



TEXTS ADOPTED

P10_TA(2026)0015

Addressing impunity through EU sanctions, including the EU Global Human Rights sanctions regime (so-called 'EU Magnitsky Act')

European Parliament resolution of 21 January 2026 on addressing impunity through EU sanctions, including the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (so-called 'EU Magnitsky Act') (2025/2049(INI))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948,
- having regard to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950,
- having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966,
- having regard to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984,
- having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 2, 3(5), 21, 23, 29 and 31(2) thereof,
- having regard to Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which concerns the adoption of restrictive measures against natural or legal persons and groups or non-State entities,
- having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
- having regard to Declaration 25 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, which concerns the need to protect and observe the due process rights of individuals or entities concerned by EU restrictive measures or by EU measures combating terrorism,

- having regard to its resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (known as urgency resolutions), adopted in accordance with Rule 150 of its Rules of Procedure,
- having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999¹ and Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998² of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses,
- having regard to Council Implementing Regulations (EU) 2021/371 of 2 March 2021³, (EU) 2021/478 of 22 March 2021⁴ and (EU) 2025/1111 of 28 May 2025⁵ implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses,
- having regard to the Council decisions amending Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999, including Council Decisions (CFSP) 2021/372 of 2 March 2021⁶, (CFSP) 2021/481 of 22 March 2021⁷, (CFSP) 2021/2197 of 13 December 2021⁸, (CFSP) 2023/1504 of 20 July 2023⁹, (CFSP) 2023/1716 of 8 September 2023¹⁰, (CFSP) 2024/1025 of 4 April 2024¹¹, (CFSP) 2024/1074 of 4 April 2024¹², (CFSP) 2024/1175 of 19 April 2024¹³, 2024/1967 of 15 July 2024¹⁴, (CFSP)

¹ OJ L 410I, 7.12.2020, p. 13, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2020/1999/oj>.

² OJ L 410I, 7.12.2020, p. 1, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/1998/oj>.

³ OJ L 71I, 02.03.2021, p. 1, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2021/371/oj.

⁴ OJ L 99I, 22.03.2021, p. 1, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2021/478/oj.

⁵ OJ L, 2025/1111, 28.5.2025, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/1111/oj.

⁶ OJ L 71I, 2.3.2021, p. 6, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2021/372/oj>.

⁷ OJ L 99I, 22.3.2021, p. 25, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2021/481/oj>.

⁸ OJ L 445I, 13.12.2021, p. 17, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2021/2197/oj>.

⁹ OJ L 183I, 20.7.2023, p. 60, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/1504/oj>.

¹⁰ OJ L 221I, 8.9.2023, p. 6, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/1716/oj>.

¹¹ OJ L, 2024/1025, 5.4.2024, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/1025/oj>.

¹² OJ L, 2024/1074, 12.4.2024, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/1074/oj>.

¹³ OJ L, 2024/1175, 19.4.2024, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/1175/oj>.

¹⁴ OJ L, 2024/1967, 15.7.2024, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/1967/oj>.

2024/3004 of 2 December 2024¹⁵, (CFSP) 2025/346 of 18 February 2025¹⁶ and (CFSP) 2025/1110 of 27 May 2025¹⁷,

- having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act)¹⁸ and its resolution of 2 April 2025 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union's policy on the matter – annual report 2024¹⁹,
 - having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 November 2020 on the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, which has been renewed until 2027,
 - having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/2721 of 4 December 2023 amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses²⁰, which extended the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act) for three years, until 8 December 2026,
 - having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,
 - having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0266/2025),
- A. whereas Article 21 TEU stipulates that the actions of the Union 'shall be guided by democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law';
- B. whereas the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act, adopted in December 2020, enables the EU to impose restrictive measures on individuals and entities responsible for serious human rights violations worldwide; whereas certain EU Member States have adopted their own national Magnitsky-style legislation and these are important tools to complement EU sanctions; whereas the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and other like-minded

¹⁵ OJ L, 2024/3004, 3.12.2024, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3004/oj>.

¹⁶ OJ L, 2025/346, 19.2.2025, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/346/oj>.

