



TEXTS ADOPTED

P10_TA(2026)0222

2025 Commission report on Georgia

European Parliament resolution of 17 June 2026 on the 2025 Commission report on Georgia (2025/2257(INI))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the Commission communication of 4 November 2025 entitled ‘2025 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2025)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Georgia 2025 Report’ (SWD(2025)0757),
- having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part¹,
- having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/2441 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2025 amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 as regards the revision of the suspension mechanism²,
- having regard to Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which requires that all possible measures be taken to ensure Georgia’s full integration into the EU and NATO,
- having regard to the Urgent Opinion on the Amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences and the Criminal Code of Georgia of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), adopted on 12 November 2025,
- having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, to which Georgia is a party,

¹ OJ L 261, 30.8.2014, p. 4, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_international/2014/494/oj.

² OJ L, 2025/2441, 10.12.2025, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2441/oj>.

- having regard to the Commission's previous enlargement reports on Georgia,
 - having regard to the 'Freedom in the World 2025' report published by Freedom House,
 - having regard to the 2025 World Justice Project Rule of Law Index,
 - having regard to the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency International,
 - having regard to the report by the OSCE fact-finding mission on Georgia (2026) under paragraph 12 of the Moscow Mechanism Document entitled 'Developments in Georgia in Respect of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms since Spring 2024',
 - having regard to the Council Presidency conclusions of 16 December 2025 on enlargement,
 - having regard to the opinion on the Law on the Registration of Foreign Agents, the amendments to the Law on Grants and other Laws relating to 'foreign influence', adopted by the Venice Commission on 9 to 10 October 2025,
 - having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,
 - having regard to its resolution of 11 March 2026 on the EU enlargement strategy³,
 - having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,
 - having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0140/2026),
- A. whereas Georgia applied for EU membership on 3 March 2022; whereas the European Council, at its meeting on 14 and 15 December 2023, granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the relevant steps set out in the Commission's recommendation of 8 November 2023 would be taken; whereas Georgia's accession process has, in practice, effectively been suspended since 2024;
- B. whereas the Commission considers Georgia a candidate country in name only, following the European Council conclusions of 19 December 2024, which found that the Georgian authorities' actions have de facto led to a halt in the pre-accession process, and in the light of Georgia's continued and serious backsliding on the fundamentals since then;

³ Texts adopted, P10_TA(2026)0077.

- C. whereas Commissioner Marta Kos rightly described the Commission's 2025 Georgia report as 'the worst report ever prepared for a candidate country';
- D. whereas the situation in Georgia has continued to deteriorate dramatically, with further backsliding in democracy, human rights and rule of law due to the actions of Georgian Dream; whereas the methods of repression, disinformation campaigns and political harassment mirror Russian hybrid tactics;
- E. whereas on 29 January 2026, 24 OSCE participating States activated the Moscow Mechanism, which enabled an independent expert mission to examine alleged human rights violations, particularly developments since spring 2024; whereas the OSCE Moscow Mechanism expert report on Georgia, published on 12 March 2026, highlights serious concerns regarding the integrity of electoral processes, including allegations of irregularities and pressure on political opposition, as well as the use of legal measures against opposition leaders and political parties; whereas the report calls for the repeal of restrictive legislation, including the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence and amendments affecting media freedom; whereas it documents cases of disproportionate use of force against protesters and raises concerns about violations of the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, with some cases reaching 'the threshold of torture'; whereas it calls, furthermore, for the immediate release of individuals detained for political reasons, including opposition members and journalists, and stresses the need for Georgia to fully cooperate with international bodies, including the Venice Commission and relevant international mechanisms;
- F. whereas the Georgian Dream government has systematically weakened checks and balances by undermining the independence of the judiciary, prosecution services and the Constitutional Court, making Georgia structurally incapable of meeting EU membership criteria under the current conditions;
- G. whereas protests against the actions of Georgian Dream have continued since 28 November 2024, demonstrating the enduring democratic will of the Georgian people, despite systematic and disproportionate violence against participants, their imprisonment and the introduction of increasingly draconian punishments for participation; whereas large-scale protests began after the government announced that it was suspending preparations for EU accession negotiations until 2028;
- H. whereas the British Broadcasting Corporation documentary entitled 'When Water Burns', aired on 1 December 2025, presented evidence suggesting that water mixed with a toxic chemical was used against protesters in Georgia in November and December 2024; whereas the use of toxic chemicals can cause long-term health problems;

