonisation of hard-to-abate industrial emissions, and the production of low-carbon products including low-carbon hydrogen; recalls the industrial carbon management strategy³⁶ to expand CO₂ capture, storage, use and removal; welcomes advancements to establish a global carbon market, which should help the decarbonisation of industries globally and ensure a level playing field for companies worldwide; recalls, in this regard, its position on the EU ETS and the CBAM³⁷, welcoming the proposed simplification of the CBAM in the first omnibus package as an important step to further enhance its effectiveness in addressing carbon leakage and calling for a workable export solution to address the risk of carbon leakage for CBAM goods exported from the EU to non-EU countries;
111. Urges improved access to finance for European industrial companies to decarbonise in line with the Paris Agreement; highlights the need for adequate financial resources to support decarbonisation under the next multiannual financial framework, including through specific

³³ Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085).

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘Action Plan for Affordable Energy’ (COM(2025)0079).

³⁶ Commission communication of 6 February 2024 entitled ‘Towards an ambitious Industrial Carbon Management for the EU’ (COM(2024)0062).

³⁷ European Parliament resolution of 3 April 2025 on energy-intensive industries (OJ C, C/2025/4369, 9.9.2025, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/4369/oj>); European Parliament resolution of 19 June 2025 on the Clean Industrial Deal, Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0137.

funding instruments that effectively address the financing needs of European industries;

112. Recognises the essential role of SMEs and SMCs, in particular microenterprises and start-ups, in driving and delivering on innovation, job creation and economic growth as well as in leading the way in the digital and green transitions through innovation and cutting-edge technological solutions; stresses the need for predictable rules and better access to finance in this regard;
113. Emphasises the need for all Parties to continuously have secure and competitive access to critical raw materials, including secondary ones; welcomes the Critical Raw Materials Act³⁸ and the Commission's intention to propose a new Circular Economy Act and calls for diversified supply chains with EU-equivalent standards; believes that a predictable regulatory framework is needed that unlocks circular business models, particularly those based on waste prevention, reuse and high-quality recycling to ensure access to critical raw materials;
114. Highlights the urgency of re/upskilling the workforce, with investments in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and net-zero skills academies, to close labour shortage and skills gaps in decarbonising the European industry; calls for collaboration with social partners to address skills gaps and future labour demands in clean technologies;

Energy policy

115. Stresses the importance of phasing out fossil fuels as soon as possible while reiterating the need to develop measures to ensure gas supply at a mitigated cost for sectors that cannot rely substantially on electrification in the short to medium term; notes that, while putting effort into achieving a global consensus on such a phase-out at COP30, the EU should continue to reduce its dependency on fossil fuels, increase the diversity of its energy suppliers, and develop an energy efficient and decarbonised economy, in order to boost its energy security and industrial competitiveness, and provide access to affordable energy for households and businesses; calls for the EU to urgently end imports of Russian fossil fuels, including natural gas, which subsidise Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine; welcomes, in this regard, the recent REPowerEU roadmap on ending Russian energy

³⁸ Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 (OJ L, 2024/1252, 3.5.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj>).

imports³⁹; calls on the G7 countries to lead by example in the energy transition, and calls on all COP Parties to decarbonise their energy systems and halt all new investments in fossil fuel extraction;

116. Highlights the untapped potential of geothermal energy in achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement and the EU's energy policy, in particular for heating and industrial process heat; urges the sharing of best practice, innovations and technologies;
117. Recalls the key outcomes of the first global stocktake under the UAE Consensus at COP28, including a tripling of renewables and doubling energy efficiency by 2030 as well as accelerating clean energy investments; welcomes the fact that 2023 was a record year for renewable electricity capacity growth⁴⁰ and calls for continuous progress monitoring and tracking, at both EU and global level; notes, with concern, that current investment trends are not aligned with the levels necessary for the world to achieve those goals⁴¹ and stresses that closing this gap requires policy action and stronger public-private coordination;
118. Highlights the importance of a global reduction in methane emissions in fossil fuel supply chains during the transition to clean energy systems in order to reach a global reduction of 75 % in methane emissions by 2030 as reflected in the IEA's Net Zero Emissions by 2050 scenario; calls on the Global Methane Pledge signatories to step up their efforts, as current reduction rates remain insufficient⁴² and global emissions continue to exceed 120 million metric tonnes annually; welcomes the Methane Abatement Partnership Roadmap, launched by the Commission at COP29, and urges its swift implementation, including by showcasing successful examples at COP30;
119. Supports a global goal to increase energy storage capacity sixfold to 1 500 GW by 2030 and more broadly to increase system flexibility in line with G7 targets; stresses the need for innovation in GHG-reducing technologies; warns that climate change disrupts energy systems, including hydropower and thermal plant efficiency; underlines the need for non-fossil flexibility and storage development to better integrate and manage renewables;

³⁹ Communication from the Commission of 12 May 2025 entitled 'Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports' (COM(2025)0440).

⁴⁰ IEA, 'Renewables', <https://www.iea.org/energy-system/renewables#tracking>.

⁴¹ IEA, *World Energy Investment 2024: Overview and key findings*, 2024.

