



TEXTS ADOPTED

P10_TA(2025)0335

Military mobility

European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2025 on military mobility (2025/2090(INI))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Titles VI and XVI thereof,
- having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Title V thereof,
- having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1153 and (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013¹,
- having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014²,
- having regard to the conclusions of the European Council, particularly those of 26 June 2025, 6 March 2025, 21 and 22 March 2024, 14 and 15 December 2023, 29 and 30 June 2023, 15 December 2022 and 30 and 31 May 2022,
- having regard to the conclusions of the Council, particularly those of 6 December 2024, 18 November 2024, 13 June 2024, 27 May 2024, 24 October 2023, 24 January 2022 and 22 January 2018,
- having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and

¹ OJ L, 2024/1679, 28.6.2024, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1679/oj>.

² OJ L 249, 14.7.2021, p. 38, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1153/oj>.

Security Policy of 10 November 2017 entitled 'Improving Military Mobility in the European Union' (JOIN(2017)0041),

- having regard to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1328 of 10 August 2021 specifying the infrastructure requirements applicable to certain categories of dual-use infrastructure actions pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council³,
- having regard to the joint report from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 24 September 2021 on the implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility from October 2020 to September 2021 (JOIN(2021)0026),
- having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security adopted by the Council on 21 March 2022,
- having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2022 entitled 'Action plan on military mobility 2.0' (JOIN(2022)0048),
- having regard to the joint report from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 13 November 2023 on the implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0 from November 2022 to October 2023 (JOIN(2023)0037),
- having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 28 May 2025 on The European Union's strategic approach to the Black Sea region (JOIN(2025)0135),
- having regard to the Commission support study on the climate adaptation and cross-border investment needs to realise the TEN-T network, published in 2024,
- having regard to the joint report from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 March 2025 on the implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0 (JOIN(2025)0011),
- having regard to the joint white paper from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security

³ OJ L 288, 11.8.2021, p. 37, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2021/1328/oj.

Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled 'for European Defence Readiness 2030' (JOIN(2025)0120),

- having regard to the revised Annex II to the Military Requirements for Military Mobility within and beyond the Union as adopted by the Council on 18 March 2025 (ST 6728/25 ADD1),
- having regard to the annual reports from 2022, 2023 and 2024 of the European Defence Agency, as well as its reports on military mobility from March 2018 and 26 January 2024,
- having regard to European Court of Auditors special report 04/2025 of 5 February 2025 entitled 'EU military mobility - Full speed not reached due to design weaknesses and obstacles en route',
- having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled 'Safer Together: Strengthening Europe's Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness',
- having regard to the statement on military mobility issued by the transport ministers of Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia on 27 May 2025,
- having regard to the tenth progress report of 10 June 2025 on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2018,
- having regard to the Vilnius Summit Communiqué issued by NATO heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius on 11 July 2023, and the Washington Summit Declaration issued by the NATO heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the NATO North Atlantic Council in Washington on 10 July 2024,
- having regard to the three joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed by the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission as well as the NATO Secretary General on 10 January 2023, 5 December 2018 and 6 December 2016, respectively,
- having regard to the Commission proposal of 19 March 2025 for a Council regulation establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the reinforcement of the European defence industry Instrument (COM(2025)0122),
- having regard to the Commission proposal of 1 April 2025 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1058 and (EU) 2021/1056 as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges in the context of the mid-term review (COM(2025)0123),

- having regard to the Commission proposal of 22 April 2025, for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697, (EU) 2021/1153, (EU) 2023/1525 and 2024/795, as regards incentivising defence-related investments in the EU budget to implement the ReArm Europe Plan (COM(2025)0188),
 - having regard to its resolution of 2 April 2025 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2024⁴,
 - having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence⁵,
 - having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on building a comprehensive European port strategy⁶,
 - having regard to its resolution of 5 May 2022 on the impact of the Russian illegal war of aggression against Ukraine on the EU transport and tourism sectors⁷,
 - having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on EU-NATO cooperation in the context of transatlantic relations⁸,
 - having regard to its resolution of 11 December 2018 on military mobility⁹,
 - having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,
 - having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Security and Defence and the Committee on Transport and Tourism under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,
 - having regard to the report of the Committee on Security and Defence and the Committee on Transport and Tourism (A10-0242/2025),
- A. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has drawn renewed attention to military mobility, highlighting the urgent need to facilitate the rapid cross-border movement of troops, equipment and assets throughout the EU in order to strengthen deterrence and defence;
- B. whereas instabilities and changing geopolitical crises in different regions of the world require the EU and its Member States, in

⁴ Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0058.

⁵ Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0034.

⁶ OJ C, C/2024/5716, 17.10.2024, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5716/oj>.

⁷ OJ C 465, 6.12.2022, p. 164.

⁸ OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 105.

