



---

## TEXTS ADOPTED

---

### **P10\_TA(2026)0215**

### **2025 Commission report on Türkiye**

### **European Parliament resolution of 17 June 2026 on the 2025 Commission report on Türkiye (2025/2256(INI))**

*The European Parliament,*

- having regard to the European Council conclusions of 17 and 18 April 2024, 30 June 2023, 23 June 2022, 24 June 2021 and 12 December 2019, and to all relevant previous Council and European Council conclusions,
- having regard to Türkiye's membership of the Council of Europe and NATO,
- having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation<sup>1</sup> (EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement),
- having regard to the statement of the members of the European Council of 25 March 2021 on Türkiye,
- having regard to the EU-Turkey statements of 18 March 2016 by the Council and of 29 November 2015 by the European Council,
- having regard to the EU's Turkey Negotiating Framework of 3 October 2005,
- having regard to the declaration issued by the European Community and its Member States on 21 September 2005 following the declaration made by Türkiye upon its signature of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement on 29 July 2005,
- having regard to the Council conclusions of 11 December 2006 and 6 March 2020, and to the Presidency conclusions of the Copenhagen

---

<sup>1</sup> OJ L 134, 7.5.2014, p. 3, ELI:  
[http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree\\_international/2014/252/oj](http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_international/2014/252/oj).

European Council of 21 and 22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

- having regard to the Council Presidency conclusions on enlargement of 16 December 2025, and to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 and of 12 December 2023,
- having regard to the international law of the sea as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which establishes the legal framework governing maritime zones and the sovereign rights of coastal states,
- having regard to the Commission communication of 4 November 2025 entitled '2025 Communication on EU enlargement policy' (COM(2025)0690) and to the accompanying Commission staff working document entitled 'Türkiye 2025 Report' (SWD(2025)0756),
- having regard to the European Court of Auditors Special Report 06/2024 of 24 April 2024 entitled 'The Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Beneficial for refugees and host communities, but impact and sustainability not yet ensured',
- having regard to the joint communications from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 29 November 2023 (JOIN(2023)0050) and of 22 March 2021 (JOIN(2021)0008) on the state of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations,
- having regard to the Commission communication of 25 September 2025 entitled 'Ninth Annual Report of the Facility for Refugees in Türkiye' (COM(2025)0517),
- having regard to the European Committee of the Regions resolution of 3 April 2025 on the Arrest of Turkish Mayors and the Assault on Local Democracy in Türkiye,
- having regard to the European Committee of the Regions opinion of 5 March 2026 on the 2025 Enlargement Package – Western Balkans and Türkiye,
- having regard to the fundamental principles of international law and to the UN Charter, the 1977 and the 1979 High-Level Agreements between the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus, and the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council (UNSC) on Cyprus, including Resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, which reaffirms the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) of 11 May 1984 on secessionist actions in Cyprus, Resolution 789 (1992) of 25 November 1992, the UNSC Presidential Statement of 23 July 2021 on Varosha, the UNSC Presidential Statement and the UNSC resolutions on the UN Peacekeeping Force

in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the mandate of which was extended until 31 January 2027 by Resolution 2815 (2026),

- having regard to Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which states that the contracting parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in any case to which they are parties, and to the ensuing obligation of Türkiye to implement all judgments of the ECtHR,
- having regard to the relevant resolutions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,
- having regard to Declaration 12(2025) of the Congress of the Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe of 27 March 2025, entitled ‘Dismissals of Mayors in Türkiye’,
- having regard to the report adopted by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe at its session of 9 and 10 October 2025 on the impact of the pre-trial detention of mayors on the exercise of local democratic governance,
- having regard to the 2025 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders,
- having regard to the Monitoring Report 2025 published by Media Freedom Rapid Response,
- having regard to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Istanbul Convention,
- having regard to the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index published on 10 February 2026 by Transparency International,
- having regard to the document of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of 22 November 2025, entitled ‘Republic of Türkiye: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission’,
- having regard to the Global Gender Gap Report 2025 published on 11 June 2025 by the World Economic Forum,
- having regard to the UNESCO statement of 10 July 2020 on Hagia Sophia, and to the relevant UNESCO World Heritage Committee decisions 44 COM 7B.58 (2021) and 45 COM 7B.58 (2023) on historic areas of Istanbul, adopted at the 44th and 45th sessions respectively,
- having regard to its resolution of 11 March 2026 on the EU enlargement strategy<sup>2</sup>,

---

<sup>2</sup> Texts adopted, P10\_TA(2026)0077.

- having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement<sup>3</sup>,
  - having regard to its resolution of 12 February 2026 on the targeted expulsions of foreign journalists and foreign Christians in Türkiye under national security pretexts<sup>4</sup>,
  - having regard to all its previous resolutions on Türkiye,
  - having regard to its resolutions on Cyprus,
  - having regard to its resolution of 15 April 2015 on the centenary of the Armenian Genocide<sup>5</sup>,
  - having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,
  - having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0106/2026),
- A. whereas Türkiye remains a candidate for EU accession; whereas EU membership remains the repeatedly declared political goal of the Turkish Government, although the gap with values and principles as enshrined in the Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and some policies of the EU is continuing to grow; whereas Türkiye needs to credibly demonstrate its commitment to closer relations and alignment with the European Union, to respect and uphold the Copenhagen criteria including the EU's foreign and security policy, to normalise its relations with all EU Member States, and to pursue and maintain good neighbourly relations with the EU and all of its Member States in order to reinvigorate its European perspective; whereas Türkiye has repeatedly been asked to refrain from all actions that violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of all EU Member States and that are in breach of international and EU law;
- B. whereas EU accession negotiations have effectively been at a standstill since 2018, owing to the deterioration of the rule of law and democracy in Türkiye and in a context of tense bilateral relations at that time;
- C. whereas in its latest progress report of 2025, the Commission once again identified serious backsliding in the rule of law and a deteriorating human rights situation in Türkiye, and raised questions about adherence to basic democratic principles, vis-à-vis the previous reporting period in 2024;

---

<sup>3</sup> OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj>.

<sup>4</sup> Texts adopted, P10\_TA(2026)0047.

<sup>5</sup> OJ C 328, 6.9.2016, p. 2.

- D. whereas the state of independence of the judiciary remains especially alarming, despite the 11 ‘judicial packages’ enacted by the Turkish Government since 2019; whereas the constitutional order of the country is jeopardised as the authority of the Constitutional Court is undermined by lower-level courts refusing to implement its rulings;
- E. whereas double standards clearly exist before the law, as evidenced by the very different treatment of similar cases, particularly in political or high-profile judicial procedures or in cases involving charges of insulting state officials;
- F. whereas Türkiye has systematically instrumentalised criminal law and counterterrorism laws to crack down on elected officials, opposition politicians and human rights defenders; whereas the recent period has been marked by a severe deterioration in democratic standards and processes in Türkiye, both on the local and the national level, as a result of judicial decisions and governmental pressure exerted on opposition mayors and municipalities; whereas since the March 2024 local elections at least 39 mayors from opposition parties, specifically 29 from the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and 10 from the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), were arrested and removed from office; whereas in 13 cases, mayors were replaced with trustees appointed by the government;
- G. whereas, after a prolonged legal process, on 21 May 2026, an Ankara Regional Court of Appeals issued a ruling of ‘absolute nullity’ (‘mutlak butlan’) concerning the CHP’s 2023 party congress, thereby annulling the election that brought Özgür Özel to the chair and the current party leadership into office; whereas this court ruling, despite pending possible appeals, was accompanied by a specific injunction in order to effectively remove from office the elected leadership and transfer its authority to the former chair, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, and the previous Party Assembly; whereas three days later, on 24 May 2026, upon the request of former chair Kılıçdaroğlu’s team, Turkish riot police stormed the CHP headquarters in Ankara, using tear gas and violence to enforce the court decision ousting the elected leadership and reinstating the previous one;
- H. whereas the democratically elected Mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem İmamoğlu, has been in prison since 19 March 2025 on trumped-up charges that bear the hallmarks of political pressure and are in blatant violation of basic principles of criminal law, such as the principle of individual responsibility; whereas this is widely considered an attempt to politically eliminate the main opposition candidate for the next presidential elections;
- I. whereas there are currently around 800 files pending before the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (GNAT) requesting the lifting of

the parliamentary immunity of current members of parliament (MPs); whereas an overwhelming proportion of the requests affect MPs from opposition parties, mainly DEM and CHP;

- J. whereas Türkiye is a member of the Council of Europe and is therefore legally bound by the judgments of the ECtHR; whereas owing to its failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings, Türkiye is currently facing historic infringement proceedings; whereas Türkiye consistently ranks among the countries most frequently found to be in violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms protected by the ECHR; whereas in January 2026, Türkiye had the highest number of pending cases before the ECtHR, accounting for over a third of the court's total case list;
- K. whereas Türkiye is classified as 'not free' by Freedom House and has experienced one of the worst declines in the level of freedom in the world in the past 11 years; whereas the 2025 World Press Freedom Index indicates further deterioration and places Türkiye as the 159th out of 180 countries for press freedom, with the report underlining that authoritarianism is gaining ground in Türkiye, media pluralism is being called into question and all possible means are being used to undermine critics; whereas, according to Reporters Without Borders and the BIA Media Monitoring Reports, between 20 and 29 journalists were jailed during 2025, 3 others were held under house arrest for months and dozens more were subjected to judicial control in ways that violated their freedom of movement; whereas in the same period a total of 58 journalists were either detained or forcibly brought in for questioning by the police;
- L. whereas Türkiye ranked 135th out of 146 countries in the 2025 Global Gender Gap Index, underscoring severe gender inequality and systemic failures in protecting women's rights; whereas according to data from the We Will Stop Femicide Platform, in 2025, there were 297 suspicious deaths of women and 294 femicides, while other sources reported figures as high as 420; whereas 2025 saw a record rise in suspicious deaths involving women in Türkiye; whereas the lack of a comprehensive official data collection system on femicides remain a serious concern; whereas Türkiye stands out as one of the OECD countries most affected by violence against women;
- M. whereas according to local human rights organisations IHD and TIHV, Türkiye's prison population had reached a record 433 543 inmates as at 2 December 2025, marking a sevenfold increase over the past two decades, while another 460 921 people were subject to judicial supervision; whereas these organisations also documented 1 412 sick prisoners, including 335 in serious condition; whereas Turkish prisons operate beyond their capacity, exacerbating problems such as overcrowding, inadequate living environments and limited access to basic resources; whereas reports of human rights violations in prisons have increased;