- I. whereas the OSCE/ODIHR was prevented from observing the local elections held on 4 October 2025 because of a late invitation from the Georgian authorities;
- J. whereas newly adopted legislative amendments introduce additional restrictions on foreign funding and criminalise so-called 'external lobbying'; whereas the legislation significantly broadens the definition of 'grants' to include technical or free-of-charge assistance and transfers between foreign organisations and their local branches, expands the scope of entities considered grant recipients, including foreign-based organisations working on Georgia-related issues, and introduces criminal penalties for violations related to grants; whereas the legislation further introduces prison sentences of up to six years for 'external lobbying', eight-year bans on political party membership for individuals who have worked in foreign-funded organisations, and additional penalties for businesses engaging in political activity unrelated to their principal activity; whereas the legislation also introduces an 'extremism' clause, enabling the imposition of prison sentences of up to three years for 'systematic acts' aimed at 'establishing the perception' that the government lacks legitimacy;
- K. whereas adopted amendments to the Criminal Code provide for prison sentences for individuals who refuse to recognise the legitimacy of the Georgian Dream government, which raises serious concerns regarding freedom of expression, political pluralism and democratic standards;
- L. whereas, in response to democratic backsliding in Georgia under the Georgian Dream regime and the country's geopolitical reorientation, the United States has suspended its strategic partnership with Georgia and imposed sanctions that remain in force; whereas the US Congress has introduced a bill entitled 'Mobilizing and Enhancing Georgia's Options for Building Accountability, Resilience, and Independence Act' (the MEGOBARI Act), which seeks to increase scrutiny of the Georgian Government's actions and its ties to Russia and other authoritarian regimes, including China;
- M. whereas in December 2024 the United States designated Bidzina Ivanishvili under its sanctions regime for undermining the democratic and Euro-Atlantic future of Georgia for the benefit of the Russian Federation; whereas the United States found that the actions of Ivanishvili and Georgian Dream have eroded democratic institutions, enabled human rights abuses and curtailed the exercise of fundamental freedoms in Georgia; whereas these actions have further derailed Georgia's Euro-Atlantic future, leaving the country increasingly vulnerable to Russia, which continues to occupy more than 20 % of Georgia's territory;

- N. whereas on 2 March 2026, nine opposition parties in Georgia announced the formation of an alliance in response to the ongoing democratic backsliding and authoritarian consolidation of power by Georgian Dream, demonstrating the consolidation of pro-European democratic forces and the growing societal demand to defend Georgia's European path;
- O. whereas eight opposition leaders and politicians, namely Nika Gvaramia, Zurab Japaridze, Badri Japaridze, Mamuka Khazaradze, Nika Melia, Irakli Okruashvili, Givi Targamadze and Giorgi Vashadze, were sentenced to seven to eight months in prison and banned from holding public office for two years for refusing to appear before the Temporary Investigative Commission of the de facto parliament of Georgia;
- P. whereas the Georgian Dream authorities have created a system of politically motivated repression that has resulted in the imprisonment of numerous political prisoners, including opposition politicians, activists, journalists and peaceful protesters, who have been deprived of their liberty solely for refusing to submit to the ruling party's authority or for exercising their fundamental rights; whereas such detentions amount to a deliberate strategy of intimidation aimed at silencing dissent, dismantling political pluralism and consolidating authoritarian rule; whereas the continued incarceration of these individuals constitutes a grave violation of Georgia's constitutional order, its international human rights obligations and the fundamental values underpinning its EU candidate status; whereas numerous students, civil society representatives and artists have been detained or fined for participating in protests;
- Q. whereas the political persecution of opposition figures remains a serious matter of concern, including the systemic targeting of Giorgi Gakharia, leader of the For Georgia party, who has been subjected to two physical attacks and charged with politically motivated criminal offences, leading to his current residence in exile;
- R. whereas former President Mikheil Saakashvili has been deprived of his liberty for over four years and is a de facto political prisoner of oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, who exercises control over the state and exerts unlawful influence over its institutions;
- S. whereas since January 2026, Georgian civil society has identified 48 political prisoners who have been imprisoned unjustly because of their participation in and support for the protests, and 68 others who remain in pre-trial detention on politically motivated charges;
- T. whereas women protesters in Georgia regularly report facing degrading treatment by the police, including sexist verbal abuse, routine strip searches, rape threats and other threats of physical

violence during protests, in detention and during house searches; whereas this trend is part of a broader pattern of abuse and impunity within Georgia's law enforcement agencies;

- U. whereas Mzia Amaglobeli, an imprisoned Georgian journalist and director of online media outlets Batumelebi and Netgazeti, was awarded the 2025 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought by the European Parliament, together with Andrzej Poczobut from Belarus; whereas the Supreme Court of Georgia has rejected Mzia Amaglobeli's appeal, which makes the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg the only remaining legal avenue for her to seek justice;
- V. whereas the situation of media freedom and freedom of expression has deteriorated dramatically; whereas the Council of Europe's 'Safety of journalists' platform reported 32 alerts concerning Georgia in 2025, a 78 % increase from 2024;
- W. whereas increasing pressure on the education system and attempts to undermine the autonomy of universities as a result of the 'one city, one faculty' initiative by Georgian Dream risk weakening one of the key institutional pillars supporting democratic debate, civic engagement and Georgia's European integration trajectory and risk curtailing access to education; whereas attacks against civil society, independent media and the academic sector demonstrate a broader pattern of pressure on freedom of expression and academic freedom in Georgia;
- X. whereas the extraction of manganese in Georgia for export to the EU has caused landslides, polluted the surrounding areas and violated labour rights in the mining region of Chiatura; whereas environmental organisations claim that waste is being discharged directly into the Kvirila River; whereas those protesting against manganese mining have reported cases of surveillance, intimidation and detention by the Georgian authorities; whereas the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive⁴ requires European companies to ensure respect for human rights, good working conditions and regard for the environment in their supply chains;
- Y. whereas some of Georgia's internationally recognised territories remain under occupation; whereas Russia recognised Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia as independent states in 2008 and still has thousands of soldiers in the area, in breach of international law; whereas Russia is continuing its 'borderisation' policy, namely the erection of physical barriers along the administrative borders of the regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia, in breach of Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity; whereas the European

⁴ OJ L, 2024/1760, 5.7.2024, ELI:
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1760/oj>.

