European Parliament
2024-2029

TEXTS ADOPTED

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EU-Syria political relations

European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2026 on EU-Syria political relations (2026/2036(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) on the situation in Syria,

– having regard to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional protocols,

– having regard to the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),

– having regard to the numerous reports and findings documenting war crimes, crimes against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Syria by the regime of Bashar al-Assad and his allies, in particular Russia and Iran, including the findings of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, the UN's International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and various human rights organisations, including the Syrian Network for Human Rights, the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, the Commission for International Justice and Accountability and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights,

– having regard to the joint statement following the Paris Conference on Syria of 13 February 2025,

– having regard to the Council conclusions on Syria and on the Middle East,

– having regard to the statements by the European External Action Service (EEAS) on the situation in Syria,

– having regard to the outcome of the first EU-Syria High-level Political Dialogue of 11 May 2026,

– having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2026/1087 of 11 May 2026

repealing Decision 2011/523/EU partially suspending the application of the Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Syrian Arab Republic[1],

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Syria,

– having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2026 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union's policy on the matter – annual report 2025[2],

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0278/2026),

A. whereas the EU and Syria held a high-level political dialogue on 11 May 2026, providing a positive impulse to EU-Syria engagement after years of frozen relations under the Assad regime, and reflecting renewed political engagement and dialogue between the EU and Syria;

B. whereas the EU's goal is an inclusive, democratic and stable Syria, a secure Syria that is able to rebuild itself and provide for returning refugees, a sovereign Syria that is at peace with its neighbours and is determined to fight against terrorism nationally and internationally, and a peaceful Syria, where all citizens can live with dignity, freedom and hope; whereas this can only be achieved through a genuinely inclusive political transition grounded in full respect for human rights, international humanitarian law, democratic governance, the rule of law, the protection of minorities and equality of citizenship;

C. whereas the historic collapse of Bashar al-Assad's murderous regime by a coalition of armed rebel groups on 8 December 2024 brought to an end more than five decades of dynastic rule and suffering for the Syrian people, as well as 14 years of conflict; whereas the Assad clan was an authoritarian dynasty defined by its grip on the security apparatus, a systematic cult of personality and the brutal repression of dissent; whereas the Assad era was also characterised by a strategic alliance with Iran, Hezbollah and Russia, which ultimately disintegrated with the fall of Damascus;

D. whereas no other conflict in recent history has resulted in so many of a country's people being killed, disabled, forcibly disappeared, displaced, or forced to flee; whereas Syria's 14-year war resulted in the deaths of approximately half a million people and left millions

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1 OJ L, 2026/1087, 12.5.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2026/1087/oj.

2 OJ C, C/2026/3690, 5.8.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/3690/oj.

more wounded; whereas the Assad regime committed war crimes and possible crimes against humanity; whereas, according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), 7.4 million people were internally displaced within Syria as of the end of 2024, and 6.1 million Syrians remained refugees, asylum seekers or persons in need of international protection worldwide; whereas the war devastated Syria’s economy and public infrastructure; whereas hundreds of thousands of Syrians remain stateless or at risk of statelessness;

E. whereas, following the fall of the regime, Ahmad al-Sharaa was named transitional President on 29 January 2025 and a Syrian transitional government was subsequently formed; whereas on 13 March 2025, the Syrian transitional authorities adopted a Constitutional Declaration setting out a five-year transitional period until the adoption of a permanent constitution; whereas a 23-member transitional government was subsequently formed, including members drawn from Syria’s ethnic and religious minorities;

F. whereas in October 2025, Syria selected the representatives of the first Syrian People’s Assembly since the fall of the Assad regime through an indirect system based on electoral colleges of approximately 6 000 vetted voters; whereas 140 of the 210 seats of the People’s Assembly were filled through these indirect elections, while the remaining 70 were directly appointed by the transitional President in July 2026; whereas concerns have been raised as to the inclusiveness and representativeness of the process; whereas the representation of women, minorities and some key regions remains limited; whereas 10 Kurdish parties and political forces have rejected the manner in which the People’s Assembly was composed, with only four seats allocated to Kurdish representatives; whereas the Syrian People’s Assembly held its inaugural session on 12 July 2026;

G. whereas religious and ethnic minorities have lived within Syria’s borders for many centuries and form an integral part of its rich cultural, historical and social heritage;

