



TEXTS ADOPTED

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Four years of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and European contributions to a just peace and sustained security for Ukraine

European Parliament resolution of 24 February 2026 on four years of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and European contributions to a just peace and sustained security for Ukraine (2026/2599(RSP))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia,
 - having regard to Rules 167(2) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,
- A. whereas four years ago, on 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation launched a brutal, unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas Russia's aggression against Ukraine started in 2014 with the occupation of parts of the Donbas region and the annexation of Crimea;
- B. whereas, despite broad international condemnation and unprecedented sanctions, Russia is escalating its war efforts through targeted attacks on critical energy infrastructure, residential buildings and civilian infrastructure; whereas millions of people in Ukraine are trying to survive freezing winter temperatures with limited electricity, heating and running water; whereas the environmental damage caused by Russia over the past four years has also had devastating consequences for Ukraine's natural resources and critical ecosystems and for its people's health, livelihoods and security;
- C. whereas Iran, North Korea and Belarus have provided Russia with substantial deliveries of weapons and ammunition, and Belarus has allowed Russia to use its territory to attack Ukraine, which amounts to an act of aggression under international law; whereas China has become a key enabler of the Russian war effort through its economic and defence-industrial support; whereas thousands of Cuban and other foreign nationals are fighting alongside Russian troops in

Ukraine; whereas, together with mercenaries and voluntary recruits, there are reportedly over 1 400 citizens of 36 African nations fighting for Russia;

- D. whereas the Wagner Group and its successor entities have systematically committed torture and extrajudicial killings, used sexual violence as a weapon of war and carried out destabilisation operations across Ukraine; whereas EU sanctions against individuals and entities associated with the Wagner Group remain insufficient to prosecute recruiters, combatants and supporters, who face no criminal penalties under current measures;
- E. whereas Ukraine and international bodies have documented hundreds of executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war by Russian forces; whereas such executions constitute serious violations of international law and human rights and are explicitly recognised as war crimes under the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;
- F. whereas Russia has repeatedly engaged in acts of hybrid warfare across the EU, including through cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and electoral interference, as well as in military provocations, including violations of airspace by fighter jets and long-range strike drones;
- G. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has severely undermined European and global security and is part of a broader imperialistic and expansionist agenda; whereas a peace agreement will have to be underpinned by credible, robust security guarantees in order to prevent and immediately counteract any renewed Russian aggression;
- H. whereas at least 20 000, and possibly up to 35 000, Ukrainian children have been forcibly deported to Russia and Belarus, or detained in temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories;
- I. whereas the Military Police of the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Federal Security Service and the Federal Penitentiary Service are holding an undetermined number of Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians in incommunicado detention, with Ukrainian human rights organisations estimating that up to 16 000 Ukrainian civilians have been illegally deprived of their liberty;
- J. whereas some Member States are still paying Russia for fossil fuels on a monthly basis, spending EUR 1,3 billion on Russian fossil fuels in December 2025 alone; whereas the EU remains the largest buyer of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) and pipeline gas, accounting for almost half (49 %) of Russia's total LNG exports and 35 % of Russia's pipeline gas exports;

1. Pays tribute to the thousands who have sacrificed their lives for a free and democratic Ukraine and in defence of our shared European values over the four years of Russia's war of aggression; emphasises that Ukraine's resilience remains a lasting testament to the strength of democracy when confronted with tyranny; reiterates its unwavering solidarity with the people of Ukraine and its support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders; reaffirms its full support for a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in Ukraine, based on terms determined by Ukraine and acceptable to its people; strongly underlines Ukraine's inherent right to self-defence in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter; reiterates its firm belief that Russia's aggression must fail and Ukraine must prevail;
2. Underlines that Russia's illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine constitutes a blatant violation of international law and of the UN Charter, as well as an unprecedented attack on the European security architecture; underlines that Russia, its leadership and its allies, such as the Belarusian regime, bear full responsibility for the war, war crimes and the crime of aggression, and calls for them to be held fully accountable;
3. Reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of Russia's brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as of the involvement of North Korea and Iran; demands that Russia and its proxy forces immediately, completely and unconditionally terminate all military action in Ukraine, cease all attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure, withdraw all military forces, proxies and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine, release and return all prisoners of war, political detainees, kidnapped children and civilians, and permanently cease violating or threatening the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine; reiterates that the EU will continue not to recognise the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine as Russian territory;
4. Reaffirms that Ukraine's future lies in the EU; recognises Ukraine's European integration as a strategic priority for the EU, and calls for the EU and its Member States to prepare for future enlargement by implementing internal reforms and developing a clear strategy for enlargement; underlines the importance of accelerating Ukraine's gradual integration into the EU single market;
5. Urges the EU and its Member States to assume more responsibility for security on the European continent and to continue providing unwavering support to Ukraine; highlights that any agreement aimed at ending Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine goes well beyond Russia and Ukraine, with profound implications for the European security order as a whole; insists that nothing about