⁹ OJ C 388, 13.11.2020, p. 22.

coordination with NATO, to be ready to respond to potential acts of aggression or different types of crises along all their external borders;

- C. whereas Member States that share external borders with Russia or Belarus, as well as those bordering Ukraine, and experiencing Russia's incursions into their airspace, are under a direct security threat, especially as Western security services warn that Russia could attack the EU in the short term;
- D. whereas military mobility is an essential enabler for common European security and defence and was identified as a critical enabler in the 2023 EU capability development priorities (CDP);
- E. whereas the resilience, deterrence and speed of military movements in Europe have now become an essential condition for the credibility of European defence; whereas military mobility in the EU significantly strengthens the security and resilience of the 27 Member States, including against increasing acts of sabotage against critical infrastructure and the rise of hybrid threats, provided that it is fully enabled to deliver its potential;
- F. whereas significant efforts are needed to improve regional transport links and enhance the pan-European network, connecting EU countries from Finland and the Baltic States in the north to the Iberian Peninsula in the south; whereas the development of coherent military mobility infrastructure in the four EU priority military mobility corridors would be essential for deploying and supplying troops and military equipment at short notice and on a large scale by rail, road, waterways, sea and air, when and where needed, while ensuring its dual-use functionality to keep essential civil supply chains functioning;
- G. whereas military mobility is a priority for EU-NATO cooperation and must enable, by an aligned approach, the movement of allied forces both in times of peace, crisis or war; whereas enhancing interoperability within the EU, with NATO and with partners such as Ukraine, is vital for collective defence; whereas, in order to achieve the strategic objectives of the EU-NATO partnership, strong leadership and coordinated governance are necessary to transform technical cooperation into a shared strategic vision, thereby strengthening mobility as a tool for cohesion and collective security;
- H. whereas Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) plays a key role in enhancing and aligning the EU's defence capabilities, reducing dependencies regarding strategic enablers such as military mobility;
- I. whereas the EU is working to promote connectivity with regional partners and candidate countries;

- J. whereas the EU's defence industrial base suffers vulnerabilities, including an over-reliance on non-EU imports, fragmented production and supply, under-investment and limited production capacity; whereas the European economic security strategy emphasises the importance of reducing strategic dependencies and protecting critical technologies and assets to safeguard EU sovereignty and competitiveness;
- K. whereas the European Council conclusions of 6 March 2025 underlined that the Union must 'become more sovereign, more responsible for its own defence and better equipped to act and deal autonomously with immediate and future challenges and threats', thus reaffirming the need to reduce external dependencies and consolidate the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB);
- L. whereas the SAFE initiative, adopted by the Council on 27 May 2025, provides for up to EUR 150 billion in support of joint procurement, industrial ramp-up and defence-related production within the EU, thereby creating a strategic opportunity to bring the European preference principle into operation and to ensure that EU funds strengthen European industry rather than reinforce external dependencies;
- M. whereas the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act¹⁰ (EDIRPA) and the EU Defence Industrial Programme (EDIP) can play an important role in supporting the development of innovative technologies and capabilities relevant to military mobility; stresses that synergies between EDIP, EDIRPA, the Connecting Europe Facility, and other EU funding instruments should be fully exploited in order to strengthen the resilience of transport infrastructure and enhance the EU's overall capacity for swift and secure military movement;
- N. whereas robust investment screening contributes to the EU's economic security, protects critical infrastructure and technologies from hostile acquisitions, and complements industrial policies aimed at fostering European autonomy and technological leadership; whereas the revision of the Regulation (EU) 2019/452¹¹ on the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union is a key

¹⁰ Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA) (OJ L, 2023/2418, 26.10.2023, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2418/oj>).

¹¹ Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (OJ L 79 I, 21.3.2019, p. 1, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/452/oj>).

instrument for safeguarding the EU's security, public order and strategic interests;

- O. whereas Parliament adopted its position on the proposed regulation¹², emphasising that all Member States should be required to maintain a screening mechanism for foreign investments on grounds of security or public order, and that stronger harmonisation is required across national systems to address strategic dependencies and emerging technological and infrastructure vulnerabilities;
- P. whereas despite significant progress in recent years to enhance military mobility through the implementation of the actions set out in the Action plan on military mobility 2.0, considerable regulatory, administrative, and financial barriers, as well as bottlenecks and infrastructure obstacles remain;
- Q. whereas there is an urgent need to intensify coordinated and integrated efforts at EU, NATO and Member State levels to increase resources and address those physical, legal and regulatory barriers;
- R. whereas internal audits and recent experience show serious shortcomings in the EU's military mobility policy, with delays from bureaucratic red tape and inadequate infrastructure meaning it could potentially take more than one month to move military equipment across borders in response to an attack;
- S. whereas many European transport routes are not yet fit for heavy military vehicles; whereas tanks have been barred from entering certain Member States because they exceed the national weight limit, and convoys have been halted at bridges not designed for such loads, highlighting the urgent need to upgrade key infrastructure such as rail lines, roads, tunnels and bridges to meet military standards;
- T. whereas investments in improving the existing dual-use air, rail, road and waterways infrastructure bring sizable benefits to communities and businesses in times of peace as well as benefiting passenger and freight transport systems and contributing to the decarbonisation of transport, the completion of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), civil protection capabilities, and the strengthening of the single market;
- U. whereas transport operators play an important role in military mobility; whereas non-harmonised procedures, however, often cause severe delays in transport operations and the issuance of cross-border permits;

¹² Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0102.