- N. whereas according to Transparency International, Türkiye scored 31 out of 100 in its 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, having fallen from 50 out of 100 in 2013 to its lowest mark, meaning that Türkiye currently ranks 124th out of 180 countries; whereas more than nine years after the adoption of the Council of Europe's Group of States against Corruption's (GRECO) Fourth Round Evaluation Report on Türkiye, only 3 out of 22 recommendations contained in the report have been implemented in full;
- O. whereas Türkiye is a diverse multi-ethnic society in a complex and tension-prone region;
- P. whereas Türkiye is going through a political process entitled 'Terror-free Türkiye', with the aim of ending political violence and addressing the Kurdish issue through a political solution;
- Q. whereas beyond the accession process, constructive engagement in EU-Türkiye relations is needed, whereas Türkiye is a member of NATO and a key partner for the stability in the wider Eastern Mediterranean region and in the areas of trade, economic relations, security, migration and cooperation against terrorism; whereas cooperation with Türkiye is advancing in a number of policy areas of common interest, including through high-level dialogues regarding the removal of trade barriers and increased cooperation on prevention of sanctions circumvention, and could further advance in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner fully in line with the April 2024 European Council conclusions;
- R. whereas Türkiye continues to host one of the largest refugee populations in the world; whereas EU-Türkiye cooperation on migration management, security and regional stability continues to be of strategic importance and contributes to the reduction of irregular and dangerous crossings on the Eastern Mediterranean route to Europe and in saving lives at sea; whereas since 2011 the EU has provided close to EUR 12,5 billion for the support of refugees and host communities in Türkiye;
- S. whereas Türkiye's alignment with the EU's common foreign and security policy has reached an all-time low of 4 % in 2025, compared with 6 % in 2024; whereas this is by far the lowest level of alignment of any candidate country; whereas this indicator does not capture all levels of engagement of any given candidate country in the field of foreign and security policy;
- T. whereas the tensions between the EU and Türkiye in relation to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean have de-escalated but not ceased;
- U. whereas Türkiye continues to play a significant role in the Syrian conflict; whereas Türkiye has conducted large-scale military operations on Syrian territory, particularly targeting Kurdish-held

areas, and occupies territories in northern Syria, both of which are violations of international law;

- V. whereas the military operations against the Iranian regime will have implications for Türkiye given its geographic proximity, including through spillover effects, in particular with regard to renewed migration pressures; whereas Türkiye has faced several missile threats against its territory originating from Iran, which were successfully neutralised via the NATO integrated air and missile defence system;
- W. whereas the EU-Türkiye trade relationship is particularly extensive, involves highly integrated supply chains, and was valued at over EUR 210 billion in 2024, with Türkiye being the EU's fifth largest trading partner and the EU being Türkiye's largest trading partner by far, as well as its primary source of foreign direct investment;
- X. whereas Türkiye's economy has been affected by high inflation, currency instability and structural challenges, with direct implications for workers, households and social cohesion; whereas over the last two years, the negative trend has been halted and corrected with sound macroeconomic policies, which, however, need time to take effect;
- Y. whereas Turkish nationals account for the second highest number of processed applications for EU visas;
- Z. whereas Türkiye will host the 31st UN Climate Change Conference in Antalya in November 2026 and should therefore demonstrate credible commitment to implementing its CO<sub>2</sub> reduction targets and making its climate policy more ambitious;
- AA. whereas prominent figures in the opposition have recently openly advocated for a re-engagement between the EU and Türkiye; whereas former Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş has called for the resumption of the Turkish accession process with the idea that this would, despite all of the current difficulties and shortcomings, trigger action in the area of democratic reform and could create leverage for all stakeholders; whereas CHP Chairperson Özgür Özel, in a letter addressed to EU stakeholders, has advocated for a more inclusive and strategic understanding of cooperation between the EU and Türkiye, reaffirming support for full EU membership, and stressing that the deepening of institutional and economic integration – including in the 'Made in Europe' process – will serve as an important lever for the consolidation of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Türkiye; whereas CHP presidential candidate and Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu has also expressed in a letter the view that disengagement with Türkiye would weaken the EU's support for the democratic transformation in the country; whereas he has further

called for a principled step-by-step rebuilding of relations, including a steady engagement anchored in the Copenhagen criteria and the urgent initiation of talks regarding the modernisation of the customs union, as a means to keep Türkiye closely aligned with EU standards and reinforce transparency, competitiveness and the rule of law;

### ***Commitment to EU accession***

1. Reaffirms its appreciation for the long-standing aspirations of the majority of the Turkish people regarding accession to the EU and maintaining Türkiye's candidate status, despite the persistent lack of progress and political will; acknowledges the fatigue that, as a consequence, continues to grow among stakeholders on both sides of the process; underscores, however, that any development in the accession process requires tangible progress in upholding the rule of law and democratic processes and believes that, in the absence of such progress, Türkiye's EU accession process cannot be resumed;
2. Stresses the merit-based, normative, non-transactional nature of the EU accession process, which is contingent on fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria and is not bound by any deadline; stresses that this fulfilment requires stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and the protection of minorities, good neighbourly relations, recognition of all Member States, respect for international law and alignment with the EU's common foreign and security policy;
3. Notes with regret that despite the Turkish Government's repeated statements recommitting to the goal of EU membership, persistent and serious concerns raised in its previous reports regarding shortcomings affecting the accession process remain unaddressed, including the continued undermining of human rights and the civil society space, and that even further serious backsliding in rule of law and deteriorating fundamental rights have been documented in the most recent period, in continuation of the trend that has pushed the country towards an authoritarian model over the past decade; considers this continued inaction as a clear indication of the Turkish Government's lack of genuine political will for reform or for reviving the accession process;
4. Invites the Turkish Government to move from rhetoric to action and, instead of lamenting the length of time Türkiye has been kept waiting at the EU's door, to demonstrate through concrete and well-understood measures, its genuine willingness to address the persistent shortcomings in the areas of the rule of law, human rights, democratic standards, freedom of the press and other fundamental freedoms, as well as with regard to respect for good neighbourly relations and international law; stresses in particular, among other urgent measures, the need to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, safeguard freedom of expression, protect journalists and

the rights of local authorities, and put an end to politically motivated trials;

5. Reiterates, nevertheless, that, while the accession process has been at a standstill since 2018, Türkiye remains a country of strategic relevance, a NATO ally and a country with which the EU has multi-layered relations ranging from the areas of trade, economy and migration management to foreign and security policy; underlines Türkiye's importance for the regional security framework and stability, as well as for the security of Ukraine in the face of Russia's aggression; stresses, however, that growing foreign policy divergences are hardly compatible with the European security and defence architecture; firmly supports the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye in every field of common interest in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner, in line with the April 2024 European Council conclusions and bound by and aimed at promoting international law;
6. Expresses its hope for a change of course in the Turkish Government's engagement with the fundamental issues at the core of the EU accession process, which would allow the EU-Türkiye relationship to develop towards a closer partnership with the perspective of a possible future reopening of the accession process;
7. Is deeply concerned by the weak voice and scarce statements of other EU institutions, and many EU Member States, in the face of the erosion of the rule of law in Türkiye; underlines that the failure by high-level EU officials to consistently and publicly address the ongoing democratic backsliding – particularly during official visits to the country – risks further alienating Turkish civil society and undermining the EU's image and credibility, including among the most pro-EU segments of Turkish society, in a manner that will take long time to remedy; calls on the EU ambassador and the ambassadors of EU Member States in Türkiye to resume visiting prominent imprisoned figures, to attend relevant trials, to publicly oppose the continued targeting of political parties and members of the opposition and dissenting voices, and to systematically raise concerns with Turkish authorities in this regard, while maintaining close engagement with civil society;

***The core of the accession process: democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights***

8. Expresses grave concern at the continuing serious erosion of the rule of law and the lack of judicial independence in Türkiye, in the framework of a deeply entrenched authoritarian interpretation of the presidential system; deplores the crackdown and arbitrary legal proceedings that are applied by the Turkish judiciary on politicians, journalists, lawyers, activists, artists and anyone who dares to raise a critical voice; further deplores the shrinking space for media

freedom, civic activity and the right to assembly in the country and calls on the government to reverse this trend before it is too late; calls for the adoption of structural measures allowing for the significant improvement of judicial independence;