Court of Human Rights has found, furthermore, that this has led to human rights violations such as restrictions on the freedom of movement, limited access to property or land, and the separation of family members;

- Z. whereas Russia exerts a growing influence over Georgia as the result of political, economic and informational campaigns; whereas the EU cannot remain reactive and merely take note of the deterioration of the situation in the country; whereas it must instead pursue a proactive and strategic approach towards Georgia in order to reduce the country's vulnerabilities to external coercion and to safeguard regional connectivity;
- AA. whereas, since 2022, Georgia has significantly increased its imports of dual-use goods from Western countries and from China; whereas available statistical evidence indicates that Georgia is acting as a transit state, facilitating the transfer of sanctioned goods to the Russian Federation, where they can be used for the production of military equipment and weapons; whereas in numerous instances, such irregularities can be attributed to deliberate strategies aimed at circumventing international sanctions imposed on Russia; whereas serious concerns have been raised regarding the role of informal governance structures and individuals linked to Bidzina Ivanishvili in facilitating an environment conducive to sanctions circumvention; whereas around 40 000 companies owned by Russian citizens or entities are currently operating in Georgia, of which approximately 30 000 have been registered since the start of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas companies engaged in trade with Russia, including in goods subject to sanctions, are often established through offshore structures, thereby complicating transparency and the identification of beneficial ownership, including in relation to business networks associated with Bidzina Ivanishvili; whereas there are persistent reports that sanctioned goods, including vehicles and technology, continue to enter the Russian market via Georgia;
- AB. whereas the EU's attractiveness as a model of democratic governance, economic growth and rule-based cooperation remains a key source of inspiration for Georgian civil society; whereas public opinion surveys consistently show strong support among the Georgian population for integration with the EU, with approximately 75 % of citizens expressing support for the country's European path;
- AC. whereas the full-scale war of aggression that Russia has waged against Ukraine since 2022 has changed the European security landscape and increased the strategic importance of EU enlargement; whereas, since the beginning of the war, many Georgians have been involved in supporting Ukraine;

- AD. whereas the EU is Georgia's largest trading partner, accounting for approximately 22.1 % of the country's total trade; whereas these exchanges are governed by the EU-Georgia Association Agreement and its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, which entered fully into force in 2016 and provides Georgian businesses preferential access to the EU market and its more than 450 million consumers;
- AE. whereas on 6 March 2026 the Commission announced that it was suspending visa-free travel for holders of Georgian diplomatic, official and service passports until at least March 2027 owing to concerns about the deterioration of democracy and the rule of law; whereas ordinary Georgian citizens continue to enjoy visa-free travel for short-term visits to the Schengen area in line with the 2017 decision;

Suspension of Georgia's EU integration

1. Expresses its full solidarity with the Georgian people, who continue their struggle for a European and democratic Georgia in the face of democratic backsliding, growing repression, unlawful arrests, relentless hostile rhetoric, disinformation and threats; stresses that nearly 75 % of Georgian people continue to support further integration with the EU; reiterates that the EU's door remains wide open for the Georgian people to return to the European path;
2. Notes with deep disappointment that Georgian Dream has not only suspended but effectively reversed Georgia's course of European integration; regrets the fact that there has been backsliding in the implementation of all nine priorities that were the conditions for granting Georgia candidate status; highlights the inconsistency of the claims by Georgian Dream that EU integration remains the main priority, while at the same time its highest officials and government-affiliated media run an orchestrated and systematic campaign spreading manipulative Russian-style narratives, disinformation and conspiracy theories against the EU, its officials and diplomats;
3. Deplores the fact that, since the rigged October 2024 parliamentary elections, Georgian Dream has further intensified its trajectory towards full authoritarianism; is dismayed at the rapid dismantling of Georgia's democratic foundations through targeted attacks against its democratic institutions, fundamental freedoms and democratic pluralism, which is totally at odds with the democratic development required for EU membership; shares the Commission's assessment that crucial institutions, such as the Central Election Commission, the Communications Commission, the High Council of Justice, the Constitutional Court, the Prosecutor's Office, the National Bank, and law enforcement and security agencies, lack impartiality, independence and democratic oversight; stresses that Georgia cannot make any progress in the European accession process as long

as it does not return to the path of democratic reforms and, inter alia, guarantee free, fair and competitive elections, protect the independence of official institutions, effectively address oligarchic control and improve the protection of human rights and media freedom;