Responding to changing geopolitical realities

1. Underlines the importance of military mobility for European security and defence; stresses that addressing the EU's strategic deficiencies and the need for enhanced military mobility has become more urgent in the light of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine;
2. Welcomes the ambition of the EU and the Member States to substantially increase their defence readiness, reduce strategic dependencies, address capability gaps and strengthen the European defence technological and industrial base in the framework of relevant EU policies and the common security and defence policy (CSDP), and in the context of NATO; welcomes EU-NATO cooperation on enhancing military mobility; considers, nevertheless, that the time has come to urgently turn stated EU-NATO common objectives into real progress;
3. Commends the collective efforts to support Ukraine; insists on the need to systematically draw lessons from Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine including on military mobility, in particular based on the experience of the Ukrainian armed forces, and also from national and multinational exercises; underlines the importance of ensuring logistical contingencies and back-up planning as well as of identifying weak and missing links; stresses the importance of early and effective coordination with strategic partners, particularly with NATO;
4. Stresses that Russia poses a considerable threat to the security of the European Union, and that developing the capability for fast deployment of troops and military capabilities to the EU's eastern flank is of the essence;
5. Underlines the strategic need for investments in all Member States along the four EU priority military mobility corridors – the Northern, Eastern, Central Southern and Central Northern Corridors – as enhanced and effective military mobility is essential to the security of all Member States and all European citizens;
6. Highlights that enhanced military mobility will reinforce the EU CSDP and its missions and operations; calls for the EU and the Member States to adopt a common vision on how to move their actions on military mobility forward, and to formulate specific deliverables which should be integrated into the EU Strategic Compass; urges concrete preparedness on military mobility by moving towards a comprehensive approach to military logistics, including security of critical infrastructure, transport hubs, maintenance, storage, refuelling, repair and ammunition;
7. Stresses that military mobility is not limited to the movement of troops, weapons and equipment, but also concerns humanitarian aid and actions of solidarity; underlines that support for military mobility

can also bring significant benefits to citizens, since the ability to rapidly deploy military forces may facilitate faster delivery of humanitarian aid and medical support, as well as the repair of infrastructure in the event of natural disasters, pandemics or other crises; stresses, furthermore, that EU investments in military mobility infrastructure may generate tangible benefits for local communities and for connectivity, thereby increasing local resilience, economic integration, job creation and public support for the European security agenda;

Tackling financial issues

8. Stresses that a centrally managed and dedicated EU transport funding instrument such as the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) must be continued in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) as the main source for robust military mobility funding, and its overall budget for transport must be significantly increased; welcomes, therefore, the proposal for an increased budget for military mobility in the forthcoming MFF, which allocates over EUR 50 billion for transport under the CEF for 2028-2034, including over EUR 17 billion for military mobility;
9. Recalls the Council's unprecedented cut of 75 % to military mobility funding under the 2021-2027 MFF, as compared to the position of Parliament and the Commission, and stresses that such a situation cannot be repeated; underlines that due to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the military mobility budget had to be frontloaded and was entirely consumed by the beginning of 2024; insists that the resources allocated to military mobility within the next MFF be drastically increased to bring them into line with the estimated investment need of at least EUR 100 billion for addressing the 500 hotspots identified in the EU as needing urgent upgrading¹³;
10. Insists, taking this investment need as well as the recommendations of the Draghi report into consideration, on the importance of at least preserving the indicated amount of EUR 17 billion in the subsequent negotiations on the overall MFF ceiling, while protecting the allocation for the achievement of the TEN-T; stresses that the Council must not make any proposal to cut the amount of this funding and believes that the channelling of these funds towards military mobility will need to be closely monitored;
11. Stresses the need to successfully foster cooperation and alignment among the Member States on cross-border and large-scale transport projects and the deployment of dual-use infrastructure to enable the

¹³ Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 October 2025 entitled 'Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030', JOIN(2025)0027).

swift and efficient large-scale mobilisation and movement of military troops, equipment and assets across the whole of the EU;

12. Reiterates that military mobility initiatives and funding should not hinder the overall implementation of actions relating to the completion of a smart, resilient, interoperable, decarbonised and sustainable TEN-T; recalls the objective of completing the TEN-T core network by 2030, including the deployment of the European rail traffic management system (ERTMS), and the extended core network by 2040;
13. Emphasises that the timely completion of cross-border transport infrastructure projects within the TEN-T network is an indispensable objective for achieving effective dual-use and military mobility objectives in Europe; recalls that according to the TEN-T coordinators' position paper of April 2024, the total investment needed to complete the core and extended core TEN-T network is EUR 845 billion over the next 15 years, and that for projects with the highest EU added value alone, the remaining amount to be invested is estimated to be at least EUR 210 billion;
14. Recalls that the implementation of large transport infrastructure projects crucial to military mobility requires long-term funding owing to the nature of the actions to be undertaken;
15. Highlights the need to streamline and simplify procedures for obtaining funding for dual-use infrastructure projects within the military mobility framework of the CEF in the forthcoming MFF;
16. Welcomes the starting loans of the European Investment Bank (EIB) for investment in dual-use infrastructure projects to enhance military mobility; calls for the sustained implication of the EIB to contribute to the financing of other dual-use infrastructure projects and capabilities;
17. Encourages the development of additional financial mechanisms to be explored, such as a Defence, Security and Resilience Bank, to address the funding needs of security, defence and resilience;
18. Recalls that Member States may use the maximum funding available under the current MFF, including the recently introduced measures to re-allocate resources in the European Regional Development Fund and in the Cohesion Fund, as well as quickly redirect unused Recovery and Resilience Facility funds towards investments in defence, including dual-use infrastructure and mobile assets to foster military mobility, including military counter-mobility;
19. Calls for assurances that the dedicated budgets under EDIP, the European Defence Fund, the SAFE programme and the measures adopted under the Defence Readiness Omnibus package and other EU defence initiatives can be used to support the expansion and

upgrading of both physical and digital dual-use infrastructure and the collaborative and predictable acquisition of enabling capabilities for defence, including on military mobility, to strengthen a genuine European Defence Union;