9. Deplores the lack of impartiality and independence and the extensive use of double standards in the judiciary, both by prosecutors and judges, particularly relating to cases about insulting officials or corruption charges; notes that government supporters are not treated in the same way as opposition members; further deplores the unlawful practice of the removal and arbitrary displacement of judges working on political cases, which significantly affects the impartiality of the process; calls on the Turkish judiciary to put an end to the use of evidence from secret witnesses, a practice that is particularly recurrent in high-profile cases and in which evidence is accepted without verification in what constitutes a clear violation of the right to a fair trial and runs contrary to the case-law of the ECtHR; highlights that this abusive use of legal proceedings leads to grave breaches of the legal presumption of innocence in contravention of international legal responsibilities and Turkish domestic law; is alarmed by reports of a severe deterioration in the quality of judicial proceedings in Türkiye, particularly observed in the low quality of the indictments, in breach of both domestic and international legal standards; points to the Turkish Council of Judges and Prosecutors and its evident lack of independence from the government in the selection, recruitment and promotion of judges and prosecutors as a key factor enabling the deliberate weaponisation of the judiciary to suppress dissent;
10. Notes with regret that even though EU enlargement policy is currently regaining new momentum, Türkiye is missing this window of opportunity because of a lack of democratic reforms; further notes that a first step to seizing this opportunity would be to abide by the rulings of the ECtHR and the Constitutional Court of Türkiye; continues to be appalled by the Turkish authorities', and in particular the Turkish judiciary's, continuous disregard for and failure to apply landmark Constitutional Court and ECtHR rulings, which undermines legal certainty and perpetuates systemic violations; takes note with regret of the prolonged infringement proceedings by the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers, which have resulted in a failure to act effectively to enforce ECtHR judgments and ensure compliance with them; calls on the Commission and the Member States to use all diplomatic channels to urge Türkiye to implement relevant ECtHR rulings and to consider applying relevant funding conditionality in relation to compliance with ECtHR rulings; condemns in the strongest possible terms the Turkish authorities' sustained and deliberate decision to illegally keep imprisoned, on political grounds, prominent figures such as former HDP party co-chairs Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ -for more than 9 years - and human rights defender Osman Kavala -for more than 8

years –, despite the relevant ECtHR rulings; calls for their immediate and unconditional release; is appalled to see that, instead of being immediately freed, Selahattin Demirtaş received on 6 January 2026 an additional prison sentence of more than one year in a different case based on speeches delivered back in 2015, despite the now three landmark rulings by the ECtHR calling for his release, the last of which was made final on 3 November 2025; considers these actions a grave abuse of power and a display of flagrant contempt for the rule of law; urges Türkiye once again to fully implement all judgments of the ECtHR in line with Article 46 of the ECHR and in line with the unconditional obligations derived from Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution, including the ECtHR's 2023 ruling in *Yüksel Yalçınkaya v Türkiye* and related cases; takes note of the ECtHR decision not to award compensation or cover legal costs in the thousands of follow-up cases, which could be potentially unfair to applicants and inconsistent with prior practice of the court; calls on Türkiye to also respect judgements related to missing persons and properties in Cyprus, including the ECtHR decision of 24 January 2008 in the case of the murders of Tassos Isaak and Solomos Solomou; calls on the Turkish authorities to execute the international arrest warrants issued against the suspects in these murders and to surrender these individuals to the Republic of Cyprus;

11. Is deeply concerned by the growing constitutional crisis in Türkiye caused by the refusal of ordinary courts to comply with binding Constitutional Court judgments or other decisions of relevant higher judicial instances, which constitutes a clear rupture of the legal order; condemns the continued detention of Gezi case defendant Can Atalay, despite two binding decisions of the Constitutional Court, and strongly denounces the unlawful stripping of his parliamentary mandate in open defiance of constitutional guarantees and the democratic will of the electorate; condemns the decision of the Istanbul 13th High Criminal Court to reject the Constitutional Court's order for a retrial in the case of Tayfun Kahraman, another Gezi case defendant whose health has seriously deteriorated recently, denying the requests to halt the execution of the sentence and to release him; is appalled by the recent conviction of Ayşe Barım, a well-known talent manager, for alleged involvement in the Gezi Park protest 13 years ago despite the lack of any evidence of wrongdoing; further regrets that the Ankara Regional Administrative Court's 13th Administrative Chamber has refused to comply with the Council of State's landmark decision in the case of Hafize Öztürk Türkmen – the first related to one of the 'peace academics' – and by which he should have been reinstated in his university position; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all arbitrarily detained individuals, for the dropping of charges against those prosecuted solely for exercising their fundamental rights, and for an end to the misuse of counterterrorism and judicial mechanisms to silence dissent;

12. Condemns the Turkish Government's relentless targeting of political parties and members of the opposition, which has been particularly severe over the last year in the case of the main opposition party CHP, moving Türkiye yet further away from already limited party competition toward fully authoritarian rule; strongly condemns the politically engineered removal from office of CHP elected Chairperson Özgür Özel and party leadership, following a court ruling that declared the 2023 CHP congress null and void and opted to reinstate the former party leadership; calls on the Government of Türkiye to cease these abuse tactics, which constitute a grave attack on democratic pluralism, the rule of law, and the sovereign will of party members and voters in Türkiye; considers this case the latest example of a broader pattern of repression against the opposition, involving the weaponisation of the judicial system with the aim of eliminating potential competitors in future elections, thereby further entrenching Türkiye in a fully authoritarian system; calls on the Commission and Member States to condemn the CHP leadership suspension publicly and privately in its exchanges with the Turkish Government and engage more constructively with opposition parties in Türkiye; is concerned about the risks of a protracted internal crisis inside the main opposition party in the absence of a swift congress that would allow party members to democratically determine their leadership;
13. Reiterates its strong condemnation of the continued detention and the removal from office of the Mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Ekrem İmamoğlu of the CHP, in what has become a massive political case affecting more than 400 defendants including district mayors and officials, 105 of which are currently in pre-trial detention; strongly rejects the Ankara regional court's decision, on 21 May 2026, to annul the decision of the 38th ordinary and 21st extraordinary CHP conventions and to reinstall former CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu over current leader Özgür Özel; regards this ruling as a flagrant example of state interference in the internal matters of the biggest opposition party; condemns, furthermore, the arrest, on 4 April 2026, of elected opposition mayor Mustafa Bozbey, alongside several members of the CHP, reportedly on false charges of corruption and bribery; considers these developments as further evidence of the systemic erosion of democratic governance and political pluralism at local level in Türkiye; welcomes the recent visits to Türkiye of EU mayors and city representatives and members of the European Committee of the Regions showing their solidarity and support with the defendants; echoes their call for the respect of municipal freedoms; is deeply concerned by the acceptance of the nearly 4 000-page indictment, prepared under the responsibility of the notorious former Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek, in which İmamoğlu is accused of leading a vast criminal network and committing 142 offenses that could result in a sentence of up to 2 430 years in prison; welcomes the significant decision of the ECtHR to accept İmamoğlu's application concerning alleged

unlawful detention under its 'priority case' procedure; condemns the long-standing targeting of Ekrem İmamoğlu, the CHP's current presidential candidate, through a maze of dozens of investigations, overlapping judicial cases and arbitrary administrative decisions, including another recent indictment on charges of 'political espionage' and the unlawful and politically motivated revocation of his university diploma, a requisite for his eligibility to be Turkish President; deplores the Istanbul 5th Administrative Court's decision on 23 January 2026 to reject İmamoğlu's request to overturn the revocation decision; is deeply concerned by the staggering number of procedures filed at the GNAT seeking the lifting of the parliamentary immunity of current MPs, which overwhelmingly affect members of opposition parties; emphasises that these actions undermine the prospect for a stronger more comprehensive EU-Türkiye partnership and overall improved relations; calls on all political actors in Türkiye to engage seriously in strengthening the GNAT as a pluralist chamber, to address the challenges facing Turkish society, and to lay the foundations for a democratic future;

14. Is gravely concerned by the further deterioration of local democracy in Türkiye; strongly condemns the dismissals and arrests of at least 39 elected mayors from opposition parties and dozens of local officials, as well as the replacement of 13 mayors with trustees appointed by the government, often in connection with the overly broad and arbitrary application of Türkiye's anti-terror legislation or unsubstantiated corruption allegations; reiterates its consideration of this long-standing practice of appointing trustees as a blatant attack on the most basic principles of local democracy; urges the Turkish authorities to immediately cease and reverse the repression of opposition municipalities - including through the selective seizure of financial assets - and to respect the rights of voters to elect their chosen representatives in line with the recommendations of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission; is deeply concerned by the recent legal reform requiring local governments, their affiliated entities and municipally controlled companies to obtain presidential approval before establishing companies or cooperatives and making other strategic financial decisions, thereby significantly expanding central executive oversight over local economic decision-making and further undermining the shrinking autonomy of local governments; highlights that the dismantling of local democracy significantly weakens state capacity, notably for the provision of services, crisis response (such as for earthquakes) and social services for refugees and vulnerable groups, and therefore threatens human security;
15. Condemns the harassment and attacks on defence lawyers on account of their professional activities, as illustrated by the ongoing imprisonment of Mehmet Pehlivan (Ekrem İmamoğlu's lawyer) or the recent sentencing to 11 years in jail of Ramazan Demir (Selahattin Demirtaş's lawyer); considers these and other actions against

lawyers as an unacceptable interference with the right to defence and the legal profession, which is one of the fundamental elements of a functioning judiciary and the rule of law; welcomes the 26th Istanbul Heavy Penal Court's acquittal on terrorism-related charges of the president and 10 members of the executive board of the Istanbul Bar Association but stresses that this criminal case should not have happened in the first place; calls on Turkish authorities to implement safeguards for the independence, safety and autonomy of lawyers and to ensure that lawyers and their professional bodies are not subjected to prosecution or other improper pressure solely for carrying out their lawful functions, thereby ensuring that the rights of legal professionals are aligned with Council of Europe standards;