4. Stresses that targeted personal sanctions imposed by the EU and its Member States against Bidzina Ivanishvili, key Georgian Dream leaders, judges, prosecutors and other officials responsible for the continuous democratic backsliding in Georgia, electoral fraud, serious human rights violations and the persecution of political opponents and activists, and against complicit owners of companies and media outlets linked to Georgian Dream, would be an important instrument against impunity; welcomes the fact that, in the absence of unanimity at EU level, an increasing number of Member States have introduced individual visa bans and other sanctions against Georgian officials; urges other Member States to follow suit;
5. Reiterates its strong call for the EU and its Member States to introduce immediate and targeted personal sanctions against Bidzina Ivanishvili, his family members and his companies and calls for the EU to freeze his assets and to cooperate on this matter with other jurisdictions, in particular the United Kingdom and the United States;
6. Condemns the systemic impunity of officials and institutions responsible for political repression, harassment of journalists and human rights defenders, and persecution of opposition figures; emphasises that the EU response to date has been inadequate and belated in view of the accelerating authoritarian consolidation in Georgia; urges the Council and the Member States to urgently adopt coordinated, EU-wide restrictive measures against all responsible politicians, officials and enablers, including the expansion of sanctions lists, comprehensive asset freezes and visa bans targeting those responsible for state capture, repression and regime-sponsored propaganda; urges the incoming Hungarian Government to lift the blockade imposed by its predecessor on EU-wide targeted sanctions against Ivanishvili and the broader Georgian Dream leadership; calls on the Council to explore collective mechanisms when unanimity is not possible in order to ensure an effective and unified EU response;

Continued backsliding on democracy and the rule of law and the autocratic consolidation of power

7. Regrets that Georgian Dream has not taken any steps to reverse its anti-democratic and anti-European course; considers that engagement with the Georgian authorities should be strictly conditional on them taking tangible and verifiable steps reversing their current course of democratic backsliding, repression, restrictions and fierce Russian-style anti-EU disinformation;

maintains, therefore, its previous positions regarding the non-recognition of the legitimacy of the parliament and the president appointed by it; regrets the fact that the parliament of Georgia is a de facto one-party parliament that is rubber-stamping legislative initiatives aimed at dismantling the foundations of a pluralistic parliamentary democracy; notes with concern the fact that the de facto parliament of Georgia has declared its temporary withdrawal from the EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly;

8. Reiterates its call for the EU's and the Member States' representatives and members of parliament to refrain from holding meetings with representatives of the regime, starting with the current de facto president, as long as the Georgian authorities continue their democratic backsliding and repression; calls on the Member States to consolidate a united and coordinated approach regarding limiting political contacts with the Georgian Dream authorities to matters of strict necessity, while maintaining and strengthening engagement with Georgian civil society, independent media, and academic institutions; condemns the persistent aggressive rhetoric against the EU and Member States' diplomats, politicians and officials; stresses the importance of continuing to promote European norms, democratic values and the European path among the Georgian population and political forces committed to democratic principles;
9. Notes with concern the aggressive rhetoric against the United States, the United Kingdom and other allies;
10. Calls on the Georgian authorities to restore merit-based civil service safeguards, reinstate effective legal protection against politically motivated dismissals and ensure effective implementation of the right to access public information;
11. Points out that the municipal elections of 4 October 2025 were boycotted by the majority of the opposition parties, reflecting the deep mistrust that the majority of society has in the independence of the electoral process; regrets that the amendments to Georgia's Electoral Code made in December 2024 and March and April 2025 further strengthened the dominance of the ruling party and introduced new restrictions on registration for local observers, media and electoral subjects; reiterates that the Georgian authorities ignored calls by the Venice Commission to repeal the changes made in 2024; stresses that the lack of observation missions from the OSCE/ODIHR owing to a late invitation and from local observer organisations owing to restrictions seriously affected the transparency of the electoral process and the credibility of its results; reiterates its call for an improved electoral environment established by an independent and impartial election administration, for future elections under diligent observation by international and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs); expresses its deep

concern about the amendment of the Electoral Code of December 2025 that prohibits Georgian citizens from voting from abroad; stresses that participation in elections is a fundamental constitutional right of every citizen and has to be made possible regardless of one's place of residence;

12. Condemns the adoption of unprecedented and increasingly restrictive legislation aimed at making it practically impossible for international support, including financial means, to reach civil society and media, and at cutting them off from any independent funding; highlights the most recent amendments to the Law on Grants, which came into force on 5 March 2026, which significantly broaden the scope of what is considered a 'grant' and make receiving grants or funding from abroad without prior government authorisation a criminal offence punishable by up to six years' imprisonment; notes that this is a direct violation of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement; calls for the protection of political foundations, international NGOs, and development agencies; reminds the Georgian authorities that any harassment of EU Member State organisations will lead to direct consequences;
13. Notes that these amendments follow those made to the Law on Grants adopted in April 2025, which already significantly narrowed options for international financial support and introduced the requirement for international donors to seek pre-approval for grants from state authorities and restrictive monitoring and punitive administrative liability for recipients, aimed at deterring organisations from accepting international assistance, including funding from the EU; stresses that the broad definition of a 'grant' can cover wide-ranging transactions subject to prior approval and can make any citizen a potential target of persecution by the government; notes with concern the prohibition of party membership for eight years for any person ever employed by an organisation that has relied on foreign funding, thus banning a large number of socially active individuals from participating in party politics; strongly urges the EU and its Member States to take immediate action to safeguard and sustain the remaining independent media and civil society organisations in Georgia;
14. Deplores the continued attempts by the ruling Georgian Dream party to persecute political opponents, including through illegal arrest and detention, threats and physical attacks; condemns the imprisonment of political opponents for refusing to appear before the Temporary Investigative Commission of the de facto parliament of Georgia, which was used by Georgian Dream as a form of political show trial aimed at opening the way for the further persecution of political opponents and the banning of opposition parties; stresses that the existence of political prisoners is incompatible with Georgia's obligations under the EU-Georgia Association Agreement; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all those imprisoned on

political grounds, including opposition politicians and former officials; notes that two opposition politicians were pardoned by the de facto president ahead of the municipal elections to ensure a semblance of competitive elections; strongly reiterates its demand for the immediate release of former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds for the purpose of him seeking the necessary medical treatment abroad; calls, furthermore, on the Georgian Dream authorities to ensure that Members of the European Parliament are granted unhindered access to Mikheil Saakashvili and other political prisoners;