⁴² IEA, 'Tracking pledges, targets and action', <https://www.iea.org/reports/global-methane-tracker-2024/tracking-pledges-targets-and-action>.

120. Highlights the in-depth revision of the EU's energy legislation under the 'Fit for 55' package, which has aligned it with the EU's increased GHG emission reduction target of at least 55 % by 2030 in order to reach climate neutrality at the latest by 2050 and which must now be effectively implemented; believes that other Parties should follow similar and relevant efforts;
121. Emphasises the role of clean energy and renewables, energy efficiency and system diversification in achieving climate neutrality; welcomes, in this regard, the recent reform of the EU's Electricity Market Design⁴³, which aims to boost renewables generation and empower and protect consumers; believes that further action is needed to implement the electricity market design rules; underlines the necessity of adopting pragmatic, clear and enabling conditions for the ramp up of low-carbon and renewable hydrogen so as to advance the energy transition, particularly in hard-to-abate sectors;
122. Recalls the EU's commitment to the energy efficiency first principle, which takes into account cost efficiency, system efficiency, storage capacity, demand-side flexibility and security of supply; stresses its role in reducing emissions, lowering energy bills, improving energy security and protecting vulnerable consumers;
123. Emphasises the need for large-scale public and private investments in the EU's energy grid and related infrastructure to allow for their modernisation, including digitalisation and expansion, including cross-border interconnection, and the further flexible integration of clean and renewable energy sources, efficiency measures and storage solutions to provide clean, sufficient, secure and affordable energy to EU citizens and industry; underlines, in particular, the need for an upgrade to the EU's electricity grid as part of the upcoming European Grids Package;
124. Stresses the need for global coordination with and support to developing countries and least developed countries to reach net-zero emissions and build capacity through cross-border cooperation in the fields of policymaking and science and technology transfer;
125. Stresses that partnerships with reliable non-EU countries on the external dimensions of energy policies must be fostered; notes the EU's efforts to build energy alliances through a sustainable development perspective, including by taking into account the interests of their populations and local communities;

⁴³ Directive (EU) 2024/1711 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Directives (EU) 2018/2001 and (EU) 2019/944 as regards improving the Union's electricity market design, (OJ L, 2024/1711, 26.6.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1711/oj>).

126. Notes the Declaration⁴⁴ to triple global nuclear energy capacity by 2050, which was launched at COP28 and has been signed as of COP29 by 31 countries, including 12 EU Member States and Ukraine; recalls, in this regard, the launch of the nuclear alliance put forward by several EU Member States and the European Industrial Alliance on Small Modular Reactors;
127. Highlights the central role of local communities and citizens in a just and inclusive energy transition; highlights the EU legal framework enabling energy communities and its potential as a model for international partners;

Research, innovation, digital technologies and space policy

128. Recognises the importance of the Copernicus programme and the EU Knowledge Centre on Earth Observation in climate action and observation; emphasises the importance of satellite monitoring for climate policy, including tracking methane emissions, forests and carbon sinks; calls for joint research on space and climate technologies, stronger public-private partnerships, and increased investment in the EU space economy for strategic autonomy;
129. Stresses the critical role of research and innovation (R&I) in achieving the Paris Agreement and Green Deal goals; regrets the EU's continued shortfall in meeting its 3 % GDP research and development (R&D) investment target and calls for strategies to boost industrial R&D;
130. Welcomes the role of the Horizon Europe programme and its partnerships, such as the Joint Undertakings and the Knowledge and Innovation Communities of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology, in driving public-private collaboration towards climate neutrality, ensuring sustainable, accessible and affordable innovation;
131. Stresses that the EU must collaborate on research focusing on technology, industry and innovative science, which helps make important contributions to the Paris Agreement and calls for the quick delivery of the new Strategy for European Life Sciences and the review of the Bioeconomy Strategy; welcomes the 'Choose Europe for Science' initiative, which improves funding opportunities for research in the EU; calls on the Commission to foster strategic research partnerships to enable a level playing field in Europe; supports further action to secure long-term accessibility to climate-related data for the international research community;
132. Underlines the key role of digitalisation in energy integration, market connectivity and emissions reduction; emphasises the importance of digital technologies and AI-based tools in achieving

⁴⁴ [Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy](#), December 2023.

the clean industrial transformation as they offer opportunities in, inter alia, electrification, flexibility and energy efficiency; looks forward to the EU's strategic roadmap for digitalisation and AI in the energy sector; is concerned by the information and communications technology sector's carbon footprint and calls for sustainable practices in data centres; recalls the objective of the EU's digital strategy to deliver climate-neutral and highly energy efficient data centres and electronic communication networks and services by 2030;

Role of the European Parliament at COP30

133. Believes that Parliament should be an integral part of the EU delegation at COP30, given that it must give its consent to international agreements and plays a central role in the domestic implementation of the Paris Agreement as one of the EU's co-legislators; expects, therefore, to be allowed to attend EU coordination meetings at COP30 in Belém and to be guaranteed access to all preparatory documents in good time; commits to act independently and free from conflicts of interest;

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134. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Secretariat of the UNFCCC, with the request that it be circulated to all non-EU Parties to that convention.