16. Continues to deplore the ongoing and intensifying prosecution, censorship and harassment of journalists and independent media, denying them the freedom to carry out their professional duties and inform the public, which is essential to a functioning democratic society; is deeply worried by reports indicating that up to 90 % of the national media is now pro-government or under government control; deeply regrets, in this regard, the seizure by the Turkish Government of TELE1, one of the few remaining critical broadcasters, which is now under trustee control, and considers this a deliberate attack on media freedom; condemns the harassment of independent journalists who, in 2025, suffered an increased number of arrests and detentions mainly connected to accusations of 'membership of a terrorist organisation', 'insulting the President' or the alleged violation of the law on assemblies and demonstrations; follows with great concern the cases of Deutsche Welle reporter Aican Uludağ, who was arrested because of social media posts made more than one year ago, was held in a maximum-security prison for over 90 days and was recently released, although the charges against him have not been dropped and his trial will resume in September, of TELE1 editor-in-chief Merdan Yanardağ, who is currently imprisoned over 'espionage' allegations, of Medyascope reporter Furkan Karabay, who has been arrested repeatedly over the last three years and was recently put under house arrest for two months, of TV anchor Sedef Kabaş, who is facing another judicial case for her social media posts, of veteran journalist Fatih Altaylı, who was recently released pending his appeal of a sentence of more than four years in jail on ludicrous charges of physically threatening the Turkish President, of BirGün reporter İsmail Arı, who was recently arrested on alleged charges of 'disinformation' for his investigative work, and of Swedish journalist Joakim Medin, among others; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all unjustly detained journalists; strongly deplores the instrumentalisation of the Radio and Television Supreme Council, which should be independent, to further stifle independent media through financial and broadcasting sanctions, which are overwhelmingly imposed on critical outlets; deplores the multiple and systematic actions against freedom of expression online, including repeated restrictions on internet access, bandwidth

throttling, broadcast bans and blocking of social network accounts, websites and thousands of news stories, alongside content removal requests meant to silence journalists and ordinary citizens, frequently on the grounds of 'national security and public order'; condemns the instrumentalisation of legal provisions by the Turkish authorities to curtail journalists' work and exert targeted pressure on them; calls on the Turkish authorities to immediately ensure the protection of freedom of expression and media freedom and to guarantee that no individual is deprived of liberty solely for the peaceful exercise of their fundamental rights, in line with Türkiye's international human rights obligations;

17. Remains concerned about bans on assemblies, frequently on unsubstantiated grounds, and the excessive use of force against peaceful demonstrators; stresses that these practices run against the guarantees to the right to peaceful assembly under Article 34 of the Turkish Constitution and continue to fall short of international human rights standards; is especially concerned about the impact that these violations of individual freedoms have on the student movement and about the fact that a wide range of repressive actions – including arbitrary detentions, disciplinary investigations, scholarship cuts, evictions from dormitories, media censorship and physical violence – appears to be being used with the aim of limiting young people's presence in the public sphere; regrets the fact that large numbers of individuals have been detained or subjected to judicial control measures because of their membership of civil society organisations and bar associations, or their participation in demonstrations, particularly the demonstrations held after the arrest and detention of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, and protests related to the 1 May, and rights for women and LGBTI+ people; acknowledges some positive steps, including some acquittal decisions, but urges the Turkish authorities to uphold the freedom of assembly and protest without undue restrictions;
18. Expresses growing concern about how the Turkish authorities are instilling a regressive moral agenda based on a religious approach in all areas of society, which stands in marked contrast to the secular foundations of the Republic of Türkiye, as enshrined in its constitution; notes that this growing shift, which is promoted by the ruling coalition, can be observed in legislation, political discourse, education, cultural life and media, raising serious questions about the erosion of secularism, pluralism and fundamental freedoms; is concerned by the Turkish Government's decision to file a lawsuit against the 168 signatories, including journalists, artists and academics, of the 'We Defend Secularism Together' declaration;
19. Remains deeply concerned about the state of academic freedom and institutional independence, as illustrated by the deteriorating situation in Boğaziçi University since the appointment, in 2021, of its rector by a decision of the Turkish President; considers this

extension of the trustee model to academic institutions, which has produced a clear negative impact on the academic life and performance of the institution, to be a further departure from EU standards on academic freedom, mirroring the government's attempts to tighten control on any space of possible dissent; calls on the Turkish authorities to ensure democratic governance and autonomy in the country's universities and to put an end to the crackdown on students that is taking place through restrictions on their freedom of association and expression and on their right to participate fully and freely in academic life; expresses its concern regarding the case of Bilgi University – abruptly closed down by presidential decree on 22 May 2026 and reopened three days later following significant public backlash and widespread protests from students and academics – as yet another example of threats to academic freedom, institutional autonomy, and state intervention in higher education;

20. Remains deeply concerned about women's rights, and particularly about the high level of gender-based violence and the high incidence of femicide in Türkiye; urges the Turkish authorities to improve the legislative framework and its implementation, including by fully applying Protection Law No 6284, in order to effectively tackle all forms of violence against women and the practice of so-called honour killings, provide stronger protection mechanisms and end the persistent policy of impunity by holding abusers to account; regrets that despite having declared 2025 the 'Year of the Family', the Turkish Government has opted for a highly ideological and regressive approach that has targeted gender equality as a threat, further reducing the visibility of women in public space, and often treating violence against women and girls as a private family matter, which contributes to impunity; reiterates its strong condemnation of Türkiye's withdrawal, by presidential decree, from the Istanbul Convention and reiterates its call to reverse this decision and re-ratify it; is concerned by the fact that civil society organisations dealing with women's rights continue to face growing pressure, including by means of systematic administrative harassment and judicial prosecutions; urges the Turkish Government to address the persistent lack of gender equality in economic life, as Türkiye has one of the lowest female labour force participation rates among OECD countries, as well as a persistent low level of participation by women in decision-making and policymaking processes;
21. Continues to condemn the ongoing violations and lack of protection of the fundamental rights of LGBTI+ persons in Türkiye, including arbitrary detentions, the persistence of hate speech, hate crimes, physical attacks and discriminatory rhetoric, and continued media stereotyping and stigmatisation on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity; deplores the fact that, instead of tackling this continued discrimination, the Turkish authorities have even intensified their repression by using the Year of the Family initiative

as a platform to specifically target the LGBTI+ community and their rights; is deeply worried about several draft law proposals leaked over the past year, which included, for the first time in the history of the Republic of Türkiye, the criminalisation of any expression of LGBTI+ identities and consensual same-sex sexual activity; calls on the Turkish authorities to refrain from any reform of the Turkish penal code that would contravene Türkiye's international obligations, including those under the ECHR; deeply regrets that in 2025, the Turkish Government continued to ban the Kuir fest and the Pride March in Istanbul and other locations, as well as many other anti-homophobia activities, while at the same time granting official permission for anti-LGBTI+ rallies and demonstrations that promote exclusion and discrimination; deplores the judicial closure of the İzmir-based Genç LGBTI+ Association, amid heightened harassment of civil society organisations working on LGBTI+ issues,' based on charges of 'obscenity' that are increasingly being used to target activists and artists, including Turkish pop singer Mabel Matiz; welcomes the decision of 23 February 2026 of an Ankara court to acquit human rights defender and LGBTI+ activist Enes Hocaoğulları of all charges; regrets the unjustified prosecution he has suffered, including 35 days of pre-trial detention for exercising his freedom of speech at a Council of Europe conference in March 2025;

22. Reiterates its call on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR), in view of the severe democratic backsliding described above, to consider restrictive measures under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, including the freezing of assets in the EU, against Turkish officials responsible for serious and deliberate violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including those officials assuming the role of trustee and those appointing them, or those who are key actors in the state's repressive machinery, such as former Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek; is appalled by his recent promotion to Minister of Justice, which indicates that throughout his career he has always been a political actor following a political agenda; expresses strong solidarity with Turkish civil society, human rights, women's and LGBTI+ organisations, youth initiatives, professional chambers, bar associations and trade unions; reiterates its view that EU financial and technical assistance should remain focused on these groups and be increased;
23. Condemns reported cases of transnational repression targeting Turkish nationals abroad, including intimidation, forced returns and misuse of international cooperation mechanisms; condemns Türkiye's activities that have undermined European social cohesion, security and democratic processes, including interference in Member States' internal affairs through diaspora communities and the use of its state agency Anadolu as an organ of propaganda; remains worried that the racist extremist movement Ülkü Ocakları,

also known as the Grey Wolves, which is closely linked to the ruling coalition Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), is spreading not only in Türkiye but also in EU Member States; calls for the EU and its Member States to examine the possibility of banning their associations in EU countries; condemns the Turkish authorities' policy of political, financial, media and logistical support for Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movements, networks, associations, charities and educational bodies operating within the territory of several EU Member States as well as the EU's neighbourhood, which enables them to carry out activities involving ideological influence, funding and recruitment; calls on Türkiye to end all forms of support for these organisations;