15. Notes that, despite a guilty plea and the existence of credible public evidence of corruption, the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili raises serious concerns as to whether the proceedings met fair trial standards; stresses that the case reflects broader concerns about politically influenced justice, informal power structures and internal divisions within the ruling Georgian Dream party, including the role of Bidzina Ivanishvili;
16. Calls on the Georgian authorities to implement independent accountability mechanisms, ensure judicial impartiality, and hold perpetrators of politically motivated abuses responsible in accordance with international human rights standards;
17. Calls for a comprehensive reform of the High Council of Justice in line with the Venice Commission recommendations, including the introduction of fixed non-renewable terms, transparent appointment procedures and extraordinary integrity checks for senior judicial office-holders with the meaningful involvement of international experts, in order to strengthen judicial independence and public trust in the judiciary; notes with disappointment the dissolution of the Anti-Corruption Bureau that was established in 2022, which was one of the key requirements for the EU to grant Georgia candidate status; calls on the Georgian authorities to amend the appointment procedure for the post of Prosecutor General by requiring a qualified parliamentary majority, and to align the Law on the Prosecutor's Office with European standards;
18. Urges the Public Defender of Georgia to intensify the execution of his mandate and use all available mechanisms to safeguard human rights, while engaging in constructive dialogue and collaboration with human rights defenders and civil society in Georgia; emphasises the necessity to prevent any selective application of his mandate, as referenced in the 2025 Commission Report on Georgia; highlights the Public Defender's distinct authority to request legislative opinions from the OSCE/ODIHR regarding authoritarian or non-democratic legislation;
19. Regrets the lack of progress made on de-oligarchisation and calls on the Georgian authorities to adopt a systemic approach in line with

relevant Venice Commission recommendations, including through strengthened transparency requirements, effective conflict of interest rules and safeguards against undue influence over political and economic decision-making;

20. Strongly condemns the attempts by the Georgian authorities to ban opposition parties; calls on the authorities to immediately halt these attempts and to withdraw the constitutional lawsuit filed by 88 members of the de facto parliament of Georgia requesting that the activities of three major opposition parties – United National Movement, Coalition for Change and the Strong Georgia-Lelo coalition – be declared unconstitutional and that their registration be revoked; underlines the fact that such actions pose a dangerous threat to fundamental democratic principles and political pluralism; emphasises that a healthy democracy requires fair and free competition between various political parties;
21. Expresses strong disapproval of the recent introduction of a new article in the Criminal Code that prohibits ‘public and systematic’ criticism of the authorities or questioning of their legitimacy, as well as ‘any other public and systematic action by the same person’, which remains open to interpretation yet provides for imprisonment of up to three years; highlights that this allows for the de facto criminalisation of freedom of expression and calls on the government to denounce this law;

Crackdown on civil liberties and fundamental rights

22. Is extremely concerned that Georgian Dream has already adopted a number of legislative acts that aim to stifle civil society and independent media and curb pluralism, such as the Foreign Agents Registration Act, restrictive amendments to the Broadcasting Law, the Law on Public Service, the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations, and stricter provisions in the Criminal Code and the Administrative Offences Code; condemns, in particular, legislative measures that increase fines under administrative codes, which increasingly result in the imprisonment of protesters who are unable to pay those fines; reiterates its call to release all political prisoners and other illegally detained persons without delay; warns that the Georgian authorities’ efforts to transform Georgia’s vibrant civil society into a tightly controlled environment of government-aligned organisations constitute a further step towards becoming an authoritarian regime; recalls that most of these laws copy the early developments under Putin’s totalitarian regime in Russia; calls on the Georgian authorities to repeal these legislative acts as a tangible step back towards its EU path;
23. Condemns the degrading and inhuman treatment reportedly inflicted on Elene Khoshtaria during her detention; demands her immediate

and unconditional release and the immediate withdrawal of politically motivated charges against her;

24. Expresses deep concern at the continued misuse of administrative detention against protesters and activists; notes the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case *Mekvabishvili v. Georgia*, which found that reliance solely on police testimony without independent evidence undermined fair-trial guarantees and contributed to the imposition of disproportionate sanctions against peaceful demonstrators; calls on the Georgian authorities to reform its administrative-offence procedures to bring them in line with the European Convention on Human Rights;
25. Condemns credible reports of excessive use of force, torture and ill-treatment against protesters and detainees, including recent findings by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) documenting allegations of police abuse and systematic deficiencies in safeguards and accountability; calls on the Georgian authorities to ensure prompt, independent and effective investigations, prosecute those responsible, and fully implement CPT recommendations;
26. Condemns the growing trend of Georgian law enforcement agents using verbal and physical abuse against protesters, threats of rape and other gender-based violence and unlawful strip searches as part of a campaign to intimidate dissidents, especially women protesters, and stifle Georgians' human rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly;
27. Condemns adopted legislation that provides for automatic detention and the imposition of subsequent criminal penalties, including imprisonment of up to one year, for individuals peacefully protesting on pavements and pedestrian areas; underlines that such measures are repressive instruments intended to suppress dissent for political purposes; deplores the frequent detention of individuals for sharing their opinions on social media;
28. Expresses its utmost alarm at the allegations that a prohibited chemical agent may have been used in Georgia against individuals in the context of protests; stresses that, if confirmed, the use of any chemical agent against civilians would constitute a grave violation of fundamental human rights, international humanitarian norms and Georgia's obligations under international law, including the prohibition of chemical weapons; deplores the inadequate investigation conducted by the Georgian authorities into this matter; calls for an immediate, independent and transparent international investigation into these allegations; calls for an examination by the United Nations Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and urges the Member States to refer this case for further investigation;