¹⁷ OJ L, 2025/1110, 28.5.2025, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/1110/oj>.

¹⁸ OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 152.

¹⁹ OJ C, C/2025/4390, 9.9.2025, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/4390/oj>.

²⁰ OJ L, 2023/2721, 5.12.2023, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/2721/oj>.

countries have adopted similar sanctions regimes; whereas cooperation and coordination among like-minded countries on sanctions increases their effectiveness;

- C. whereas the European Court of Human Rights, in a unanimous ruling of seven judges in the case *Magnitsky and Others v Russia* (application nos. 32631/09 and 53799/12) on 27 August 2019, held that Russia was responsible for Sergei Magnitsky's death in prison and that he had been subjected to intentional acts of violence amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment; whereas, despite investigations into his detention, torture, unlawful posthumous prosecution and death, no one has been held criminally accountable;
- D. whereas in its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the EUGHR SR – EU Magnitsky Act, Parliament welcomed the adoption of the sanctions regime as an essential addition to the EU's human rights and foreign policy toolbox;
- E. whereas the EUGHR SR – EU Magnitsky Act applies to a broad range of human rights violations and the persons and entities listed can include perpetrators, enablers and third parties supplying material or technical assistance for repression;
- F. whereas the EUGHR SR targets individual perpetrators and entities, instead of broad economic sectors, which reduces collateral damage to the general population and avoids harming access to food, medicine or public services;
- G. whereas the EUGHR SR also covers widespread violations or abuses and systematic or serious concerns as regards the objectives of the common foreign and security policy set out in Article 21 TEU, such as torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, slavery, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, enforced disappearance of persons, arbitrary arrests or detentions, human trafficking, sexual and gender-based violence, violations or abuses of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, violations or abuses of freedom of opinion and expression, and violations or abuses of freedom of religion or belief;
- H. whereas the EUGHR SR listings are a form of international recognition for victims of human rights abuses;
- I. whereas transnational repression has not yet been included in the list of serious human rights violations that trigger sanctions under the EUGHR SR – EU Magnitsky Act;
- J. whereas numerous Parliament resolutions have called for sanctions instruments to be used in a more flexible way and more often in cases of core international crimes or serious human rights violations;
- K. whereas as at 4 November 2025, 168 listings had been made under

the EUGHR SR – EU Magnitsky Act (131 individuals and 37 entities); whereas the list of designations under this regime has grown, and not much is known about its impact and effectiveness;

- L. whereas despite progress, substantial gaps remain in the geographical and thematic coverage of transnational listings and in the establishment of benchmarks aligned with the sanctions' objectives; whereas, despite several calls by Parliament, corruption is still not considered a crime within the EUGHR SR – EU Magnitsky Act;
- M. whereas listings have primarily focused on violations of physical integrity and civil-political rights, particularly those targeting political opponents and activists, predominantly males, in authoritarian regimes, rather than on core international crimes, such as genocide and crimes against humanity, and systemic violations of socio-economic rights;
- N. whereas listings, in line with the EU's strategic relationships and geopolitical interests, have largely been geographically concentrated, leaving other areas and contexts under-addressed;
- O. whereas confidentiality around potential listing or de-listing is key to ensuring the effectiveness of the EUGHR SR – EU Magnitsky Act; whereas Parliament should have a role in this process;
- P. whereas parliamentary scrutiny of the EUGHR SR – EU Magnitsky Act is necessary in order to strengthen its legitimacy; whereas Parliament's resolutions containing recommendations for additional listings continue to be insufficiently considered by the Council;
- Q. whereas the EUGHR SR – EU Magnitsky Act currently provides only for asset freezes and visa bans;
- R. whereas the current regime of asset freezes and visa bans could be complemented by additional measures, such as restrictions on financial services, public procurement and participation in EU-funded projects, and its scope should be extended to cover the immediate family members of human rights violators;
- S. whereas guidance from the Commission remains insufficient to clarify the scope of the prohibitions on delivering any kind of support, including technical and material support to sanctioned persons and entities;
- T. whereas some implementation loopholes, such as derogation clauses allowing contracts that were concluded before an individual or entity was listed, create opportunities for sanction circumvention and diminish the effectiveness of sanctions;
- U. whereas existing EU geographical sanctions regimes include broader

restrictions that could complement the EUGHR SR – EU Magnitsky Act through cross-listing;