24. Expresses its deep concern about the lack of improvement in the dire situation in Turkish prisons owing to severe overcrowding and poor living conditions, with reports, including by the Council of Europe, of torture and ill-treatment being widespread, and access to basic needs, such as hygiene and healthcare, and information being severely limited; notes reports of pregnant women being held in pre-trial detention, including cases of childbirth in custody; urges Türkiye to prioritise non-custodial measures for pregnant women and ensure full implementation of the UN Bangkok Rules on women prisoners; is particularly worried by the conditions of imprisonment of minors, older people and seriously ill prisoners, which are reportedly not compatible with the standards established by the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; take notes of the recent legal reforms on the law on imprisonment, which have paved the way for the early or conditional release of thousands of prisoners; calls on the Turkish authorities to avoid any politically motivated discriminatory implementation of these reforms and to prioritise the release of vulnerable inmates, including older people, ill people, persons with disabilities and mothers with children; calls on the Turkish authorities to reform their prison policy, in order to address the insufficient legal guarantees for the prevention of torture and ill-treatment and to improve their response to cases denouncing instances of torture, maltreatment and abuse; is worried by reports by local human rights organisations warning of a renewed rise in enforced disappearances since 2016;
25. Commends the Turkish authorities and political parties for their efforts within the context of the ongoing 'Terror-free Türkiye' initiative, which has paved the way for notable breakthroughs such as the announced dissolution of the terrorist organisation the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK); regrets, nevertheless, the lack of timely and decisive action on the part of the Turkish Government, whose stalling tactics and attitude towards the next steps in the process have rendered it more fragile and vulnerable to external developments, while creating space for further polarisation; underlines the need to prevent the broad application of anti-

terrorism legislation from being used to restrict legitimate political activity, peaceful dissent, civil society work and independent media; deplores the fact that the initiative is accompanied by an atmosphere of repression and curtailment of democratic local government; regrets the continued political repression, judicial harassment and restriction of cultural and linguistic rights faced by Kurdish citizens, which undermine democratic principles and social cohesion; takes note of the final report by the Commission for National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy established within the GNAT; expresses its hope that the process will continue advancing, with a prominent role for the Turkish Parliament, to the point of providing a peaceful and sustainable solution to the political, social, democratic and security-related dimensions of the Kurdish issue and of implementing legislative reforms for Kurdish rights, bringing about reconciliation between the different groups in Turkish society; highlights that this process should be an opportunity to address long-standing human rights concerns and reinforce democratic institutions; encourages all stakeholders, particularly the Turkish Government, to make full use of this process to advance reforms and strengthen human rights protections, by bringing counterterrorism, which remains an important field of cooperation with the EU, and other legislation and its implementation in line with EU and Council of Europe human rights standards, leaving behind the security-driven approach that has prevailed during the last decade; considers some recent developments to be contradictory and worrying signs, such as the continuation of the trustee system or the new convictions of Selahattin Demirtaş, of his lawyer Ramazan Demir and of the mayor of Istanbul's Esenyurt district Ahmet Özer, who has been sentenced to over six years of prison on charges of 'membership of a terrorist organisation' for his role in an informal political alliance between his party the CHP and the DEM party in the 2024 local elections;

26. Calls on the Turkish authorities to establish an institutional framework as an integral part of any lasting peace process, in order to address enforced disappearances, forced displacement and other grave human rights violations stemming from decades of conflict around the Kurdish issue; urges the establishment of pluralistic monitoring mechanisms and the meaningful inclusion of human rights organisations and civil society actors, including in the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission for National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy;
27. Acknowledges that Türkiye provides generally adequate legal guarantees for freedom of religion or belief and that freedom of worship is generally respected in the country; urges the Turkish authorities to address the remaining shortcomings with regard to the protection of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, in particular as regards their legal personality, the insufficient protection and promotion of minority languages, limited access to

schooling support, restrictions on the training, appointment and succession of clergy, restricted access to media and public advertising in minority languages, and persistent complications in the enjoyment of property rights; calls on Türkiye to implement the Venice Commission recommendations, Council of Europe resolutions and all relevant ECtHR rulings in this regard, including concerning the Greek Orthodox population of the islands of Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos); notes with concern that representatives of different confessions, including non-Muslim and Alevi communities, continue to face bureaucratic obstacles when attempting to register places of worship; calls on Türkiye to adopt the long-awaited regulation on the election of board members in non-Muslim minority foundations controlling community hospitals; reiterates its call on Türkiye to respect the importance of the Ecumenical Patriarchate for Orthodox Christians all over the world, to recognise its legal personality and the public use of the ecclesiastical title of the Ecumenical Patriarch, in accordance with the relevant Venice Commission recommendation; calls on Türkiye to fully respect and protect the outstanding universal value of Hagia Sophia and the Chora Museum, which are included in UNESCO's World Heritage List; notes with concern that Türkiye has still not implemented two decisions of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee of 2021 and 2023 regarding its obligations to undertake special measures to protect these monuments; deplores the lack of protection of Panagia Soumela Monastery, which has been put forward for inclusion in the UNESCO World Heritage Monuments list; expresses its serious concerns at the acts of vandalism and destruction targeting minority places of worship; strongly condemns the continued hate attacks against Alevi, Christian and Jewish minorities; calls on the Turkish authorities to effectively investigate and prosecute those responsible for hate crimes, including hate speech, and all forms of discrimination committed against minorities, and to ensure that media regulators apply standards against incitement and hate speech, including against religious communities, notably the Alevi, Christian and Jewish communities; welcomes the envisaged reopening of the Halki Seminary, which has been closed since 1971, as an important positive step in the recognition of religious and minority rights and calls for the lifting of all obstacles to its proper functioning; deplores the application in recent years of administrative measures, such as the N-82 and G-87 codes, to hundreds of foreign Christian pastors, missionaries and their family members, designating them as national security threats without evidence, trial or effective means of appeal, which has resulted in their deportation from Türkiye or their being denied re-entry to the country; urges the Turkish Government to take all the necessary steps to ensure full religious freedom and non-discrimination within the UN framework and according to the EU *acquis* and principles; calls on Türkiye to refrain from any statements or actions that could be interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of EU Member

States concerning the situation of the Muslim minority in Thrace, in view of the relevant ECtHR rulings;

### ***Socio-economic and sustainability reforms***

28. Welcomes the Turkish authorities' ongoing macroeconomic stabilisation and reform programme and their commitment to reducing inflation while protecting growth, which has reduced inflation and improved confidence in the Turkish lira, as also evidenced by the recent IMF Article IV staff consultations in Türkiye; notes that, despite these efforts, the economic situation remains fragile and volatile, with the results of the unorthodox monetary policy still impacting the cost of living; notes that, as a tight monetary policy and prudent fiscal policy will be required to stay on this path, measures should be undertaken to protect the most vulnerable, particularly pensioners;
29. Notes that the continued erosion of the rule of law and legal certainty will inevitably have a negative impact on investor confidence and on the economy; stresses that sustainable economic development requires strong democratic institutions, the rule of law, legal certainty and respect for fundamental rights; highlights the vast financial impact that unlawful actions by the authorities can have, as illustrated by the arrest of the Mayor of Istanbul in March 2025, which triggered financial turmoil and large capital outflows, forcing the relevant authorities to take extraordinary measures to stem the fall of the lira, restore investor confidence and preserve financial stability, at the cost of a substantial decrease in official reserves; is concerned by the extensive use of the extraordinary powers granted to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF), which has seized and appointed trustees to hundreds of private companies, including large conglomerates and media companies such as TELE1, making the TMSF one of the country's biggest corporate actors; notes that the outward migration of talented people from Türkiye because of concerns regarding the rule of law and fundamental freedoms can have an increased negative impact on the economic and social situation;
30. Acknowledges the recent important discovery by the Turkish Government of large reserves of rare earth elements in Eskişehir province, which could position Türkiye as an important actor in a strategic global market; highlights the potential of this discovery in contributing to diversification and resilience in global rare earth element supply chains as well as the major challenges it implies, including access to advanced extraction and processing technologies and the need to ensure high standards of environmental protection and sustainable resource management;
31. Calls on Turkish authorities to implement Türkiye's international obligations in relation to the fight against corruption, in particular

the UN Convention Against Corruption and the relevant Council of Europe conventions, and to ensure effective responses to the recommendations issued by GRECO, including by adopting the necessary legislation, which is one of the remaining benchmarks for visa liberalisation; stresses the need to improve the integrity of public procurement processes, political party financing, the judiciary, public administration and the construction sector, which remain particularly vulnerable to corruption; deeply regrets that the recent high-level corruption cases launched by the authorities have exclusively targeted opposition mayors and municipalities, further diminishing trust in the effectiveness and real will of the authorities in the fight against corruption; urges the Turkish authorities to ensure impartiality and transparency in their anti-corruption efforts; calls on the Turkish authorities to enhance the fight against counterfeiting and to restore the property rights regime according to international standards;

32. Welcomes the removal of Türkiye from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in June 2024, following significant progress in improving its anti-money laundering regime and combating the financing of terrorism; calls for Türkiye to align more closely with the EU *acquis* and FATF recommendations to further strengthen its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing framework, including on the traceability of transfers and the prevention of misuse of new payment and crypto-asset channels for illicit finance;
33. Points out that a number of critical challenges concerning the labour market remain unaddressed, such as informal employment, the gender pay gap and income inequality; continues to be worried about the low coverage of collective bargaining and the serious impediments to unionisation in the private sector; believes that more efforts are needed to enhance social dialogue mechanisms and address emerging occupational safety challenges; recalls that trade union freedom and social dialogue are crucial to the development and prosperity of a pluralistic society; calls on the Turkish authorities to remove obstacles that limit unionisation and collective bargaining rights by using social dialogue mechanisms effectively, and to recognise the right to strike for civil servants; deplores the repeated detention of trade unionists in Türkiye for merely performing their duties; condemns, in this regard, the recent detention of Mehmet Türkmen, chair of the textile sector union BİRTEK-SEN, on 15 March 2026, noting that he was also imprisoned for over a month in 2025; calls for his immediate release and for an end to the judicial harassment against him;
34. Takes note of Türkiye's new 2025 climate law, which went into effect in July 2025, and welcomes the inclusion of an emissions trading system, while noting that some improvements, such as for certificate caps, still need to be addressed; deplores that Türkiye remains a very

poor performer in the field of climate mitigation and calls on Ankara to work on a credible legal framework for emissions reduction; highlights that the plan by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources to uphold subsidies for domestic coal generation and carbon-intensive electricity generation slows down progress on the roll-out of renewables; calls on the Turkish Government, also in the light of its hosting of the 31st UN Climate Change Conference in 2026, to decide on a coal phase-out pathway and pull forward its CO<sub>2</sub> peak from 2038; calls for the EU and the Turkish authorities to deepen and prioritise cooperation on the Green Deal, notably for carbon pricing in the context of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, to address the implications for Turkish exporters, and to support industrial decarbonisation financing and grid modernisation as well as just transition policies;