Ukraine should be decided without Ukraine, and nothing about Europe without Europe;

6. Welcomes the adoption of the law that will allow Orthodox parishes from Ukraine to disaffiliate from the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate and to decide freely on their new hierarchical affiliation; notes that, in August 2024, Romanian Orthodox parishes in Ukraine submitted a request for the recognition of the 'Romanian Orthodox Church in Ukraine' as a religious association, so that Romanian Orthodox parishes disaffiliating from the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate could affiliate with it;
7. Calls for the EU, its Member States, their transatlantic allies and international partners to undertake even more effective military, political and diplomatic efforts, and in particular to massively increase military support to Ukraine and substantially enhance comprehensive pressure on Russia in order to definitively stop Russia's war of aggression and enable Ukraine to liberate all its people and re-establish full control over its entire territory within its internationally recognised borders;
8. Welcomes the conclusions of the meeting of the 'coalition of the willing' held in Paris on 6 January 2026; strongly welcomes the proposal for a multinational 'reassurance force' for Ukraine; welcomes the agreement to finalise politically and legally binding commitments to restore peace and security in the event of a future, post-ceasefire, armed attack by Russia, alongside a clear framework for support to Ukraine, including the sustenance of its long-term military capabilities and deepened defence cooperation; regrets the fact, however, that these security guarantees would only be implemented once a ceasefire is agreed upon; takes note of the talks on a ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism; underlines the need to implement these ambitious proposals;
9. Underlines that any peace agreement must not place limitations on Ukraine's ability to defend itself and must be based on full respect for the principles of international law, accountability for war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression, and Russian reparations for the massive damage caused in Ukraine; underlines that any such agreement must be complemented by robust and credible security guarantees to Ukraine, amounting to the level of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union and avoiding a repetition of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum; reconfirms that Ukraine has the freedom to choose its security and political alliances free from any Russian veto; underlines that any agreement with Russia should include a commitment by Russia to immediately cease its hybrid warfare against the EU and its partners, including Ukraine; insists that the 'coalition of the willing' and the United States must provide robust

security guarantees that will prevent and immediately counteract any renewed Russian aggression;

10. Notes the US administration's efforts to end Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, but expresses its concern about the US approach towards peace talks, which appears to prioritise short-term dealmaking and the preservation of 'strategic stability' with Russia over genuine peace talks leading to a comprehensive, just and lasting peace based on the principles of international law; calls, therefore, for the EU and its Member States to continue working with the United States and like-minded partners to ensure that negotiations for a just and lasting peace for Ukraine are conducted in good faith, and with the objective of definitively ending Russia's aggressions against Ukraine; underscores that Russia's continued attacks do not indicate its readiness for genuine peace talks; highlights the negative impact on Ukraine of ill-considered promises to deliver a peace process within a specific timeframe;
11. Insists that no sanctions should be lifted before a peace agreement is negotiated and sustainably implemented; calls for the EU to impose further substantial sanctions, such as a comprehensive ban on remaining Russian and Belarusian imports, targeting unsanctioned raw materials in particular; welcomes the ongoing EU-G7 discussions on exploring a maritime services ban on all Russian energy exports, but urges the EU and its Member States to proceed even without the support of other G7 countries, and to ban trade and commercial activities with Russia and Belarus, with a particular focus on any potential dual-use items; calls on the Council, along with its US partners, to apply a similar sanctions policy to all enabling states, including Belarus, Iran and North Korea, and to sanction Chinese entities supplying dual-use goods and military items essential for the manufacturing of drones and missiles; calls for additional sanctions to be adopted against Russia's shadow fleet and for these to be enforced strictly, including through interdiction; calls for an end to cooperation with Rosatom and Roscosmos and for the adoption of sanctions against them; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention; emphasises that sanctions are having a clear impact on the Russian economy, but reiterates that the sanctions regime needs to be broader and its implementation stricter if it is to have the required effect of limiting Russia's funds for its war of aggression; welcomes the forthcoming adoption of the 20th package of sanctions against Russia;
12. Welcomes the European Council's decision of 18 December 2025 to provide Ukraine with a EUR 90 billion financial assistance package in the form of EU-backed loans; calls for the swift implementation of the Ukraine support loan and stresses the need to respond appropriately to Ukraine's evolving needs; welcomes the necessary flexibility featured within the package under the derogation regime

laid down in Article 13(5) of the proposed regulation establishing the support loan¹;