H. whereas Syria still faces recurring violence, poverty, fragile and fragmented institutions, limited administrative capacity, weak governance, social fragmentation and enduring division and mistrust inherited from years of dictatorship and civil war; whereas Syria also still faces continuous interferences, as well as disregard for its territorial integrity and sovereignty, from regional powers including Türkiye, Israel and Iran; whereas Iran and Russia continue to interfere in Syria’s internal affairs, including by using Syrian territory to project military, intelligence and destabilising influence in the wider region;

I. whereas Syria is confronted with the fallout of the war with Iran, including heightened regional militarisation and violations of Syrian

airspace and territory; whereas Syria is facing cross-border attacks while trying to stay out of confrontations;

J. whereas for many years, Syria has been a crucial link connecting Iran with Lebanon and facilitating the transfer of weapons, funding and logistical capacities to Hezbollah and other terrorist organisations in the region; whereas the use of Syria’s territory as a transit corridor has contributed to destabilising the region, undermining the sovereignty of the Syrian state and fuelling conflict in the Middle East;

K. whereas for years Russia maintained a military presence in Syria through the air and naval bases of Khmeimim and Tartus on the Mediterranean coast, which constituted a strategic challenge for the EU, NATO and regional stability; whereas on 9 August 2026, the Syrian transitional authorities announced that an agreement had been reached whereby Syria will take control of the Tartus commercial pier and the Khmeimim airbase, and the military bases will be converted into ‘joint training centres’; whereas, however, no withdrawal of the remaining Russian troops has been announced; whereas Bashar al-Assad and his family found refuge in Russia, where he remains to this day, which illustrates Moscow’s continued responsibility for shielding perpetrators of grave crimes and obstructing full accountability; whereas others fled to Russia alongside Bashar al-Assad, including militia leaders under EU sanctions, such as Nabil Al-Abdallah; whereas Russian troops caused widespread destruction during the war and are guilty of war crimes, including a great many attacks on civilian areas; whereas Russia has become one of Syria’s principal suppliers of crude oil and petroleum products following the lifting of sanctions;

L. whereas Türkiye is still present in Syria in contravention of international law, exerting enormous political and economic influence, and illegally occupying parts of Northern Syria; whereas Türkiye has military bases and observation posts in Syria and engages in military operations that cause deadly attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure in Kurdish-majority areas along the border between the two countries and against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF); whereas military operations conducted by Türkiye undermine Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and constitute a violation of international law;

M. whereas Israel has occupied a part of the Syrian territory in the Golan Heights since 1967; whereas, following the overthrow of the Assad regime, Israel has further seized the UN-patrolled demilitarised zone beyond the Golan Heights, repeatedly carried out strikes on military targets in Syria and established a military presence alongside incursions further within Syrian territory, including in the former UN-monitored buffer zone and beyond; whereas in April 2026, Israel’s cabinet approved a USD 334 million

plan to transfer thousands more Israeli settlers into the occupied Syrian Golan Heights; whereas US diplomatic efforts, conducted outside of the multilateral framework of the Global Coalition against Daesh and aimed at reaching a security agreement between Syria and Israel, are still ongoing;

N. whereas over 3,5 million Syrian refugees remain abroad, primarily in Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, while over 7,4 million are internally displaced within Syria; whereas over 3 million refugees and internally displaced people have returned to their homes since December 2024; whereas a UNHCR survey indicates that 80 % of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt intend to return to Syria at some stage;

O. whereas the Syrian transitional authorities have taken significant steps to dismantle the country's drug trafficking networks;

P. whereas the Council has lifted the EU's economic sanctions against Syria, while maintaining targeted restrictive measures, and has approved the full resumption of the EU-Syria Cooperation Agreement[3], which had been suspended since 2011, with the aim of restoring normal trade relations with Syria and supporting the country's socio-economic recovery;