35. Expresses concern over animal welfare in transport from and through the Republic of Türkiye; calls for compliance with international standards and the prevention of overcrowding and heat stress; is concerned by the reported killing and mistreatment of stray dogs and cats; calls for their population control in line with international standards;

### ***Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations***

36. Continues to commend Türkiye for hosting around 2,7 million refugees, including 2,3 million Syrians under temporary protection as at January 2026; notes that, according to Frontex reporting in January 2025, irregular migration along the Türkiye–EU border declined by approximately one quarter in absolute numbers; reiterates the importance of Türkiye’s collaboration for the effective and orderly management of migration flows; further notes the fact that since 2011, the EU has contributed close to EUR 12,5 billion to assist Türkiye in supporting refugees and host communities; supports the continuation of EU funding to further sustain the healthcare, education, protection and integration of refugees in Türkiye; calls for the EU and the Member States to maintain and, where possible, scale up financial assistance for the humanitarian and protection space in Türkiye, increasing efforts to support Turkish civil society organisations and refugee-led organisations;
37. Expresses concern about the deterioration of the protection environment for Syrian refugees in Türkiye, including the suspension of health insurance, the closure of refugee camps without adequate alternatives and the downscaling of services provided by international non-governmental organisations and the UN; furthermore, remains concerned about the situation of minority groups, refugees and migrants who continued to face discrimination, violence and forced returns in 2025; highlights that Türkiye must continue to protect Syrian refugees until the conditions for their return are met; calls on the Turkish authorities to reinstate ‘go-and-

see' visits or equivalent mechanisms enabling informed return decisions; notes with concern that there are credible reports uncovering human rights violations at EU-funded removal centres in Türkiye and calls on the Commission to launch a transparent and independent investigation into the matter; calls on the Commission to ensure utmost transparency and accuracy in the allocation of funds and to make sure that EU-funded projects, particularly those related to removal centres and border control, comply with all relevant human rights standards; calls on Türkiye to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 and the EU-Türkiye Readmission Agreement vis-à-vis all Member States; stresses that migrants' vulnerability must not be instrumentalised for political purposes against the EU or its Member States; urges Türkiye to continue cooperating in good faith with all EU Member States in the field of migration, ensuring that a clear signal is sent to human smugglers to deter further illegal flows;

38. Reiterates its call on Türkiye to work on a constructive, and not assertive or aggressive, approach in its neighbourhood; welcomes the continued dialogue between Greece and Türkiye, including high-level meetings such as the summit between Prime Minister Mitsotakis and President Erdoğan in February 2026, which can foster a constructive environment and further de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean, which is of paramount importance amid the dangerous escalation of conflicts in the wider region; reiterates its strong interest in stability and security in the region and encourages all sides to further advance in this line of dialogue and cooperation with the aim of resolving any pending dispute and difference within the framework of international law; expresses its deep concern that Türkiye continues to uphold a formal threat of war against Greece (*casus belli*), which is inconceivable among allies and good neighbours, should Greece exercise its lawful right to extend its territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles into the Aegean Sea, in accordance with Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; deplores the fact that Türkiye continues to violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States, such as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, including through the promotion of the Blue Homeland doctrine, the significant increase in violations of Greek territorial waters and airspace compared to 2024 – although the latter remain at relatively low levels – the political instrumentalisation of the NAVTEX system, the violation of the Greek continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone by impeding the progress of projects for EU connectivity, such as the Great Sea Interconnector and EastMed Pipeline, which have been designated as a EU project of common interest, the rejection of the publication of the Greek maritime spatial planning published under the Maritime

Spatial Planning Directive<sup>6</sup> and the publication of a Turkish maritime spatial planning covering areas under Greece's sovereignty and jurisdiction, the objection to Greece's establishment of a marine park in the Aegean Sea entirely within Greek territorial waters and the announcement of the establishment of two Turkish marine parks extending into areas of Greek jurisdiction in August 2025, or the considerable increase, since 2024, of illegal fishing activities by Turkish vessels within Greek territorial waters; expresses its serious concern about the proposal for a draft law prepared by the Ankara University National Center for the Sea and Maritime Law (DEHUKAM) that would codify the 'Blue Homeland' doctrine and could be in direct contravention of established international law; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fully respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace as well as their sovereign rights in accordance with EU and international law, including under UNCLOS, and including the right to delimitate continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zones and the right to explore and exploit their natural resources; calls, in this regard, on Türkiye not to proceed with the adoption of any law that could contravene these principles; reiterates its view that the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on the delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean infringes upon the sovereign rights of third countries, does not comply with the law of the sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third countries;

39. Strongly reaffirms its view that the only solution to the Cyprus problem is a fair, comprehensive, viable and democratic settlement, within the agreed UN framework, on the basis of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with a single international legal personality, single sovereignty, single citizenship and political equality, as set out in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the agreed areas of convergence and the framework of the UN Secretary-General, as well as in accordance with international law and the principles and values on which the EU is founded; calls, as a matter of urgency, for the resumption of negotiations on the reunification of Cyprus under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General as soon as possible, from the point at which they were interrupted in Crans-Montana in 2017; calls on Türkiye to abandon the unacceptable proposal for a two-state solution in Cyprus and to return to the agreed basis for a solution and the UN framework;
40. Welcomes the steps taken by the UN Secretary-General towards a resumption of comprehensive settlement talks, including his appointment of a Personal Envoy on Cyprus; calls on the Commission

---

<sup>6</sup> Directive 2014/89/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 135, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/89/oj>).

to rapidly appoint a new European Commission Special Envoy for Cyprus; welcomes the two informal meetings held in a broader format, under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, in Geneva in March 2025 and New York in July 2025, as well as the various meetings in Cyprus of President Nikos Christodoulides and leader of the Turkish Cypriot community Tufan Erhürman including the meeting of December 2025, in which a joint statement emphasised that ‘the real aim is the solution of the Cyprus problem with political equality as described in the UNSC Resolutions’; further welcomes the stance of both sides, following on from the fact that there is a new leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, which has contributed to renewed hope for the creation of a conducive environment for the resumption of settlement negotiations; warmly welcomes the agreement on further confidence-building measures as a positive and relevant step and encourages their implementation; strongly supports the continuation of contact between both sides under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General and the work of his Personal Envoy on Cyprus; calls for the EU and its Member States to firmly support the continuation of this dialogue and to stand ready to support, in any way needed, the potential success of this process; encourages all sides to use this momentum to move towards the resumption of negotiations and not to miss this window of opportunity;

41. Calls on Türkiye to respect the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UNFICYP, to cease and reverse all unilateral actions and violations within and in the vicinity of the buffer zone, and to refrain from any further such actions and provocations, including harassment and intimidation of farmers; reiterates its call for cooperation among the Republic of Cyprus, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the UN to implement concrete measures for a demilitarisation of the buffer zone, in order to reduce tensions and contribute to a conducive environment for the resumption of the UN-led negotiations; calls on Türkiye to withdraw from Strovilia and facilitate the full implementation of the Pyla Understanding; further calls on Türkiye to withdraw its troops from Cyprus and refrain from any unilateral action that would entrench the permanent division of the island and from action altering the demographic balance; strongly condemns Türkiye’s attempts to upgrade the status of the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus, including via the Organisation of Turkic States and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and calls on all states to respect Cyprus’ sovereignty as outlined in UNSC resolutions; condemns the ongoing efforts by Türkiye to ‘open’ Varosha and have it settled by people other than its lawful inhabitants, in violation of the relevant UNSC resolutions; calls on Türkiye to reverse its illegal actions and to transfer the area of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants under the temporary administration of the UN, as called for by UNSC Resolutions 550(1984) and 789(1992); deplores any effort to turn Varosha into a dark tourism attraction, which sensationalises tragedy and insults the dignity and

rights of the lawful inhabitants; condemns the continued usurpation, sale and illegal development of properties belonging to Greek Cypriots in the occupied areas; remains deeply concerned about the education and religious restrictions and impediments faced by the enclaved Greek Cypriots; calls on Türkiye to step up its cooperation with the Council of Europe and its relevant bodies and institutions, to address their key recommendations, to fully implement the ECHR with regard to respecting freedom of religion, freedom of opinion and expression and the right to access and worship, including the right to conduct religious ceremonies and enjoy cultural heritage, and to stop the deliberate destruction of cultural and religious heritage; commends the work of the bi-communal technical committee on cultural heritage in restoring many of the affected monuments; regrets Türkiye's continuing refusal to comply with international civil aviation law and establish a channel of communication between air traffic control centres in Türkiye and the Republic of Cyprus, the absence of which entails real safety risks and dangers as identified by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fulfil its obligation to fully implement, in a non-discriminatory manner, the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement in relation to all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus, and to implement the obligations it assumed with regard to the EU as per the negotiating framework of October 2005;