13. Reiterates its firm conviction that Russia must pay for the massive damage caused in Ukraine, and calls once more for the EU to use the cash balances associated with Russian sovereign assets immobilised under EU sanctions to back a reparations loan that would serve to support Ukraine's defence and reconstruction and increase pressure on Russia to end its war of aggression; strongly supports the Council's conclusion that the co-legislators should continue working on the Commission's reparation loan proposal;
14. Urges the EU, in coordination with NATO, to support the strengthening of Ukraine's defence capabilities by developing an enhanced industrial partnership enabling transfers of technology and know-how, and to assist the integration of the Ukrainian defence technological and industrial base into the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), while supporting EDTIB activities in Ukraine; urges the Member States and their defence industries to make additional investments and develop partnerships with Ukraine for joint development in the EU and production by Ukrainian industry inside the EU; commends the Danish model of support for Ukraine, and calls for greater incentives for closer cooperation between and integration of the EDTIB and Ukraine's defence industrial base; urges those Member States that can provide such weaponry to deliver air defence systems to Ukraine to enable it to protect more of its critical infrastructure and to supply Ukraine with far-ranging missile systems so that it can target military and strategic infrastructure; urges the lifting of remaining restrictions preventing the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against military targets on Russian territory that are responsible for launching attacks on Ukraine's population and critical civilian infrastructure; underlines the importance of ensuring that Ukrainian military personnel are properly trained under the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) and calls for an expansion of EUMAM Ukraine's mandate, including the possibility to extend training activities to Ukrainian territory following a ceasefire, in order to strengthen Ukraine's national training capacity;
15. Calls for Ukraine's inclusion in the EU's military mobility corridors; reiterates the importance of ensuring the swift movement of equipment and troops from west to east and of learning lessons from the experience of the Ukrainian armed forces;

¹ Commission proposal of 14 January 2026 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the Ukraine Support Loan for 2026 and 2027 (COM(2026)0020).

16. Welcomes the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2026/261 on phasing out Russian natural gas imports and preparing the phase-out of Russian oil imports²; urges the Commission to accelerate the phase-out of other Russian energy sources, including oil and all petroleum products, uranium, enriched uranium, and nuclear fuel and services, in line with the commitments made in the REPowerEU roadmap; underlines that this measure is a crucial step towards ending the EU's reliance on Russian fossil fuels and inflicting further strain on the Russian economy; regrets the fact that seven EU Member States imported more Russian energy in 2025 than in 2024; underlines that the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines must never be reactivated and calls for their permanent decommissioning as a matter of strategic security; reminds the Member States to refrain from taking any measures that could jeopardise the achievement of the EU's objectives;
17. Strongly condemns the systematic deportation, forcible transfer and attempted assimilation of Ukrainian children by the Russian Federation; calls for the immediate and unconditional cessation of these practices and the safe and unhindered return of all unlawfully deported Ukrainian children; expresses its support for the organisations and persons engaged in retrieving these children, and for the 'Bring Kids Back UA' initiative; welcomes the work of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children as a key platform for coordinated international action, including tracing deported children, verifying their identity, legal status and whereabouts, securing their return and pursuing accountability;
18. Strongly condemns the use of sexual and gender-based violence as a weapon of war and stresses that this constitutes a war crime; also condemns sexual and gender-based violence in the transit centres in Ukraine and across the EU; regrets the fact that the Temporary Protection Directive³ is interpreted so narrowly that many women who have fled Russia's war of aggression cannot access abortion care or other sexual and reproductive health treatments, including treatment following sexual abuse; reiterates its call, in its resolution

² Regulation (EU) 2026/261 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 January 2026 on phasing out Russian natural gas imports and preparing the phase-out of Russian oil imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 (OJ L, 2026/261, 2.2.2026, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2026/261/oj>).

³ Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof (OJ L 212, 7.8.2001, p. 12, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2001/55/oj>).

of 29 February 2024⁴, on the Commission to review the directive in order to ensure that all Member States are obliged to offer the same care that women could otherwise receive in Ukraine;

19. Stresses that the number of Ukrainians identified as victims of human trafficking in the European Union is alarmingly high, and has increased since Russia's full-scale invasion; calls on the Member States to increase their support, including through economic means, for the victims and for preventative measures;
20. Calls for the EU and its Member States to impose sanctions on the Military Police of the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Federal Security Service and the Federal Penitentiary Service for their systematic involvement in committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, including enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, torture and incommunicado detention; calls, moreover, for the EU and its Member States to impose personal sanctions on all institution heads and other Russian officials of Russian penitentiary institutions in which Ukrainian civilians are illegally detained; calls for the EU and its Member States to ban the entry into the Schengen area of Russian military personnel who have participated in the war of aggression against Ukraine; urges the Member States to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention and ensure full and effective implementation;
21. Calls on the Council to list the Wagner Group and its successor entities as terrorist organisations under Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism⁵; emphasises that listing these entities as terrorist organisations, beyond the asset freezes currently applied to them, enables the prosecution of recruiters, combatants and supporters and the application of criminal penalties against them;
22. Highlights the disturbing fact that a growing number of foreign fighters in the Russian army were brought to Russia or to the frontlines in Ukraine under false pretences; urges governments of South Africa, Ghana, Kenya, Botswana and other African nations to crack down on deceptive recruitment activities that see their young men fight on the frontlines alongside Russian forces; calls on the countries concerned to proactively warn their citizens of the dangers of travelling to Russia in connection with job offers that are either directly or indirectly linked to the Russian army; calls on social media platforms to take measures to prevent the abuse of their services for the purpose of conducting these deceitful recruitment

⁴ European Parliament resolution of 29 February 2024 on the need for unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after two years of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine (OJ C, C/2024/6745, 26.11.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6745/oj>).

⁵ OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 93, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/compos/2001/931/oj>.

campaigns; condemns the policies of governments, such as the governments of Cuba or of some Central Asian countries, that do not prevent the participation of their citizens in Russia's war of aggression or even go so far as to promote such participation;

23. Emphasises that Russia's relentless attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure not only violate international law, but also constitute a deliberate strategy to undermine civilian resilience, plunge the affected areas into turmoil and weaponise energy as a tool of coercion; calls for the EU and its Member States to scale up and institutionalise energy assistance to Ukraine; stresses the critical importance of continued and increased EU and Member State humanitarian assistance to Ukraine in response to the acute humanitarian situation caused by Russia's systematic attacks on Ukrainian cities and critical civilian infrastructure;
24. Urges the Commission to actively support international justice mechanisms and ensure accountability and reparations for war crimes and the crime of aggression; encourages the EU and its Member States to support the establishment of a special tribunal to prosecute Russia's crime of aggression against Ukraine;
25. Welcomes Ukraine's accession to the International Criminal Court (ICC); reaffirms its strong support for the ICC's investigation in Ukraine and its overall efforts to prosecute individuals responsible for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression; expresses its utmost concern about the US sanctions against the ICC, its prosecutors, judges and staff; calls on the Commission to activate the Blocking Statute to protect the ICC from extraterritorial sanctions;
26. Calls on the Ukrainian authorities to uphold parliamentary pluralism as a cornerstone of democratic governance and to ensure constructive and meaningful cooperation with all parliamentary political forces represented in the Verkhovna Rada;
27. Commends the paramount work done on a daily basis by Ukrainian healthcare services, and in particular Ukrainian nurses, throughout the war; highlights, against this background, the important work done by the Ukrainian medical movement 'Be Like We Are', a grassroots movement made up mostly of nurses, in supporting healthcare workers and defending their rights;
28. Notes the unwavering commitment of most EU Member States to Ukraine, but stresses its dissatisfaction with those Member States that obstruct or actively undermine EU positions and policies; recalls the principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, which requires Member States to refrain from any measure that could jeopardise the achievement of the EU's objectives; calls on the Council to urgently resolve the deadlock

preventing the operationalisation of the Ukraine Assistance Fund under the European Peace Facility, which is essential for the implementation of the EU's long-term security commitments to Ukraine;

29. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the United States Congress, the Russian authorities, and the authorities of the other countries mentioned in this resolution.