- V. whereas the EUGHR SR – EU Magnitsky Act has largely focused on lower-level officials and functionaries, while those holding real political and military power have often remained beyond the scope of its designations;
- W. whereas listings under the EUGHR SR – EU Magnitsky Act to date have not targeted any actors responsible for committing some of the core international crimes recognised in the Rome Statute;
- X. whereas civil society actors continue to engage informally with EU institutions in proposing names for listing, in the absence of a structured mechanism for their input; whereas the European External Action Service (EEAS) lacks the resources to assess, investigate and respond to the information it receives;
- Y. whereas improved transparency, coordination with accountability mechanisms, coordination with international actors and like-minded countries and the uptake of listings at United Nations level would strengthen the sanctions regime's effectiveness;
- Z. whereas some Member States have failed to comply with EU sanctions by allowing sanctioned individuals to enter the territory of the EU; whereas such failure to comply with the sanctions considerably harms the EU's credibility and undermines the effectiveness of EU sanctions regimes;
- AA. whereas implementation is largely carried out at national level and each Member State is responsible for enforcing the sanctions on its territory; whereas this creates a risk of weak links where individuals or companies may try to circumvent the sanctions by moving money or activities to Member States with slower or less strict implementation; whereas the EU institutions have repeatedly stressed the need for more uniform and coordinated application to make sanctions truly effective;
- AB. whereas Parliament has called, in numerous resolutions, for the introduction of qualified majority voting for the adoption of sanctions under the EUGHR SR – EU Magnitsky Act;
- AC. whereas the extension of the EUGHR SR – EU Magnitsky Act until December 2026 provides an opportunity to review the regime;
- 1. Reiterates its support for the EUGHR SR – EU Magnitsky Act as an indispensable foreign policy tool for enhancing human rights worldwide and for strengthening the EU's human rights toolbox, particularly given its capacity to contribute to changing the behaviour of targeted persons and entities and to efforts to hold accountable the direct perpetrators, enablers, instigators and

indirect supporters of serious human rights violations, as well as those who directly or indirectly benefit from such violations, including their immediate family members; highlights that the instrument is designed so as to not affect the enjoyment of human rights by the population;

2. Reaffirms its unwavering commitment to combating impunity for serious human rights violations and abuses worldwide through the effective use of existing EU sanctions instruments and tools, including the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act; reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the international justice system, which is facing unprecedented challenges, including baseless sanctions against judges and staff of the International Criminal Court, some of whom are EU nationals; urges the EU, in that regard, to activate its Blocking Statute²¹ to contain the impact of those sanctions;

Policy coherence and strategic effectiveness

3. Calls for a comprehensive impact assessment of the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act and its interactions with the EU country-specific sanctions and the other EU horizontal restrictive measures in order to evaluate its coherence, proportionality and effectiveness, including in changing the behaviour of those listed, to identify operational gaps and to ensure consistent and strategic application worldwide, and calls for the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act to be reviewed in accordance with the findings of this impact assessment;
4. Calls for the listings drawn up under the EU’s EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act to be reviewed continuously and systematically, at least once every 12 months, so as to ensure their consistency, proportionality and conformity with the latest information and judicial decisions;
5. Considers that more information on the de-listing criteria should be made available in order to enhance legal clarity, due process, transparency and accountability;
6. Reiterates that it is important for the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act to be consistent with and complement the EU’s country-specific and horizontal restrictive measures, sectoral measures and arms embargos, as well as existing international sanctions frameworks;
7. Encourages the Council to seek to align EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act listings with the sanctions lists of like-minded partners, in particular those in the G7, and the UN Security Council, where

²¹ Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom (OJ L 309, 29.11.1996, p. 1, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1996/2271/oj>).

politically and legally feasible, in order to enhance global legitimacy and effectiveness;

8. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to enhance synergies between the EUGHR SR – EU Magnitsky Act and international accountability mechanisms, such as the UN, the International Criminal Court and regional human rights courts, to improve the effectiveness of EU actions against serious human rights violations;
9. Underlines that it is important for EU candidate countries and potential candidate countries to align with the EUGHR SR – EU Magnitsky Act, in line with their broader alignment with the EU's common foreign and security policy;
10. Fully supports the imposition of targeted anti-corruption sanctions within the EU framework, which has been a long-standing priority of Parliament, whether through its inclusion in the EUGHR SR – EU Magnitsky Act or under a different regime; recommends extending the regime's scope to cover large-scale corruption cases and abuse of state procurement contracts that directly sustain authoritarian regimes, thereby linking human rights abuses with kleptocratic practices; stresses, furthermore, that anti-corruption sanctions should take into account the broader systemic context and be closely linked with comprehensive strategies towards the respective actors; welcomes the fact that the Commission put forward a proposal for an anti-corruption sanctions regime; finds it regrettable that the file has been blocked at the Council by some Member States;
11. Stresses that the EUGHR SR – EU Magnitsky Act should also address human rights violations enabled through digital surveillance, spyware exports and other technologies used for repression, and deliberate acts of environmental destruction with a clear intent to harm the civilian population; calls for explicit listings of individuals involved in such abuses;
12. Welcomes the recent use of the EUGHR SR – EU Magnitsky Act against actors responsible for the transnational repression of dissidents and human rights defenders, and calls for more listings to reflect this growing global trend and to systematically assess acts of transnational repression, including digital surveillance, harassment of exiles, and cross-border intimidation, disinformation and legal abuse; calls on the Council to adopt a working definition of transnational repression to ensure consistent sanctioning, including of non-state proxies such as private security companies and diaspora organisations; calls for the EU to step up the application of sanctions against individuals and entities credibly documented as responsible for acts of transnational repression against human rights defenders, including harassment of relatives, digital attacks and intimidation abroad;

13. Urges the Member States to refrain from bilateral political or diplomatic actions that undermine their commitment to international criminal justice mechanisms, including the Rome Statute, and the defence of human rights, or that contradict the EU's unified stance on sanctions; instructs the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, if this recommendation is not taken into account, to call on the Member States concerned to align their actions and maintain EU unity; invites the Member States to enhance coordination and make use of their own instruments, such as universal jurisdiction and national sanctions, provided that these are applied in a coordinated manner in support of the common EU objectives, so as to bring about significant change and help achieve the objectives of EU sanctions;
14. Condemns the fact that some EU Member States have failed to comply with EU sanctions by allowing sanctioned individuals to enter EU territory, thereby harming the credibility and effectiveness of sanctions; urges all EU Member States to fully and unconditionally comply with EU sanctions; calls on the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, to ensure that EU Member States comply with the sanctions and to rigorously and without discrimination address any instances of non-compliance by Member States;
15. Stresses that EU restrictive measures can only be fully effective if they are interpreted, enforced and implemented consistently, swiftly and uniformly by all Member States; notes the differences between Member States in terms of legal frameworks, administrative structures and operational resources for the implementation of sanctions; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to take the necessary steps to ensure a more harmonised and coordinated application, including by strengthening the capacity for asset freezes, improving the exchange of information and developing common EU-level monitoring and enforcement mechanisms;
16. Urges the EEAS to define legal pathways for mobilising the interest accrued from the frozen assets of individuals sanctioned under the EUGHR SR – EU Magnitsky Act so that it can be used to benefit the victims of the serious human rights violations for which the sanctioned individuals are responsible; encourages the EU, furthermore, to explore the possibility of establishing a specific procedure regarding ill-gotten gains;
17. Strongly welcomes the Council's adoption of thematic sanctions packages under the EUGHR SR – EU Magnitsky Act; urges the Council to systematically and proactively adopt similar targeted measures to address other specific and grave human rights violations, including torture, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, and the repression of civil society and human rights defenders;

18. Reiterates its call for the Council to gradually switch to qualified majority voting for decisions in areas of the common foreign and security policy that do not have military or defence implications, such as sanctions;