42. Reiterates its call on Türkiye to give the Turkish Cypriot community the necessary space to act in accordance with its role as a legitimate community of the island, which is a right guaranteed by the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus; reiterates its call on the Commission to step up its efforts to engage with the Turkish Cypriot community, with a view to facilitating the resolution of the Cyprus problem and recalling that its place is in the European Union; calls for all parties involved to demonstrate a more courageous approach to bringing the communities together; stresses the need for the EU body of law to be implemented across the entire island following a comprehensive resolution of the Cyprus problem; takes note of the annual report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Secretary-General on Cyprus; remains concerned by restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against Turkish Cypriot human rights activists and particularly journalists who have criticised the influence of Türkiye, such as the Turkish Cypriot journalist Şener Levent and Ali Kışmir, the President of the Turkish Cypriot Journalists' Union; takes note of the significant work of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus and calls for improved access to military zones occupied by the Turkish army, access to its military archives and information as to the transfer of remains to new burial sites;

43. Stresses the importance of reinforcing EU-Türkiye cooperation on regional security matters, particularly in the light of the changing geopolitical landscape; reaffirms, in this context, the strategic and geopolitical importance of Türkiye, which is also an ally in NATO, and its increasing presence, influence, mediation and facilitation role in areas critical to international security and EU strategic interest, such as the Black Sea region, including Ukraine, the South Caucasus and the Middle East, as well as in other relevant areas of cooperation such as migration management, counterterrorism and energy security; acknowledges that Türkiye continues to actively participate in and contribute substantially to EU crisis management missions and operations; stresses that pragmatic cooperation with Türkiye on security and defence can be strengthened where it serves mutual strategic interests; remains duly concerned, nevertheless, that Türkiye continues to exclude a Member State from cooperation with NATO; calls on Türkiye to refrain from using its NATO membership to block cooperation between the EU and NATO;
44. Regrets Türkiye's low level of alignment with the EU's common foreign and security policy (CFSP), which has decreased from 6 % in 2024 to a record low of 4 % in 2025; notes, however, that this indicator, based solely on statistics regarding alignment with the statements by the VP/HR and Council decisions on sanctions, might not fully capture all levels of engagement and dialogue in the framework of foreign and security cooperation; welcomes, in this sense, the recently increased level of dialogue with the EU and the active participation and substantial contribution to EU crisis management missions and operations under the common security and defence policy; takes note of the growing anti-Western stance of the Turkish authorities; expresses concern about its possible implications for the EU's interests in the Western Balkans, the Black Sea region, the South Caucasus, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East; believes, however, that, in the current geopolitical landscape, it is important to explore the possibilities for cooperation with Türkiye in the context of current and future EU policies in the field of security and defence; urges Turkish authorities, nevertheless, to urgently address the country's extremely low level of alignment with the CFSP and to remove other key obstacles to ensuring the necessary trust among partners and allies, such as maintaining a *casus belli* against an EU Member State, questioning the sovereignty of others or maintaining the Russian-made S-400 air defence system; notes with concern that Türkiye has applied to become a member of BRICS+ while it currently holds a partnership status, and is considering the same for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation; expresses serious concern about the fundamental incompatibility of Türkiye's potential full membership of BRICS+ with the EU accession process; underlines that such an engagement, reflecting a non-liberal model of global and regional governance, could complicate efforts for a more comprehensive EU-Türkiye partnership;

45. Recognises, as regards Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, Türkiye's efforts in terms of its facilitation and potential mediation role, as underpinned by its hosting of several direct talks between both sides in Istanbul, as well as through the provision of military, diplomatic and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, including defence equipment, which has contributed to Ukraine's defence efforts; acknowledges that Türkiye has traditionally maintained a position of not supporting sanctions adopted outside the UN framework; nevertheless continues to regret the fact, that Türkiye does not align with the EU's restrictive measures against Russia, while welcoming the measures it has taken to prevent the circumvention of sanctions via Turkish territory, such as to prevent the re-export of common high priority items, which are delivering some results, and calls for alignment with the EU sanctions framework against Russia; urges the Turkish authorities to increase their efforts to detect and prevent the circumvention of restrictive measures, in particular on advanced technology items used for military purposes by Russia, to prevent the 'false transit' of these items to Russia via Central Asia, to extend these measures to other economically critical goods, to reduce the use of energy resources originating from Russia, and to address the risks linked with Russia's 'shadow fleet' in terms of maritime and environmental safety; further expresses concern that Türkiye has not restricted the operations of Russian state-controlled media in the context of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine; notes the widespread presence of pro-Russian narratives and Russia-linked disinformation in the Turkish information space, particularly on Ukraine, NATO and energy security; calls on Türkiye to strengthen efforts to counter foreign information manipulation and disinformation; notes with concern that, through the TurkStream and Blue Stream pipelines, Türkiye is a major importer of Russian natural gas, as well as a major source of oil and petroleum products; reiterates its concern about Türkiye's close cooperation with Russia on the development of large nuclear power plants, including the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, which is expected to become operational in 2026, and which is owned and will be operated by Russia's State Atomic Energy Corporation, Rosatom; urges the Turkish Government to join the Espoo Convention, which commits its parties to notifying neighbouring countries on major projects under consideration that are likely to have a significant adverse environmental impact across boundaries;
46. Expresses concern over Türkiye's close diplomatic, economic and energy relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, including regular high-level contact, sustained trade relations and the continued import of Iranian gas; regrets Türkiye's lack of alignment with the EU's response to Iran's crackdown on protesters, including restrictive measures regarding the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); takes note of the recent judicial developments in the United States concerning Halk Bankası A.Ş. (Halkbank), including proceedings related to sanctions evasion and money laundering

schemes; calls on Türkiye to progressively align with the EU's CFSP positions and sanctions regime; notes with concern that the military operations against the Iranian regime will have implications for Türkiye as a result of its geographic proximity, including through spill-over effects, in particular with regard to renewed migration pressures; underlines the importance of regional coordination and close cooperation with Türkiye and other international partners in this context;

47. Welcomes Türkiye's long-standing position in favour of a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which aligns with the EU's position, and its active participation in the 'Global Alliance for the Two-State Solution' for its implementation; welcomes Türkiye's contribution to mediation efforts in the Gaza ceasefire and with regard to the Gaza peace summit of October 2025 in Sharm El-Sheikh; condemns the Turkish authorities' active support for the EU-listed terror group Hamas and its refusal to designate it as a terrorist organisation, which is not compatible with the EU's foreign and security policy; deplores the fact that Türkiye did not condemn the attack on 7 October 2023 against Israel conducted by Hamas; warns against Türkiye's engagement with regional actors associated with extremist agendas, noting that such ties could complicate EU-Türkiye relations and affect regional stability; calls on Türkiye to remain firmly anchored in the multilateral system, with the United Nations at its core, as the essential framework to advance a comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
48. Notes Türkiye's increased leverage over developments in Syria following the fall of the Assad regime and its intensive engagement with the current Syrian transitional authorities, which includes providing them with military training and advisory support; remains concerned about the continued presence of Turkish forces in the country and about the involvement of Turkish-backed armed groups in the latest episodes of violence in the north and north-east of Syria, including against groups that played a decisive role in the international fight against Daesh; condemns the establishment of long-term military infrastructure and administrative structures in occupied areas under Turkish control; calls on Türkiye to engage constructively with the Syrian authorities, to respect Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity and to address its security concerns in full accordance with international law while ensuring that all Syrians, including Kurds, can enjoy security and fundamental rights, and to refrain from any interference in Syria's internal processes; condemns the attacks on the civilian population during the latest episode of violence between the Syrian army and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), causing numerous deaths and the displacement of large numbers of civilians, as well as the lack of access to humanitarian aid; expresses its hope that the latest agreement between the Syrian transitional government and

the SDF, which envisages the gradual integration of Kurdish forces and institutions into the state and the historic recognition of Kurdish cultural, linguistic and civil rights, will allow for stability in the north-east region of Syria, which is key for the success of an inclusive political transition in the country; warns that any serious deterioration in regional security could promote a resurgence of Daesh; stresses that any transfer to Türkiye, or via Türkiye, of adult Daesh fighters or suspects originating from detention facilities in Syria must remain subject to effective custody, monitoring and information-sharing arrangements, including in any cross-border transfers; notes the significant investment required for the reconstruction of Syria's economy and acknowledges Türkiye's interest in contributing to these efforts; expresses its support for close and constructive cooperation between the EU and Türkiye in this regard;

49. Reaffirms its support for the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Türkiye in the interests of reconciliation, good neighbourly relations, regional stability and security, and socio-economic development, and welcomes the progress achieved so far, including the easing of certain visa procedures, the preparations for the upcoming opening of the border for third-country nationals and holders of diplomatic passports and the resumption of direct flights by Turkish Airlines; encourages Türkiye to firmly advance in this process on its own merits without making it dependent on its relations with a third country; calls on both countries to continue to work towards better connectivity in order to facilitate the land connection between Europe and Asia, as well as to promote historical reconciliation, an improved business climate, and stronger people-to-people contacts; supports the Commission's efforts in bringing forward an EU Cross-Regional Connectivity Agenda involving Türkiye, Armenia and Azerbaijan – including projects such as the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway line – which has great potential to contribute to regional stability and economic and social development; encourages Türkiye to support the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan and encourages Türkiye once again to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide in order to pave the way for genuine reconciliation between the Turkish and Armenian peoples, and to fully respect its obligations to protect Armenian cultural heritage;

### ***Wider EU-Türkiye relations***

50. Reiterates its firm conviction that, beyond the accession process, which is currently at a standstill because of non-compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and a lack of democratic reforms, Türkiye is a country of strategic relevance; stresses the importance of maintaining constructive dialogue and deepening cooperation in areas of mutual strategic interest, including in relation to Cyprus, and in a phased proportionate and reversible manner and in line with

the European Council conclusions of April 2024; reaffirms that the EU continues to be committed to pursuing the best possible relations with Türkiye, based on dialogue, respect and mutual trust, in line with international law and good neighbourly relations;