29. Expresses deep concern over the systematic violation of human rights in Georgia and discrimination against vulnerable groups, including LGBTIQ+ persons; stresses that these violations are incompatible with Georgia's obligations under the EU-Georgia Association Agreement and international human rights standards; calls on the Georgian authorities to uphold the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, association and political participation, and to ensure the safety and protection of, and effective legal remedies for, all human rights defenders and activists; calls strongly for the EU and the Member States to monitor these violations, provide support and protection to at-risk individuals, and link progress made on EU assistance, cooperation and accession to tangible improvements in human rights protection;
30. Urges the de facto parliament of Georgia to rescind the Law on Family Values and the Protection of Minors, whose provisions starkly violate human rights, including the rights to equality, non-discrimination, education, health, freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association, as well as privacy, liberty and security; stands with the LGBTIQ+ community of Georgia and views with deep abhorrence the law's false equivalence between consensual same-sex relationships and incest; recalls that similar laws in Russia under the Putin regime have paved the way for the expansive repression of minorities and, ultimately, an atmosphere of intimidation and discrimination in Russia;
31. Expresses serious concern about the situation in Georgia's Chiatura region as a consequence of the mining of manganese for the EU market and calls for the implementation of the CSDDD, as the EU carries a responsibility for the well-being of local residents and for the protection of the environment affected by the damage caused;
32. Reiterates its opposition to the backsliding on labour laws and labour rights in Georgia, as seen in the 2024 amendments to the Law on Public Service; calls on the Georgian authorities to abide by labour law standards and refrain from restricting labour rights; recalls that the EU *acquis* includes alignment with International Labour Organization conventions, the European Social Charter and EU legislation on working conditions;
33. Welcomes the activation of the so-called Moscow Mechanism by the OSCE at the initiative of 24 participating States, which opened the opportunity to send an expert mission to assess Georgia's implementation of OSCE commitments, in particular with regard to the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms since the spring of 2024; calls on the Georgian authorities to engage substantively with its findings and to implement its recommendations within clear deadlines, including on the release of persons held for political reasons, the repeal of legislation incompatible with international obligations, and accountability for ill-treatment;

stresses that, should the authorities fail to take concrete and verifiable steps to implement its recommendations, participating States and relevant international institutions should consider appropriate follow-up measures to ensure accountability, including targeted sanctions and the use of relevant international legal mechanisms; calls on the EU Member States participating in the OSCE to actively support an extension of the mission's mandate, given the systematic and well-documented violations requiring comprehensive independent assessment;

34. Welcomes the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly's 2025 October resolution urging the Council of Europe's bodies to 'use all available means', including Article 52 of the European Convention on Human Rights and interstate applications to the European Court of Human Rights under Article 33 thereof, to ensure that Georgia upholds its obligations as a Council of Europe member state; calls on the EU Member States and the Council of Europe member states to consider implementing this recommendation;
35. Strongly condemns the role of Georgian Dream-aligned media outlets, including Imedi TV, PostTV and Rustavi 2 TV, in disseminating systematic disinformation, smear campaigns and hostile propaganda against the EU and its institutions and representatives, in particular the Head of the EU Delegation to Georgia and EU Member State diplomats; notes the recent decision by the United Kingdom to impose sanctions against Imedi TV and PostTV; calls for the EU institutions to review the accreditation of such media outlets within the EU institutions and encourages the EU Member States to follow the United Kingdom's example and adopt appropriate and proportionate restrictive measures against individuals and entities responsible for orchestrating and financing these disinformation campaigns, including under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime; calls for the inclusion on the EU sanctions list of members of the leadership of the Georgian National Communications Commission and the Georgian Public Broadcaster;
36. Expresses concern about pressure placed on and legal proceedings brought against the independent media; emphasises that media pluralism and the safety of journalists are essential prerequisites for a democratic society;
37. Notes with concern recent reforms in Georgia's education sector that appear to centralise control over academic institutions, weaken academic freedom and university autonomy and hinder Georgia's integration with the European higher education system; warns about measures aimed at changing the structure and duration of academic programmes and the introduction of the 'one city, one faculty' principle, which limits the range of disciplines offered by individual universities; is worried about regulatory pressure placed on institutions such as Ilia State University following their public

support for student protests, while support is extended for private institutions associated with figures close to the ruling elite; stresses that independent education experts warn that the cumulative effect of these measures risks reducing academic pluralism and further politicising the higher-education system;