Removing obstacles to military mobility and moving towards a 'military Schengen area'

20. Reiterates calls for a 'military Schengen area' and encourages the Commission to provide a roadmap towards this objective with no further delay;
21. Reiterates its profound concern about the current lack of responsiveness and efficiency in military mobility, which is hampered by regulatory and procedural complexity and lack of harmonisation resulting in slow coordination and time loss;
22. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to embed a 'whole-of-society' approach towards military mobility, involving all relevant stakeholders, including the public, private and civil sectors, by communicating and explaining measures taken;
23. Demands that the Commission and the Member States fully implement, as a matter of urgency, the 13 commitments taken under the Military Mobility Pledge 2024, focusing on investments in transport infrastructure and transport assets, regulatory harmonisation, accelerating cross-border movement permissions and enhancing the CSDP and EU-NATO cooperation;
24. Urges the Commission to take a horizontal approach when proposing further actions by harmonising and simplifying regulations and procedures with the urgent aim of integrating and coordinating the EU's approach to removing all existing administrative, diplomatic, logistical and infrastructure barriers to military mobility;
25. Calls for the establishment of a European digital one-stop shop for the issuance of cross-border movement authorisations for military equipment, including a codified priority system and a database shared with NATO;
26. Highlights the need to streamline complex, lengthy and divergent national rules and procedures; insists that the upcoming military mobility package proposes simplified, harmonised, uniform and digitalised procedures across all transport modes, including on customs, transport of dangerous goods, abnormal transport, diplomatic clearances and the use of identical permits, such as for cross-border movement bids/credits and EU/NATO form 302 documentation, which should be recognised and used by all Member States; further calls for the development of a military customs system to digitalise customs formalities and reduce administrative

burden and cost, with respect to the existing EU projects such as the Secure Digital Military Mobility System;

27. Underlines the importance of removing the administrative barriers and infrastructural obstacles faced by companies that operate abnormal road transport for military equipment and cranes for critical infrastructure projects; calls, therefore, for further harmonisation of the rules on abnormal road transport within the framework of the ongoing revision of the Weights and Dimensions Directive;
28. Underlines that the provision of war risk insurance coverage for high-risk logistics providers can serve as an incentive for companies, as it contributes to mitigating operational risks;
29. Stresses that the harmonisation of procedures and effective interoperability will strengthen mutual trust among Member States and boost cross-border connectivity;
30. Welcomes the objective of simplifying the legal and administrative frameworks as proposed in the Defence Readiness Omnibus package and the upcoming Joint Communication on Military Mobility 2025 and calls for its swift entry into force and implementation;

Crisis framework

31. Urges the Commission to present a legal and operational framework addressing 'crisis situations', clearly distinguishing at least three 'phases', such as 'peacetime', 'crisis' and 'wartime', and including rules for each phase in order to ensure interoperability and priority access for armed forces to transport facilities, networks and assets, with streamlined movement for military personnel and equipment throughout and across military corridors; asks for this framework to provide clear definitions for 'fall-back situations' and 'fall-back solutions' to guarantee continuity of military transport in case of disruption, as well as guidance to Member States in mandating different security providers with the surveillance and protection of critical infrastructure;
32. Expects that the forthcoming legal framework will establish an efficient and clear communication and coordination system between military and public authorities, including NATO, to also exchange information, on a need to know basis, with infrastructure managers and transport operators qualified to provide military logistic services in order to foster resilience across entire networks for each phase; notes, in particular the lack of cooperation and limited communication between port authorities and military or relevant defence building actors; understands the sensitivity of information sharing practices, especially with foreign-owned European port authorities; stresses, however, that a reliable and secure channel for specific information exchange is necessary;

33. Highlights the need for the establishment of a permanent decision-making mechanism enabling heads of state and government to take immediate action in 'crisis' and 'wartime' phases;
34. Calls on the Commission to establish a military mobility taskforce with representatives of all competent EU bodies to streamline the preparation, implementation and monitoring of all initiatives concerning military mobility in a horizontal manner, and, in parallel, calls for the designation of national contact points to improve overall governance and coordination of military mobility;
35. Urges the Commission to take into account all the recommendations made by the European Court of Auditors regarding governance in all future initiatives within the domain of military mobility;
36. Recognises the crucial role of transport workers in military mobility and in facilitating supply chains; calls on the Commission and the Member States to tackle labour shortages, to invest in the transport workforce, to improve working conditions, training opportunities to equip workers with the skills required for military mobility and the attractiveness of the sector;

Improving and constructing new dual-use infrastructure

37. Welcomes the adoption by the Council of the four priority military mobility corridors in the EU for short-notice and large-scale movements, created in cooperation with NATO, and the ongoing identification of 500 hotspots which need urgent upgrading; highlights that more than 94 % of these corridors are a part of the TEN-T, underlining the strong synergies between civilian and military infrastructure; calls for a precise evaluation of the financial needs to complete these military mobility corridors;
38. Underlines the need to accelerate transport infrastructure development and to enhance both the physical and cyber protection of its critical components along the four priority military mobility corridors;
39. Highlights that the weakest links and bottlenecks have knock-on effects on the functioning and effective continuity of entire corridors and the transport network as a whole; calls on the Commission and the Member States, therefore, to allocate adequate resources to ensuring a well-connected military mobility network, including improvements in the maintenance, modernisation and interoperability of existing infrastructure;
40. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to assess the need to appoint a dedicated European coordinator for each priority military mobility corridor to facilitate their implementation, as members of the military mobility taskforce;