51. Welcomes, in this view, the enhancing of EU-Türkiye relations beyond the accession process in areas of mutual interest and in line with the recommendations of the joint communication on EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023, in a phased proportionate and reversible manner; further welcomes the recent high-level dialogues on trade and the economy, migration and security, climate, and science, research, technology and innovation; calls again for the resumption of all relevant high-level dialogues and for the establishment of structured high-level dialogues on sectoral cooperation if needed to address other common challenges;
52. Supports deepening the connectivity agenda with Türkiye in the fields of energy, transport, digital and people-to-people contacts, in accordance with EU and international law, as an example of good pragmatic and mutually beneficial cooperation with the potential to foster peace and stability in the region; stresses the strategic importance of accelerating the completion of key infrastructure projects improving the connectivity between the EU and Türkiye, in line with the extended Trans-European Networks; stresses the relevance of Türkiye for the development and functioning of transcontinental connectivity initiatives, including the increasingly important alternative trade route between Europe and Asia (the Middle Corridor), which could contribute significantly to strengthening the EU's supply chain resilience and economic cooperation and can play an important role in advancing the EU's broader strategic autonomy objectives; urges the timely development of the Black Sea ring highway and railroad connections; welcomes Türkiye's readiness to invest in the construction of a Black Sea highway connecting Türkiye, Bulgaria and Romania;
53. Calls on the Commission, following the successful experience with other candidate countries, to undertake the necessary arrangements in order to extend as soon as possible the 'roam like at home' programme to Türkiye; calls on the Commission to consider working towards the extension of the Single Euro Payments Area and other relevant programmes so as to enhance people-to-people contacts; welcomes the good progress made on science and research cooperation in the reporting period, in particular linked to participation in Horizon Europe; supports Türkiye's participation in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and calls for the deepening of EU-Türkiyecooperation in the fields of civil protection and resilient infrastructure putting emphasis on the need to strengthen decentralised municipal capacity, civil society participation, better coordination and public communication;

54. Reiterates its view that full implementation and modernisation of the EU customs union is needed, particularly given the current geopolitical landscape; is aware of the importance that large sectors of the EU and Turkish economies attach to the updating of this instrument, which has been in force for more than 30 years; stands ready to support an upgraded customs union with a broader, mutually beneficial scope, which could encompass substantial economic and strategic benefits for both partners, strengthening trade, investment and supply chain resilience, boosting digital and green transition, public procurement and sustainable development commitments, and contributing to the economic security of both the EU and Türkiye; underlines, however, that for Parliament to give its consent at the end of the process, such a modernisation would need to be based on strong conditionality related to human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for international law, adherence to the CFSP, and good neighbourly relations, including Türkiye's full implementation of the Additional Protocol on extending the Ankara Agreement to all Member States without exception and in a non-discriminatory fashion, and include measures to support the green transition and to help small and medium-sized enterprises adjust; welcomes the positive steps, including the decrease in trade barriers, observed in the most recent period, which also followed the holding of the high-level dialogue on trade;
55. Underlines the relevance for EU-Türkiye trade of upcoming initiatives from the Commission such as the industrial accelerator act and the 'Made in Europe' approach, with possible strong requirements that could eventually require an overhaul of EU procurement rules and severely affect the already outdated customs union between the EU and Türkiye; welcomes the fact that the Commission's proposal for the industrial accelerator act already provides that content from partners with which the EU has concluded an agreement establishing a free trade area or a customs union – such as Türkiye – will be deemed to be of EU origin; supports this approach and calls for any other relevant legislation to be proposed in the same vein in the future to keep taking into account the importance of further integrating the markets and economies of the candidate countries, particularly those that have a customs union with the EU;
56. Notes with deep regret that Türkiye has made no progress towards meeting the required benchmarks for visa liberalisation; reiterates its willingness to start the visa liberalisation process as soon as the Turkish authorities fully satisfy the six clearly outstanding benchmarks in a non-discriminatory manner vis-à-vis all EU Member States while aligning with EU visa policy; regrets the fact that Turkish citizens are facing problems with visa requests and applications to EU Member States owing to a marked increase in demand and fears of abuse of the system; recognises, however, the political commitment to improving access to visas and calls for

intensified efforts on both sides to address the remaining technical and administrative barriers; calls on the Member States to increase the resources allocated to this matter; supports measures on visa facilitation, particularly with regard to business activities and Erasmus students; deeply regrets the constant attempts by the Turkish authorities to blame the EU for not making progress on this dossier, while they themselves have not taken any of the necessary steps to comply with the remaining benchmarks; reminds Türkiye that the lack of tangible and cumulative progress on the pending conditions has a direct impact on business activities and Erasmus students; regrets the Turkish Government's abusive use of special passports, the number of which is unknown, while not taking the necessary actions to advance towards a framework that could benefit the whole population; calls on the Turkish Government to address the remaining obstacles preventing the reopening of the visa liberalisation dialogue, and equally calls on the Council to do its share once such steps are taken; takes note of the EU and Member States' decision to introduce a visa cascade framework on 15 July 2025;

57. Welcomes the reengagement of the European Investment Bank in Türkiye and the Turkey Investment Platform under the European Fund for Sustainable Development, which enables stronger investment support through guarantee programmes in the three overarching policy priorities, namely the Green Deal, the Global Gateway strategy as well as jobs and growth, in accordance with the relevant conditions on respect for EU values; highlights the need to ensure that no EU programmes benefit entities in Türkiye that fail to respect fundamental EU values;
58. Supports the decision taken by the EU component of the EU-Türkiye Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) to postpone its 82nd meeting, scheduled to take place on 14 and 15 April 2025 in Ankara, in the aftermath of the detention and arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu and others; retains the view that parliamentary dialogue remains a crucial part of EU-Türkiye relations and expresses the hope that the work of the JPC will resume soon when conditions allow; regrets the Turkish authorities' decision not to invite the European Parliament to observe the presidential and parliamentary elections in May 2023 amid allegations of unfair treatment, noting that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe were invited; expresses its hope that a European Parliament mission will be invited to observe any upcoming elections in the country;

### ***The way forward for EU-Türkiye relations***

59. Reiterates its view that the Turkish Government has neglected to take the necessary steps to address the fundamental democratic

shortcomings within the country and therefore maintains that Türkiye's EU accession process cannot be resumed in the current circumstances, while recognising the democratic and pro-European aspirations of a large part of Turkish society; takes note of recent calls by relevant Turkish opposition figures advocating renewed engagement and the reopening of accession talks; expresses appreciation for this innovative and bold approach; remains, however, sceptical about supporting it unless there is a clear signal from the Turkish Government of its willingness to recommit to the EU path through concrete and credible actions;

60. Recalls that, as in the case of any other candidate, the accession process is contingent on full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and on the normalisation of relations with all EU Member States; stresses that Türkiye's constructive engagement, including in relation to the Cyprus problem, remains key to advancing closer cooperation between the EU and Türkiye; considers, in this regard, that when advancing their declared EU aspirations, the Turkish authorities should place less emphasis on the country's capabilities in security and defence and instead address the grave state of democracy in the country; notes that it is committed to advancing the accession process provided that the Turkish Government takes these necessary steps;
61. Continues to urge the Turkish Government to engage constructively with the EU institutions and Member States and to keep working towards a closer, more dynamic and strategic partnership, beyond the currently frozen accession process, on the basis of the relevant Council and European Council conclusions and the established conditionality; insists on the need to begin a process of reflection on how this new constructive and progressive framework for EU-Türkiye relations grounded in respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and fundamental rights, can encompass the interests of all parties involved; stresses the need to strengthen the EU-Türkiye partnership by, for example, the modernisation and enhancement of the current Association Agreement;
62. Is of the opinion, nevertheless, that continued backsliding on democracy and the rule of law in the near future will only make the country drift further away from the EU, eroding the trust that is needed for the real enhancement of cooperation and partnership in areas of mutual interest, such as trade, energy or security;
63. Believes that it is in the EU's interest to reassess ways in which Türkiye can remain anchored to the EU, not only in terms of standards but also in terms of values and principles, and to design political initiatives according to that goal; expresses its alarm about the gradual consolidation of another autocratic system on the EU's doorstep, as such developments have direct and far-reaching implications for the Union's long-term interests and stability; urges

all EU institutions, the Member States and the European Council to be vocal in addressing the persistent democratic backsliding and human rights violations in Türkiye, in particular regarding the ongoing dismantling of pluralist democracy, as doing so is not incompatible with pursuing the best possible relations between the EU and the country; calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service to ensure that the agendas of high-level officials visiting Türkiye include a plural representation of political and civil society stakeholders in order to obtain a more complete vision of the country;

64. Reiterates its utmost commitment to sustaining its support for Türkiye's independent civil society; calls on the Commission to uphold and increase its political and financial support to the vibrant and pro-democratic civil society in Türkiye, whose efforts can contribute to generating the political will necessary for deepening EU-Türkiye relations; is of the opinion that while incentives-based and transactional approaches work in many areas of EU-Türkiye cooperation, they have failed to advance the democratisation of the country; highlights, in this view, that the resumption of the accession process depends mainly on the unwavering political will of Türkiye's authorities and society to become a full-fledged democracy, which cannot be forced upon it by the EU;
65. Reiterates its call to strengthen and deepen mutual knowledge and understanding between the societies of Türkiye and the EU, promoting cultural growth, socio-cultural exchanges and combating all manifestations of social, religious, ethnic or cultural prejudice; stresses, in this context, the importance of facilitating people-to-people exchange for EU-Türkiye relations, notably for the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and human rights; encourages Türkiye and the EU to promote shared values, particularly by supporting young people;

◦

◦   ◦

66. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Council and the Commission; asks that this resolution be translated into Turkish and forwarded to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Türkiye.