38. Expresses concern over the organised fraudulent call-centre networks operating from Georgia, in particular those targeting EU citizens; underlines that international journalists' investigations have suggested that high-ranking Georgian Dream officials offer protection to these scam networks in exchange for financial compensation, which helps them to withstand economic sanctions;
39. Welcomes the Commission's decision to suspend visa-free travel for holders of Georgian diplomatic, service and official passports, which has applied since 6 March 2026 across all EU Member States under the revised and more flexible visa suspension mechanism that entered into force on 30 December 2025, as a direct consequence of the Georgian Dream regime's actions in breach of fundamental values; encourages the Member States to carry out a thorough screening, by conducting an interview and requesting supporting documents from these visa applicants, and refuse visas if there are any doubts about the reliability of the information provided by them; regrets that EU-wide visa bans for Georgian officials responsible for serious human rights violations, democratic backsliding and repression have not been possible due to opposition from the Hungarian and Slovak Governments; notes that the eighth visa suspension mechanism report highlights Georgia's lack of compliance with key benchmarks and previous recommendations; warns that continued inaction by the Georgian authorities could lead to the suspension of visa-free travel for the entire population, for which Georgian Dream would be fully responsible; calls on the Commission to establish a mechanism whereby civil society activists, journalists and students may continue to have visa-free access to the EU, and to increase direct support for people-to-people exchange programmes such as Erasmus +, Horizon Europe, the European Solidarity Corps and Creative Europe;
40. Highlights that the lack of thorough academic research, historical education and public awareness concerning the Soviet occupation and its long-term consequences enables the spread of historical manipulation and disinformation campaigns, which the Russian Federation exploits to undermine the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Georgian society; stresses, therefore, the importance of academic research, documentation and the dissemination of knowledge about Georgia's history under Soviet occupation, including the political repression, mass executions and the history of resistance to Soviet-Russian occupation, as well as the restoration of these events to the collective memory; expresses regret that, in recent years, with at least the passive acquiescence of the authorities, efforts to relativise

communist crimes and reverse the process of de-Stalinisation have been observed; emphasises, in this regard, the important role of independent historians, researchers and civil society organisations, such as SovLab, in studying the Soviet occupation, its political, legal and moral consequences, as well as in identifying burial sites of victims of communist terror and ensuring their identification and dignified commemoration; encourages relevant institutions in the Member States engaged in documenting the consequences of Soviet occupation, communist crimes and other totalitarian regimes, to deepen cooperation with their Georgian counterparts, support joint research projects, and participate in educational programmes and initiatives aimed at uncovering, documenting and disseminating knowledge about this chapter of Georgia's history; expresses concern about the systematic obstruction of access to archives related to repression and crimes committed during the period of Soviet occupation; calls on the Georgian authorities to ensure full, transparent and non-discriminatory access to archives relating to the Soviet period for scholars, researchers and civil society organisations;

Alignment on foreign and security policy matters

41. Regrets that the level of Georgia's alignment with statements by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and with Council decisions on sanctions has further decreased from 53 % in 2024 to 40 %, demonstrating its lack of commitment to European integration; is particularly disappointed that Georgia did not systematically align with international and EU initiatives in support of Ukraine, including on resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly, the UN Human Rights Council and the Council of Europe, and has instead strengthened its relations with Russia and supported Russian narratives that aim to shift responsibility for the war of aggression and the crimes committed by Russia;
42. Is extremely grateful for the strong solidarity the Georgian people have shown towards Ukraine during Russia's war of aggression, which reflects widespread public opposition to Russian imperialist policies, the country's own experience of Russian military aggression, and the strong will of the people to preserve their independence and remain outside Moscow's sphere of influence; points out that many Georgian volunteers have fought alongside the Ukrainian armed forces, in particular in the Georgian Legion, and that Georgian civil society has participated in humanitarian aid campaigns in support of Ukraine;
43. Notes that Georgia has still not aligned with the vast majority of sanctions against Russia, Belarus and Iran; calls on the Georgian authorities to adopt verifiable measures and strengthen cooperation and customs monitoring to prevent the territory of Georgia and/or

legal entities registered in Georgia from being used to circumvent EU restrictive measures; considers the current level of alignment and enforcement efforts to be manifestly insufficient and incompatible with the responsibilities of an EU candidate country; stresses that more decisive action is urgently required, including full alignment with EU restrictive measures, effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and transparent cooperation with EU institutions to prevent sanctions evasion, including concerning dual-use goods, oil exports and financial flows linked to Russian and Iranian entities; warns that continued failure to align with the EU's foreign policy and sanctions regime will have direct consequences for Georgia's EU accession process; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue closely monitoring Georgia's compliance with the EU sanctions regime, including risks of sanctions circumvention through Georgian territory or entities registered in Georgia;