41. Recalls that counter-mobility infrastructure, including dual-use obstacles, fortifications and rapid deployment systems to reinforce border and territorial defence, also forms an important part of military mobility; calls on the Commission and the Member States to carry out thorough coordinated planning and preparation for counter-mobility infrastructure in the four priority corridors of military mobility, prioritising the Eastern and Northern Corridors;
42. Recalls that railways are the backbone of the land-based mobility system to move large quantities of oversized, heavy, hazardous and dangerous military assets; insists that priority should be given to immediate and short-term solutions, such as removing administrative burdens for military personnel for cross-border movement; calls on the Commission to ensure increased capacity building, especially in transport hubs and key areas in line with the four priority military mobility corridors;
43. Underlines the crucial role played by rail interoperability in ensuring seamless operations across the Member States; expresses its strong concern about the persistent lack of rail interoperability caused by differences in track gauges within the EU, such as those in the Baltic states, Finland and the Iberian peninsula, which affects cross-border movements of troops, equipment and assets, making road transport indispensable; asks the Commission to continue addressing the various obstacles to seamless rail operations across the EU, inter alia the slow rollout of ERTMS and digital automatic coupling (DAC), and differences in track gauge; recalls the requirement of the TEN-T regulation for the Member States concerned to present their plans by July 2026 for the migration of their networks to the European standard nominal track gauge; welcomes, in that regard, the Rail Baltica project, connecting the Baltic states to the EU's railway network by adapting their track gauges; considers this project strategic for both civilian and military mobility, as it provides interoperable, sustainable, and high-capacity rail connections across the EU's eastern flank;
44. Notes that digital technologies that are relevant to increasing civilian rail capacity, such as ERTMS and DAC, are also relevant for military mobility and should be improved; warns that the ERTMS was developed in a different geostrategic context and calls for an assessment of its robustness and cybersecurity resilience; underlines that, given its reliance on radio technology, any network unavailability due to jamming or other factors would lead to the immediate suspension of rail traffic; calls for an assessment of a similar nature within the framework for the development of the Future Railway Mobile Communication System (FRMCS);
45. Notes that road and rail connections to ports and freight terminal networks are often key to facilitating the 'last mile' movements of military equipment to required areas and, as such, play an integral

role in the success of military mobility; recalls that all strategic points of road transport, such as parking facilities, refuelling stations and car-wash stations, should be urgently upgraded to accommodate large numbers of military transport units and personnel in times of emergency; calls, therefore, for investments in key road infrastructures along the four priority military mobility corridors to be among the priorities to facilitate military mobility in the most effective way possible;

46. Calls for a harmonised European framework facilitating the movement of military convoys operated by authorised civilian providers, such as those operating abnormal road transport services, specialised cranes and heavy equipment, through the four priority military mobility corridors, while ensuring civilian safety;
47. Highlights that ports play a strategic role as critical nodes in the military mobility network, serving as entry and exit points for large-scale military deployments, and enabling sea-to-land transport integration, especially for transatlantic cooperation, as well as in the resilience of the Union's strategic economic interests; notes that maritime infrastructure suffers from structural shortcomings with many EU terminals not designed to handle military cargo; stresses the need to ensure sufficient capacity for military supplies and to establish contingency plans for diverting civilian cargo if necessary;
48. Underlines that the ownership and control of certain critical maritime infrastructure requires immediate action and stricter rules, as highlighted in the white paper for European Defence Readiness 2030;
49. Calls for investments in port infrastructure and for amended requirements for access to financial instruments for both seaports and inland water ports, to strengthen their integration within the TEN-T corridors and to enhance EU energy security policies; urges the Commission to create and implement strategies that increase the capabilities and build the capacity of ports; underlines both the surface and sub-surface dimensions of the maritime domain, calls for the inclusion of Ro-Ro (Roll-On/Roll-Off) and Ro-Pax (Roll-On/Roll-Off Passenger) vessels as dual-use mobile assets within the scope of the EU military mobility strategy;
50. Notes that inland waterways are also an important element of military mobility, offering seamless and sustainable means of dual-use transportation owing to their available capacity, intermodal complementarity and reduced vulnerability to opportunistic intelligence; notes the existing capacity of the waterborne network to transport oversized military assets, dangerous goods and fuels for regular supplies, as well as to provide back-up solutions as part of contingency planning; suggests assessing the need for the further

expansion of existing locks, and for increasing the availability of cranes and the waterborne fleet;