Strengthening the fight against impunity

19. Calls for the EU sanctions regime to be consistent with and complement international criminal law, international humanitarian law, and EU policies related to the rule of law and fundamental freedoms, with the aim of strengthening the fight against impunity worldwide;
20. Urges the EU to strategically align EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act listings with national and international criminal justice efforts, including by listing individuals indicted by international courts, such as the International Criminal Court, and perpetrators of core international crimes and other actors who frustrate such accountability processes;
21. Underlines that sanctions should also serve the purpose of ensuring that perpetrators of serious human rights violations and corruption do not remain anonymous, thereby exposing those responsible;
22. Urges the Council to ensure that all regions of the world are treated with equal scrutiny and commitment, and to correct current geographical and thematic imbalances in listings under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act by extending listings beyond the current geographical concentration to all persons and entities responsible for serious human rights violations, irrespective of their country of origin;
23. Encourages the Council to pay particular attention to violations such as sexual and gender-based violence, discriminatory policies, and the persecution of women leaders, journalists and activists, so that these categories are adequately reflected in future listings;
24. Notes that, so far, a significant proportion of individuals sanctioned under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act were involved in the state's repressive apparatus, but did not make decisions, while only a minority of those listed hold political or military leadership positions; urges the Council to extend designations beyond low-level designations to include political and military leaders, sanctioning those responsible for making decisions that led to grave human rights violations;
25. Calls for greater and more effective communication on imposed sanctions to reiterate the EU's global stand on human rights and the fight against impunity, as in some cases sanctioned individuals are being portrayed as heroes by national propaganda and are even rewarded by repressive regimes; notes that the deterrent element of

the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act works most effectively against individuals and entities with property in, or means to travel to, the EU;

26. Condemns any countersanctions imposed on the EU or its institutions, Member States, bodies or citizens solely for promoting and upholding human rights, democracy and the rule of law through the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act;

Transparency, accountability and the role of civil society

27. Recommends enhanced transparency and clear guidelines in the sanctions process, while upholding the rights of listed individuals to effective judicial review;
28. Recommends that sustained, demonstrable, real and lasting behavioural change by listed individuals and entities, such as ongoing cooperation with international justice mechanisms, be formally recognised as a de-listing criterion to incentivise accountability and compliance;
29. Proposes the establishment of a structured and transparent consultation mechanism for civil society reporting and engagement in the sanctions process, with protective measures for whistleblowers, including the establishment of a dedicated EEAS contact point; recommends the introduction of a budgetary window to strengthen the EEAS's capacity to systematically assess, investigate, react to and process information and proposals from civil society;
30. Calls on the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to envision a complementary role for Parliament in collecting and proposing cases of serious human rights violations to be considered under the sanctions regime, and to provide Parliament with annual reports about decisions on sanctions under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act, including in the circumvention of sanctions; calls for the listings recommendations contained in Parliament's resolutions to be thoroughly considered by the Council;

Preventing circumvention and strengthening enforcement tools

31. Calls for the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act to be reviewed to prevent sanction circumvention by issuing explicit and updated guidance on the prohibition on providing economic resources and technical and material support to listed individuals and entities, clarifying that the prohibition on providing technical and material support includes non-financial assistance such as ICT infrastructure, software, legal facilitation and cyber tools used for repression; emphasises the need to strengthen the EU's sanctions regime by broadening and diversifying the use of secondary sanctions with a

view to targeting government officials, entities, businesses and individuals involved in facilitating breaches or the circumvention of sanctions, which would enable authoritarian regimes to continue their grave human rights violations;

32. Calls on the Commission to enhance cooperation with the European Banking Authority, the European Securities and Markets Authority, the Anti-Money Laundering Authority and national financial intelligence units in order to systematically identify whether opaque financial products, crypto-assets and offshore structures are being used to evade sanctions;
33. Encourages the cross-listing of entities under both the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act and geographical sanctions regimes where appropriate;
34. Calls on the Council to review derogation clauses to ensure that contracts concluded before a person is listed do not benefit their family members or associates, or any entities controlled by the sanctioned person;

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35. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.