44. Calls for the EU and its Member States to take urgent and decisive action to halt the systematic circumvention of EU sanctions by Russia facilitated by the Georgian authorities, including by establishing a dedicated EU monitoring mechanism to track trade flows of high-priority dual-use goods and aviation components transiting through Georgia; calls, furthermore, on the Georgian authorities to fully cooperate with these efforts and to publish regular, transparent reports on such trade flows in order to strengthen customs enforcement and prevent further sanctions evasion;
45. Is concerned by the potential use of Georgian ports, refining infrastructure and oil-handling facilities to facilitate the re-export or blending of Russian petroleum products in order to circumvent international sanctions regimes; expresses serious concern over reports that Russian crude oil is being shipped to Georgia's newly built and partially state-financed Kulevi refinery on the Black Sea coast; calls on the Georgian authorities to immediately halt and prevent any such activities and to ensure that Georgian infrastructure is not used to facilitate the circumvention of EU sanctions on Russia; notes that the Kulevi Oil Terminal was not included in the 20th EU sanctions package against Russia based on the commitments from the Georgian authorities and the terminal's operator that they would strictly comply with EU sanctions; calls for its inclusion in future sanctions if the Georgian authorities and the terminal's operators do not strictly comply with EU sanctions; calls for enhanced cooperation between the EU and international partners to ensure the full enforcement of restrictive measures;
46. Calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Anti-Money Laundering Authority, to assess Georgia's legal and regulatory framework, including provisions of the Georgian Tax Code that may facilitate the use of offshore-registered companies and obscure beneficial ownership, thereby enabling sanctions circumvention and

money laundering; calls for the enhanced monitoring and scrutiny of companies registered in Georgia that are owned or controlled by Russian citizens or entities, particularly those established since February 2022; calls on the Georgian authorities to establish an asset recovery office, an asset management office and a register of ultimate beneficial owners in order to strengthen anti-money laundering safeguards and reduce the risk of sanctions circumvention;

47. Notes that, having abandoned the path of Euro-Atlantic integration, Georgian Dream is making a strategic turn towards cooperation with China, Russia and Iran, as confirmed in numerous reports; stresses that this reorientation demonstrates a disregard for Georgia's constitutional commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration and the clear and consistently expressed will of Georgian society; expresses outrage that, instead of addressing credible findings on the growing influence of authoritarian powers, investigations have been launched against the authors of such reports, including Hudson Institute researcher Giorgi Kandelaki and Tinatin Khidasheli;
48. Expresses its concern over the involvement of Chinese state-owned enterprises in strategic projects such as the Anaklia Deep Sea Port, which was originally developed with Western partners and intended to strengthen East-West connectivity independent of Russian and Chinese influence; reminds the Georgian authorities that the success of the Middle Corridor is linked to Georgia's adherence to the rule of law and that Global Gateway investments require Georgia to be a stable and transparent partner;
49. Notes initiatives for strategic connectivity projects in the Black Sea region, including the Black Sea Digital Connectivity Submarine Cable and the Black Sea Submarine Electricity Cable, which could enhance energy and digital links between the EU and the South Caucasus;
50. Notes that the Georgian Orthodox Church remains an influential institution in Georgian society and plays an important role in shaping public discourse; expresses concerns regarding the use of religious networks by Russia as channels for disinformation and influence operations across Georgia, with the aim of undermining pro-European orientation and democratic resilience; recalls that some clerics within Georgia have resisted such instrumentalisation and have spoken out against both Russian influence and the policies of the Georgian Dream regime; underlines that the Georgian Orthodox diocese and communities are also present in the EU, which highlights the need for vigilance and resilience against transnational disinformation efforts;
51. Notes with particular concern Iran's growing influence in the country, in particular through religious and educational institutions

and youth mobilisation, and through economic structures that effectively enable Iran to evade sanctions; is further concerned by the growing influence of economic actors linked to the Iranian regime operating in Georgia; underscores that such actors may be used for financial sanctions circumvention, money laundering and the illicit export of Iranian goods, benefiting actors connected to both the Iranian and the Georgian Dream regimes via corruption and skewed public tenders;

52. Considers that Georgia should play a constructive role in facilitating Armenia's access to international maritime trade routes, thereby contributing to regional connectivity, economic resilience and stability in the South Caucasus;
53. Reiterates its unwavering support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia; strongly condemns Russia's ongoing occupation of Georgia's regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia and the continued 'borderisation' process, which constitutes a violation of Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity; urges the Georgian Government to maintain a clear and consistent position on Russian aggression; roundly condemns Russia's efforts to integrate the occupied territories politically, militarily and economically into the Russian Federation; notes with deep concern the continued illegal detentions and targeting of ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, including women and young people, on fabricated charges, such as espionage or the possession of a Georgian passport; condemns these practices as serious human rights violations contributing to intimidation, discrimination and the forced displacement of the Georgian population; strongly condemns the ongoing development of the Russian naval base in Ochamchire, which is not just a violation of territorial integrity but a direct threat to the security of the entire Black Sea basin and Georgia's own maritime trade ambitions; reiterates its call for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Russian forces from the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia;
54. Calls for targeted restrictive measures against those responsible for human rights violations in the occupied territories building on precedents such as the 2018 'Otkhozoria-Tatunashvili List';
55. Reiterates the importance of the work of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) on conflict resolution, human rights monitoring and support for affected communities; strongly condemns the Russian Federation's continued obstruction of the EUMM's access to the occupied regions of Georgia, as well as past acts of intimidation against EUMM monitors, including unlawful detentions and other incidents involving threats and interference with the EUMM's work; considers that the visible and public implementation of the EUMM's mandate should be further strengthened through increased support and additional personnel and should be more prominently

communicated, as it significantly contributes to the EU's engagement in the region and exposes Russia's aggressive tactics, which, since the 2008 war against Georgia, have continued to bring death, suffering and instability to the region;

◦

◦ ◦

56. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the President of Georgia Salome Zourabichvili and the de facto authorities of Georgia.