51. Stresses the importance of creating additional logistics hubs and transshipment terminals along the four priority military mobility corridors; calls for the existing logistics hubs and commercial transshipment terminals relevant for military transport along the military mobility corridors to be adequately adapted and designated as dual-use infrastructure and equipped with fit-for-purpose equipment, such as direct-access loading platforms and ramps suitable for military assets;
52. Highlights the importance of establishing a network of strategically located logistics hubs, along the four priority military mobility corridors, including inland ports, capable of providing the necessary infrastructure for maintenance, storage, and repair to ensure swift intermodal transfers between road, rail, maritime, inland waterway and airport infrastructures and military installations; stresses in this respect that such hubs should provide the necessary dual-use energy infrastructure, such as refuelling and repowering stations, to support mobility needs and security of supply;
53. Underscores that logistics hubs should provide space, capacity and infrastructure for troops in transit, in particular regarding shelter, food and fuel supply;
54. Calls for the development of logistics hubs to be supported also under relevant European industrial programmes to strengthen the resilience of the European industrial and technological base; recalls the need to take action on the digitalisation of logistics processes to ensure the resilience and security of strategic infrastructure;
55. Considers it of the utmost importance to extend transport corridors, including for military mobility, into Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and the Western Balkans, in order to enhance interoperability, increase operational responsiveness, support partners where appropriate in their resistance against Russian aggression and other hybrid threats in the region, and deter future aggression on the EU's territory; notes the use of the Solidarity Lanes for military mobility and considers it important to strengthen them in order to enhance Ukraine's security and resilience;
56. Underlines that accurate, secure and up-to-date digital modelling, digital maps, geographic information systems and geospatial data services are indispensable for both civilian and military infrastructure and route planning, cross-border coordination and the rapid deployment of troops and equipment; stresses that the protection of data and communications during military movements is of the utmost importance to the security of civilians and military personnel, and the preservation of capabilities; stresses that all

transport information services used for military and defence purposes should be duly secured and legally protected to avoid digital leaks of sensitive information regarding military mobility operations and economic data; urges the Commission to coordinate digital and electronic security measures along the four priority military mobility corridors;

57. Stresses that the entire European Union is vulnerable to cyberattacks and digital intrusion; underlines that the digital systems that control physical transport infrastructures and assets represent priority targets for cyber-attacks; calls for the EU and the Member States, therefore, to support the development and adoption of innovative European sovereign digital technologies, including Galileo, to strengthen both the cybersecurity and resilience of these infrastructures and assets; highlights, in this regard, the potential of artificial intelligence and encourages further research and development efforts to develop next-generation digital capabilities;
58. Expresses serious concern regarding the increase of Russian cyberattacks against navigation systems in the Baltic Sea region; calls on the Commission to include and address the nature of hybrid threats in the upcoming omnibus, as well as the jamming and spoofing of global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) as a hybrid attack on European maritime and air traffic;
59. Stresses the need to accelerate the transposition and implementation of the NIS2 Directive¹⁴, and to enhance cooperation between sectoral transport authorities, competent cybersecurity agencies, computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) and the European cyber crisis liaison organisation network (EU-CyCLONe); stresses the importance of including concrete measures addressing military mobility aspects in EU and national cybersecurity risk assessments;
60. Highlights the importance of protecting and improving the resilience of critical transport infrastructure, including against cyber-attacks and hybrid threats that jeopardise civil air, maritime and land traffic; recalls that energy and communication critical infrastructure (aerial, surface and sub-sea or underwater, including GNSS) also directly affects the success of military mobility activities;
61. Calls for the establishment of a European mechanism for monitoring and providing rapid response in the event of cyber or hybrid attacks

¹⁴ Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive) (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj>).

on critical transport, energy and communication infrastructure, to be developed in close cooperation with NATO;

62. Asks the Commission to urgently take measures to simplify and accelerate procedures for investments serving military mobility purposes, in particular to establish targeted exemptions from the current public procurement rules for military mobility infrastructure and assets having a significant military or dual-use component; stresses that projects of strategic European interest must be implemented without excessive delays, while ensuring transparency, fair competition and the right to due process;
63. Notes the importance of public-private partnerships for military mobility; encourages the EU and the Member States to facilitate and incentivise civil-military cooperation in relation to military mobility; highlights the importance of predictability in terms of the demand for military mobility capabilities, combined with sufficient funding and simplified procurement rules, which would enable the supply industry to increase and maintain production levels;
64. Believes that the European preference principle should be a priority in the EU's efforts to strengthen its strategic autonomy and resilience, while acknowledging the Member States' freedom to build their military capacities to respond to threats in the short term; recalls that this principle should be applied to ensure that EU funds invested in defence and security through programmes such as SAFE, EDIP and EDIRPA, in particular in technologies related to critical dual use infrastructure, support the EDTIB;
65. Reiterates that the resilience of critical infrastructure requires a more harmonised and thorough screening of foreign direct investment in the EU; stresses that the revision of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 on the screening of foreign direct investment represents a major step towards a more coherent and effective European framework for protecting security and public order while preserving openness and transparency; welcomes, in that regard, the Commission's proposal to review Regulation (EU) 2019/452 on the screening of foreign direct investment, which should aim at adequately balancing investment needs and the protection of essential security interests and the EU's defence capacities;
66. Stresses that over the next decade, while advancing with transport decarbonisation efforts, the use of fossil fuels in military mobility will remain critical, such as the use of dual-mode locomotives, and locomotives with internal combustion engines, which is the only operational solution in the event of a wide-scale shortage of electric power;
67. Draws attention to the need to extend fuel supply chains for the armed forces along the four priority military mobility corridors;

highlights that energy infrastructure across the Eastern flank requires development to support military mobility activities, and calls on the Commission to address the ‘fuel drought’; encourages stockpiling of strategic reserves of energy that could be particularly relevant for the regions with insufficient pipeline infrastructure and fuel storage capacity; calls on the Commission, in this respect, to review the Oil Stocks Directive¹⁵ in the light of recent geopolitical shifts in order to enhance energy security and resilience against emerging threats;