Q. whereas the EU stood with the Syrian people throughout the war, including by fundraising and coordinating donor support through the Brussels conferences; whereas the EU continues to play this role through the Syria Partnership Coordination Forum, co-chaired by the EU and the Syrian transitional authorities and launched on 17 November 2026 in Damascus; whereas the EU remains one of the largest donors addressing the humanitarian and recovery needs arising from the Syrian crisis; whereas, since 2011, the EU and its Member States have collectively mobilised over EUR 41 billion in humanitarian, development, economic and stabilisation support for the Syrian people, making them the single largest international donor to the Syrian crisis; whereas at the ninth Brussels Conference on 'Standing with Syria: meeting the needs for a successful transition', held on 17 March 2025, the EU and its partners pledged approximately EUR 5.8 billion for Syria and the region for 2025 and 2026, of which nearly EUR 2.5 billion was pledged by the EU to support socio-economic recovery, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance; whereas in May 2025, the EU increased its humanitarian response for the region by allocating an additional EUR 20 million in humanitarian aid, specifically noting the precarious conditions in northeastern Syria;

R. whereas in January 2026, the Commission and European Council

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[3] OJ L 269, 27.9.1978, p. 2, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/1978/2216/oj.

Presidents visited Syria and announced a new political partnership with a view to supporting a peaceful and inclusive transition and reconciliation within Syria, along with a comprehensive financial support package of approximately EUR 620 million for 2026 and 2027; whereas a few weeks later, the Commission announced the mobilisation of EUR 150 million from the EU financial cushion for Syria for the next two years to support the political transition, socio-economic recovery, job creation and capacity building;

S. whereas there have been recent cuts by major international donors, notably the United States, to humanitarian budgets;

T. whereas, between 2011 and 2024, Parliament maintained no formal contact with its Syrian counterparts, in line with the EU's policy of isolating the Assad regime; whereas in October 2025, it led its first mission to Syria since the fall of the Assad regime;

U. whereas the Council has extended the EU's restrictive measures against individuals and entities linked to the former al-Assad regime until 1 June 2027, reaffirming the EU's continued commitment to accountability for past crimes and serious human rights violations in Syria;

V. whereas the United States rescinded Syria's designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in August 2026;

W. whereas the safe, voluntary and dignified return of refugees remains severely constrained by insecurity, a lack of basic services and the absence of political guarantees and economic opportunities;

X. whereas over 400 000 Palestinian refugees live in Syria, the vast majority living below the poverty line and many in protracted displacement; whereas the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) continues to provide essential services to this population;

Y. whereas 90 % of the Syrian population lives below the poverty line and 15,6 million Syrians remain in urgent need of humanitarian assistance due to continued displacement, the collapse of essential services and the extensive destruction of infrastructure; whereas years of conflict, destruction, displacement and economic isolation have resulted in a deep humanitarian and socio-economic crisis, severely undermining access to basic services, decent livelihoods, healthcare, education and social protection;

Z. whereas the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that Syria's overall humanitarian appeal is barely 16 % funded, with only USD 480 million received against the USD 2,9 billion needed; whereas the termination of most US aid programming in Syria has had drastic consequences for the humanitarian situation in the country;

AA. whereas women and girls have been disproportionately affected by the conflict; whereas rape and sexual and gender-based violence have been used as weapons of war; whereas girls' limited access to education remains a critical concern, with female illiteracy exceeding 30 % in some rural or conflict-affected areas;

AB. whereas Syria is among the world's most heavily mine-contaminated countries, resulting in hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries; whereas over 60 % of Syria's agricultural land is estimated to be unusable due to mine-related threats; whereas explosive ordnance contamination continues to impact the most vulnerable communities and constitutes one of the most acute barriers to the safe and voluntary return of displaced Syrians, the resumption of agricultural activity and access to essential services; whereas the fall of the Assad regime enabled a shift to a country-wide approach to mine action coordination, but major challenges remain; whereas experts estimate that, at current resource levels, full clearance of Syria's contamination could take between 25 and 40 years; whereas more than 2 000 people have been killed or injured by explosives since the fall of the former regime;

AC. whereas the Syrian army and affiliated local militias launched an extensive offensive against Kurdish forces in early 2026 resulting in casualties and the mass displacement of civilians; whereas the hostilities also led to repeated disruptions of essential services, damage to civilian infrastructure, mass displacement, food insecurity and limited access to healthcare, water and sanitation;

AD. whereas on 16 January 2026, President al-Sharaa issued Decree No 13, which annuls the exceptional measures stemming from the discriminatory 1962 Hasakah census and grants Syrian citizenship to residents of Kurdish origin, including those previously rendered stateless by that census; whereas the decree constitutes the first formal recognition of Kurdish national rights since Syria gained independence in 1946, aims to ensure equal rights and duties, recognises the Kurdish language as a national language and prohibits discrimination or incitement on ethnic or linguistic grounds;

