



TEXTS ADOPTED

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Continuous Belarusian hybrid attacks against Lithuania

European Parliament resolution of 18 December 2025 on the continuous Belarusian hybrid attacks against Lithuania (2025/3025(RSP))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to its previous resolutions on Belarus, Russia and Ukraine,
 - having regard to the statement of 29 October 2025 by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU on Belarus' hybrid actions at the EU external border,
 - having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act and the fundamental principles of international law,
 - having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,
- A. whereas Belarus has intensified its hybrid operations against Lithuania, including the deployment of UAVs and balloon incursions, cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns, and continues to instrumentalise migration;
- B. whereas these actions must be understood in the context of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and its broader strategy to destabilise the EU and NATO; whereas Belarus is a platform for Russia's hybrid operations against Europe; whereas intelligence and security assessments across the EU indicate that Belarusian hybrid tactics closely align with and contribute to Russia's broader strategy of hostility against the EU and its Member States;
- C. whereas, since 2024, Lithuania has recorded hundreds of airspace violations by objects launched from Belarus, including weather balloons, none of which had been notified to aviation authorities, constituting breaches of international safety rules and Lithuanian sovereignty;

- D. whereas these incursions, including in the vicinity of Vilnius and Kaunas airports, are endangering lives, undermining security and disrupting civil aviation, and have already caused 19 airport closures and affected hundreds of flights and tens of thousands of passengers, causing significant economic losses;
- E. whereas the Lithuanian authorities have reported a major escalation of hybrid activities originating from Belarus, having detected three balloons in 2023, 184 in 2024, and around 700 balloons and 200 drone intrusions in 2025;
- F. whereas Lithuanian security services have recovered debris from Belarus-launched UAVs and balloons, indicating controlled deployment, onboard electronics and, in one case, the presence of explosive materials;
- G. whereas, since Lithuania's decision to temporarily close its border with Belarus, the Belarusian de facto authorities have engaged in economic coercion by detaining European freight vehicles, threatening their confiscation and obstructing lawful cross-border trade;
- H. whereas, since 2021, Belarus has systematically instrumentalised migration by directing irregular migrants toward the Lithuanian border as a deliberate destabilisation strategy; whereas, taken together, UAVs and balloon incursions, disinformation campaigns and border pressure constitute a pattern of coordinated hybrid aggression against Lithuania and the EU;
- I. whereas, on 9 December 2025, following a surge in balloons launched from Belarus, Lithuania declared a national state of emergency and authorised the shooting down of unmanned flying objects;
- J. whereas Belarus has tried to deflect responsibility by falsely accusing Lithuania of espionage and fabricating evidence, mirroring established Russian information warfare tactics aimed at eroding public trust and deflecting accountability; whereas countering such actions requires coordination at EU and NATO level;
- K. whereas Belarus maintains increasingly close military and intelligence cooperation with and dependence on Russia, including shared air-defence structures, the transfer of technology in UAV systems and coordinated hybrid operations targeting EU Member States; whereas these hybrid attacks serve the strategic interests of the Kremlin by testing air-defence and detection systems, probing response thresholds and undermining NATO and EU cohesion;
- L. whereas the EU's eastern flank constitutes a strategic area for Europe's overall security and therefore requires strengthened infrastructure, enhanced surveillance capabilities and effective rapid

reinforcement mechanisms; whereas Lithuania's experience demonstrates the urgent need for coordinated EU action, effective and innovative counter-UAV capabilities, border-protection technologies and rapid information-sharing across the Member States;

- M. whereas the Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 points to the European Drone Defence Initiative and Eastern Flank Watch as the initiatives that should be launched first;
- N. whereas the US decided to lift some sanctions against Belarus without prior coordination with the EU;
- 1. Strongly condemns Belarus's ongoing hybrid attacks against Lithuania, and therefore the EU, including UAV and balloon incursions, instrumentalised migration, economic coercion, smuggling operations, military provocations, cyberattacks and state-sponsored disinformation; considers these attacks to be deliberate, coordinated and hostile, and part of a broader Russia-led strategy to undermine the EU, the Member States' governments and NATO;
- 2. Condemns the retaliatory measures taken by the Lukashenka regime against Lithuania, including the illegal detention and intimidation of European freight operators, which constitute acts of coercion aimed at an EU Member State;
- 3. Expresses its full solidarity with Lithuania and other Member States targeted by Belarusian hybrid attacks; reiterates that threats to one Member State's security affect the EU as a whole and require a united response;
- 4. Demands that Belarus immediately cease all hybrid attacks against Lithuania and other Member States, including the launch of unmanned devices, smuggling, regime-supported organised crime, disinformation, economic coercion, intelligence recruitment, and the instrumentalisation of migration, immediately release all European hauliers and their property, compensate them for any financial losses and ensure the safety of civil aviation and border crossings; condemns the Lukashenka regime for instigating acts of sabotage and other hostile actions directed against Lithuania and other EU Member States, providing operational support for these acts and offering a safe haven to the perpetrators, as evidenced by the recent railway track explosion in Poland and by the granting of refuge to the perpetrators of the murder of Polish soldier Mateusz Sitek, who was killed at the Polish-Belarusian border; calls for the immediate cessation of these hostile actions and for the surrender of those responsible for the above-mentioned serious crimes to law enforcement authorities;
- 5. Fully supports Lithuania's right to take proportionate measures against any attacks to protect its sovereignty, public order and

aviation safety, including the interception or neutralisation of unmanned flying objects originating from Belarus:

6. Deplores the lack of coordination surrounding the partial lifting of US sanctions on Belarus on 13 December 2025, which undermines solidarity and collective support for EU and NATO members targeted by Belarusian hybrid attacks; stresses that statements by the US special envoy to Belarus on the Belarusian de facto authorities giving assurances that the balloon launches will be stopped indicate an acknowledgement of responsibility and are relevant for the establishment of state responsibility under international law;
7. Reiterates that it does not recognise Aliaksandr Lukashenka as the legitimate President of Belarus; stresses that any review of EU sanctions against Belarus or engagement with it must be strictly conditional upon Belarus effecting sustained, verifiable and irreversible systemic change, including the release of the more than 1 100 remaining political prisoners; calls for solidarity in addressing the threats posed by the Lukashenka regime, particularly those posed by its state-engineered instrumentalisation of migration; strongly condemns the Belarusian de facto authorities' use of migration for political ends;
8. Calls for deeper EU-NATO intelligence cooperation on airspace security and counter-hybrid threats; calls for strengthened EU-NATO cooperation on Lithuanian airspace surveillance, including unified incident-classification protocols, enhanced air-policing rotations and coordinated responses to balloon or UAV intrusions; underlines the need for regular joint exercises simulating hybrid aerial threats; calls on the Member States to ensure the rapid cross-border mobility of military and security assets, including air-defence and counter-UAV capabilities, in support of Lithuania;
9. Calls on the Member States and the NATO allies to reassess current strategic and operational frameworks for addressing hybrid threats, with a view to strengthening deterrence, preparedness and timely responses, moving from a reactive approach to proactive deterrence;
10. Emphasises that the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure, including transport and aviation infrastructure, must be structurally embedded and adequately financed in the next MFF;
11. Calls on the Commission and Frontex, in full respect of its mandate, to support the strengthening of Lithuania's border and airspace surveillance through the use of additional sensors, patrol aircraft, mobile counter-UAV kits and real-time threat analysis; notes that Belarus's hybrid tactics expose structural vulnerabilities requiring a collective EU response; welcomes the European Drone Defence Initiative as a flagship European project for detecting, tracking and countering hostile unmanned aerial systems; welcomes the proposed

Eastern Flank Watch, aimed at integrating air-defence and counter-drone capabilities with ground-based and maritime security in the Baltic and Black Sea regions; calls on the Commission to prepare measures to protect Trans-European Transport Network infrastructure and safeguard the continuity of trans-European transport services against future hybrid attacks; calls for the swift implementation of these projects;

12. Calls for deeper EU-Ukraine cooperation on drone technologies, counter-UAV systems, cyber protection and hybrid-threat resilience, recognising Ukraine's expertise as strategically valuable for EU security;
13. Welcomes the recent adoption of a new sanctions criterion covering hybrid attacks against Member States; calls on the Council to adopt additional targeted sanctions against Belarusian officials, state-owned and private entities, and individuals involved in UAV production and deployment and all other hybrid operations targeting critical infrastructure, economic activities and democratic institutions; calls on the Council to take further sectoral measures against Belarus, including expanded restrictions in the aviation and financial sectors, additional import and investment bans, broader service prohibitions, restrictions on access to governance roles in critical European infrastructure, and bans on accepting donations from the Belarusian de facto authorities and publicly owned entities;
14. Calls for the EU and the Member States to pursue international accountability for Belarus's actions, including threats to civil aviation, the illegal detention of EU freight operators and the transnational repression of Belarusians residing in EU Member States, and to raise these issues in relevant international forums;
15. Urges the Council to incorporate eastern-border security priorities into the next MFF, ensuring sustained EU investments to counter hybrid threats and to improve the resilience of the EU's critical infrastructure, military mobility and defence technologies;
16. Rejects Belarusian disinformation propagating fabricated evidence or alleging espionage; calls for the EU and the Member States to strengthen strategic communication, counter disinformation, publicly attribute hostile acts and implement the recommendations contained in the Niinistö report, in order to build societal resilience;
17. Calls on European businesses, particularly hauliers, to reassess the security risks associated with operating in Belarus and to take appropriate protective measures;
18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

the EU Member States, NATO, the UN and the Belarusian de facto authorities.