68. Recalls that, given that the railway system relies on electric power to enable the circulation of trains, rail operations require the resilience of energy grids to be increased and power to be restored rapidly in the event of any outage or shortage;
69. Notes with concern that the EU is highly dependent on imports of crude oil and petroleum products; calls on the Commission to recognise that a robust European military mobility strategy demands resilient and predominantly EU based fuel and alternative fuel production and refinery capacities to also enhance strategic autonomy; calls for the immediate development of a comprehensive fuel distribution and storage network, and the diversification of energy supply to guarantee energy security; underlines that the timely implementation of the provisions and targets of the Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Regulation¹⁶ (AFIR) can also play a relevant role in diversifying the energy supply options for military mobility, and contribute to the EU’s general transport decarbonisation objectives;
70. Calls on the Commission, therefore, to take military mobility capabilities and needs into account when developing the EU energy system, taking into consideration decarbonisation objectives and the need for strategic autonomy and resilience;

Eastern flank

71. Highlights that given Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the eastern flank of the EU has been repeatedly targeted by cyberattacks, hybrid threats and acts of sabotage, including incidents against transport operators; calls for the EU, therefore, to step up efforts in support of Member States to ensure that critical transport infrastructure on the eastern flank is fully protected and

¹⁵ Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products (OJ L 265, 9.10.2009, p. 9, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/119/oj>).

¹⁶ Regulation (EU) 2023/1804 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure, and repealing Directive 2014/94/EU (OJ L 234, 22.9.2023, p. 1, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1804/oj>).

resilient, including through rapid mechanisms for reinforcement and enhanced cyber defence for rail, road, ports and energy supply nodes; highlights in that regard the extreme vulnerability of the Baltic states, notably owing to the Suwalki Gap, and stresses that an accelerated response time and faster troop movements would be needed in the event of Russian aggression;

72. Recalls that the four priority military mobility corridors play a crucial role in the EU's security and defence; considers that allowing the swift and efficient functioning of all identified priority military mobility corridors will allow effective security for the Member States currently most exposed to the threats posed by Russia; draws attention to the fact that the four priority EU military mobility corridors also ensure NATO's ability to quickly reinforce and effectively defend the eastern flank, thus bolstering collective security, deterrence and resilience across the Alliance;
73. Notes that military mobility in and towards Poland is essential for the security of the entire eastern flank; underlines the added value of multimodal logistics hubs located in western Europe to ensure the rapid movement of European and allied troops and heavy equipment to eastern Europe;
74. Welcomes the Eastern Regions Pact initiative, recently announced by the Commission, which aims to provide tailored support for Member States along the EU's eastern border to improve infrastructure and boost resilience in the border regions; stresses the fundamental importance of the 'Eastern Shield' project as a strategic undertaking aimed at strengthening Europe's security, including through the protection of relevant military corridors to maintain the capacity to respond, noting its inclusion in the white paper on defence readiness; calls for the provision of adequate financial resources to ensure its implementation;
75. Recalls that military mobility infrastructure projects must be continuously re-evaluated and updated as part of the European semester of defence, in line with the latest military threats and capabilities, going beyond the territorial expansion of ports to include the training of staff and improved maritime traffic management, as well as resilience capabilities against rapidly evolving threats, such as underwater drone detection;
76. Supports the European Drone Defence Initiative, in the light of recent and repeated violations in the European airspace by unmanned drones; calls for improvements to and increases in drone capabilities across all Member States in cooperation with NATO, and based on field experiences by the Ukrainian armed forces; stresses that these European drone capabilities should build on lessons learned from Ukraine about the key value of creating innovative drone and counter-drone ecosystems, linking research and

development with production, and relying on scalable production capacity and continuous technological development, ranging from underwater, reconnaissance and combat drones, to defence and counter-drone capabilities;

77. Recalls that a counter-drone network would be adaptable for dual-use purposes and help deal with non-defence related threats or other hazards common to every EU border, including border protection, the instrumentalisation of migration, the protection of critical infrastructure and transnational organised crime;

Enhancing capabilities

78. Reiterates that surface transport systems are the main transport modes for the movement of military assets, which are usually heavy and oversized and contain dangerous goods;
79. Notes with concern the current shortage of certain military mobility equipment such as flatbed wagons, and their decline in production since the Cold War period; calls for their development to be supported under European industrial programmes; stresses the critical need for collaboration between public and private stakeholders to leverage and maximise the potential of available railway resources for military mobility and encourages the use of standby contracts;
80. Stresses the need to urgently address the lack of rolling stock fleet across the European railway organisations; stresses the importance of a harmonised authorisation procedure for rolling stock, managed by the EU Agency for Railways (ERA); recalls the need to replace national rules by technical specifications for interoperability (TSI) to increase the availability of cross-border rolling stock for military and civilian purposes;
81. Calls for a coordinated approach to the acquisition of railway rolling stock, with a view to maximising the efficient use of available manufacturing capacity; underlines that common procurement of such vehicles should be encouraged;
82. Notes that, in addition to surface transport, air transport is the fastest way to move the first military assets and logistical materials; highlights the need to develop a European strategic airlift reserve and to strengthen strategic enablers for aerial military mobility, such as heavy airlifters;
83. Notes the growing use of autonomous vehicles in the delivery of military supplies, which provides a solution to the shortage of personnel in military logistics units and minimises human losses in times of conflict; urges the adjustment of EU and national legislation and regulations to allow the introduction of semi-autonomous logistics into military mobility corridors;