AE. whereas the agreement between the Kurdish-led SDF and the Syrian transitional authorities of January 2026 envisioned, among other measures, the phased integration of the SDF's military and administration into the Syrian transitional government institutions, which was delivered on 25 August 2026 with the SDF commander-in-chief Mazloum Abdi announcing the dissolution of the group and his nomination as an adviser to the transitional President, and the appointment of local officials and a new governor of the Hasakah province from the ranks of the SDF; whereas the stability of northeastern Syria is key for the success of an inclusive political transition in Syria, protecting the rights of all Syrian people; whereas

some cultural and civil rights of Kurds, such as Syrian citizenship, were recognised in the agreement;

AF. whereas Daesh (ISIS) and other jihadist groups remain a serious threat; whereas the Kurdish-led SDF, as part of the Global Coalition against Daesh, have played a decisive and internationally recognised role in the fight against the terrorist threat, including by clearing landmines, cluster munitions and unexploded ordnance, and maintaining stability and local governance in northeastern Syria since 2015; whereas the Syrian transitional authorities recently joined the Global Coalition against Daesh and became a full member; whereas the United States has completely withdrawn its military presence from Syria; whereas an undetermined number of Daesh terrorists escaped from prisons and camps in early 2026 during clashes between the Syrian army and the SDF – of which only a few have since been recaptured; whereas the US Government initiated the transfer of Daesh detainees from Syria to Iraq, resulting in more than 5 700 Daesh fighters being transferred to Iraqi custody; whereas recent attacks attributed to Daesh cells, including the assassination of officials affiliated with the Syrian transitional authorities in eastern Syria, demonstrate that the terrorist organisation retains operational capabilities in parts of the country;

AG. whereas the gradual transfer of Daesh detainees to Iraq only displaces the problem and engages Europe in new forms of dependency on the capacities and political will of third countries;

AH. whereas tens of thousands of people, mostly women and children, and including some EU nationals, remain detained in camps and prisons in northeastern Syria in life-threatening conditions due to their alleged links to Daesh; whereas the situation of women and children – some of them born in detention – in the al-Hol and al-Roj camps remains unresolved amid a deteriorating security environment; whereas detention without legal process violates international law;

AI. whereas Syria has always been a country with a rich multicultural identity, in which Muslims (Sunni and Shia), Kurds, Druze, Christians of various denominations, Armenians and others have coexisted for centuries; whereas this diversity should be preserved; whereas Syria’s religiously and ethnically diverse society has suffered at the hands of the violent and divisive Assad regime and terrorist groups, especially Daesh; whereas Syria’s Christian population has steeply declined since 2011 due to its targeting by both the Assad regime and by Daesh and other terrorist groups; whereas the Kurdish and Arab communities in northeastern Syria have endured years of systemic violence, insecurity, forced displacement and severe violations of their fundamental human rights resulting from atrocities perpetrated by Daesh; whereas Daesh threatened not only the Kurdish population, but also the Yazidis, who became the victims

of genocide; whereas Daesh cells continue to carry out attacks against the SDF and civilians in northeastern Syria, including against Sunni Arab communities;

AJ. whereas the security situation in post-Assad Syria has been, and continues to be, marked by the frequent resurgence of violence against specific communities and religious minorities, especially Alawites, Druzes and Christians, including Syriac Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Apostolic, Armenian Catholic, Armenian Evangelical, Chaldean Catholic, Apostolic Catholic Assyrian, Maronite, Latin Catholic, Syriac Catholic, Melkite Greek Catholic, Baptist, Anglican Episcopal, Presbyterian, Evangelical and Pentecostal communities, all of whom have been disproportionately affected by targeted violence, forced displacement and attacks on places of worship, underlining the need to protect freedom of religion or belief in post-Assad Syria; whereas the situation remains highly fragile and puts a dangerous strain on Syria’s diverse social fabric;

AK. whereas armed groups, including forces aligned with the transitional authorities, carried out large-scale attacks against Alawite communities in Homs, Hama, Latakia and Tartus in March 2025; whereas the UN Commission of Inquiry reported that the violence resulted in approximately 1 400 deaths, mostly of civilians, including women, children, elderly people and persons with disabilities, and noted allegations of looting, the destruction of homes and mass displacement; whereas the Commission of Inquiry further warned that the Alawite community continues to face abductions, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances and other abuses, and called for strengthened protection measures, accountability for perpetrators regardless of affiliation or rank, and the exclusion of suspected perpetrators from the Syrian transitional authorities’ security forces;