84. Calls for a reflection on the availability and adequacy of the EU capabilities for the medicalised transport of multiple patients for injured personnel, in order to ensure their timely evacuation and appropriate care;
85. Highlights the need to evaluate and aggregate Member States' demands to ensure the steady availability and supply of dual use assets, such as locomotives, vessels, trucks, trailers suitable for abnormal loads, strategic airlifters, air-to-air refuelling systems, and fixed and mobile cranes;
86. Stresses the importance of registering the aforementioned transport assets in a civil - military 'solidarity pool' so they can be used whenever and wherever necessary in the most efficient manner, building on rescEU strategic reserves of European crisis response capabilities; calls on the Commission to ensure EU-level coordination with the Member States, allowing for predictability and planning for the supply industry;
87. Stresses the need to ensure coherence between the priorities of the military mobility action plan and the programming of EDIP, ensuring that the capability gap assessments (CDP and the coordinated annual review on defence (CARD)) guide the definition of funding priorities; calls on the Commission to incentivise the EDTIB to address these gaps; notes the need to support investment in purchasing, repairing, maintaining and sharing transport assets through EU-wide funding instruments; highlights the importance of predictability in terms of the demand for military mobility capabilities, combined with sufficient funding and simplified procurement rules, which would enable the supply industry to increase and maintain production levels;
88. Calls for investment in research and development to advance dual-use capabilities; stresses the importance of EU support to stimulate innovation in dual-use vehicle technologies, including modular platforms adaptable for both civilian and military use, as well as in the civilian naval and airspace industries to foster new technologies;

Enhancing EU-NATO cooperation

89. Believes that enhanced military mobility reinforces both the CSDP and the transatlantic alliance; stresses that NATO relies on the infrastructure of EU Member States to move troops and equipment; notes with approval that, thanks to progress in EU-NATO cooperation, including through the EU-NATO Structured Dialogue on Military Mobility, the EU's relevant military requirements are consistent with NATO's technical and geographical requirements to a level of around 95 %;
90. Calls on the Member States to strengthen cooperation among themselves and with NATO, in particular within the existing Central

Europe Pipeline System and the NATO Security Investment Programme, in order to ensure interoperability, cybersecurity and sufficient transport and storage capacity for EU and NATO military operations;

91. Regrets the persistence of political and procedural obstacles to sharing classified information on logistical networks between NATO and the EU and urges shared understanding in this regard to achieve synergies; underlines that these obstacles, in particular the absence of an agreement with NATO for the exchange of classified information, undermine the efficiency of both organisations' defence efforts significantly; calls for strong efforts by EU Member States to overcome the political obstacles preventing an agreement on the exchange of classified information; calls for the establishment of a permanent EU-NATO information sharing platform to support the work of NATO's Joint Support and Enabling Command;
92. Calls for the organisation of regular joint EU-NATO exercises and stress tests involving the armed forces, civil protection, infrastructure managers, and transport operators to improve communication and coordination, streamline procedures, and identify and remove obstacles to military mobility;
93. Calls on the Commission and NATO to deepen coordination on maritime mobility, ensuring interoperability standards for naval transport, port access and the protection of sea lines of communication, paying particular attention to the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the outermost regions; urges close EU-NATO cooperation on securing the transatlantic delivery of military equipment and supplies via sea and air because of their importance; recognises the important role of Türkiye in securing transport routes and overall EU-NATO military mobility, notably its decision to close the Black Sea Straits in February 2022, which prevented Russia from reinforcing its naval presence in the Black Sea;
94. Notes that NATO's operational-level planning timeline is three days; therefore, insists on complying with commitments to meet the maximum three to five-day objective for completing relevant border crossing and abnormal, oversized and overweight transport permitting procedures, relying on streamlined, harmonised and digital procedures; calls for the time to be reduced to three days for rapid reaction units in 'peacetime' and to 24 hours in a crisis situation; reiterates its call for the two forms 302 in use by NATO and the EU to be merged into one, in order to reduce unnecessary duplication and facilitate faster cross-border movements; in order to speed up permitting procedures, calls for the introduction of automatic recognition for route and bridge analyses within Member States and across borders and of a notification-based fast-track

regime for certified operators running military or emergency-related transports as part of the military mobility package;

95. Calls on the Member States to urgently develop the necessary defence capabilities for military transport, including extending the NATO pipelines networks and strategic airlift capabilities, based on the coordinated annual review on defence findings and the 2023 EU capability development priorities; considers it important to meet, in consultation with NATO as appropriate, the military requirements and to mitigate the technical and geographical gaps;
96. Stresses the added value of the exceptional participation of the US, Canada, the UK, Norway and Switzerland, as well as that of other likeminded partners, in the military mobility project of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO); calls for the implementation of capability objectives and for the extension of participation to strategic partner countries such as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, in line with PESCO rules;
97. Underlines the need for interoperability also with key regional partners and candidate countries, such as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and the Western Balkans; calls for specific assistance to the Republic of Moldova making it more resilient to hybrid threats and better connected with EU transport and security systems; underlines the importance of strengthening coordination with regional partners on technical standards, the security of critical infrastructure and the protection of networks against hybrid threats and attacks; considers that interoperability with third countries must be accompanied by regular assessments;
98. Highlights the importance of Parliament not only as co-legislator in the military mobility policy, as part of the EU's ambition to achieve defence readiness by 2030, but also in its role in democratic oversight over EU action; calls on the Commission, therefore, to provide more systematic follow-up and stricter reporting, including relating to EU NATO cooperation and PESCO, on military mobility measures, implementation and funding;
 -
 - ◦
99. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, NATO, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the EU security and defence agencies and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.