AL. whereas Christians suffered a bloody terrorist attack perpetrated by Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah, a Sunni extremist group, against the Greek Orthodox Mar Elias Church in Damascus in June 2025 with 25 deaths, marking the deadliest attack against Christians in years; whereas there were attacks against the predominantly Christian Orthodox population of Suqaylabiyah in April 2026;

AM. whereas the province of Suweyda experienced its worst violence of the post-Assad era in July 2025, with violent clashes involving Druze militias, Bedouin tribal groups, the Syrian army and Israeli air strikes; whereas there are concerning reports of sexual violence, killings, torture, forced displacement and widespread looting and arson targeting Druze homes, leaving up to 155 000 people, primarily from Druze villages, unable to return; whereas on 24 July 2025, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) strongly condemned the violence and called for the protection of all civilians

regardless of their ethnic or religious background; whereas the VP/HR also stressed the urgent need for accountability for grave violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law, and underlined the importance of preventing further violence, sectarian incitement and sexual and gender-based violence;

AN. whereas following the despicable terrorist attack in a Greek Orthodox Church in Jordan's Karak governorate in October 2026, the Jordanian military launched strikes on targets in the Dara'a province in Syria that were identified as linked to the attack, leading to tensions between Jordan and Syria and the momentary closure of their shared border, due to a lack of coordination prior to these strikes being launched; whereas laudable diplomatic efforts have been made to de-escalate the tensions since this event;

AO. whereas international humanitarian law and international human rights law were systematically violated during the Assad regime and the Syrian civil war, including through the use of chemical weapons, torture and enforced disappearance; whereas hundreds of thousands of Syrians – victims of the Assad regime and of Daesh and other armed parties – remain missing or forcibly disappeared, and millions of family members continue to search for answers; whereas cases of arbitrary detention and disappearances without warrants or judicial decisions still occur;

AP. whereas most perpetrators of violence, crimes, war crimes and crimes against humanity during the Syrian civil war have not yet faced accountability, which remains a precondition for durable reconciliation; whereas in May 2025, Syria established new transitional justice institutions, namely a National Commission for Transitional Justice, a National Commission for Missing Persons, a Fact-Finding Committee and a Civil Peace Committee; whereas Syria's existing legal framework lacks the codified definitions of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide necessary to ensure legal certainty and prosecute these crimes;

AQ. whereas in April 2026, the first trial of a senior Assad-era official, Atef Najib, former head of political security in Deraa, was opened in Damascus, with charges including murder, torture and responsibility for massacres linked to the 2011 crackdown, among them the death in custody of a child named Hamza al-Khateeb;

AR. whereas the Syrian transitional authorities have begun arresting and charging other former regime officials; whereas in April and May 2026, Syrian security forces arrested Adnan Abboud Hilweh, a general accused of orchestrating the 2013 sarin chemical attack on Eastern Ghouta, Jayez al-Moussa, Assad's Air Force chief of staff and an EU-sanctioned figure tied to chemical weapons attacks, Major General Wajih Ali al-Abdullah, who ran Assad's brutal military affairs office for 13 years, and Amjad Youssef, the intelligence officer

accused of leading the 2013 Tadamon massacre; whereas all parties to the conflict against whom credible evidence of atrocities exists, including military commanders, pilots, personnel responsible for planning and conducting military operations, as well as members of private military formations operating on the side of the Syrian regime, must face justice, irrespective of their affiliation; whereas criminal responsibility covers both direct perpetrators and those exercising command over operations;

AS. whereas former Assad regime officials have only just begun facing trial, so far on a limited scale, for their involvement in the policy of repression pursued by the former Assad regime; whereas such trials have also begun outside of Syria, notably in EU countries such as Austria, where Khaled al-H, head of Syria's General Intelligence Directorate in Raqqa between 2011 and 2013, went on trial on 1 June 2026 on charges of torture and sexual abuse; whereas the cement manufacturer Lafarge and eight of its former executives were found guilty in April 2026 of financing terrorist groups in order to keep their factory in Syria running, by paying several million US dollars to armed groups, including Daesh, between 2013 and 2014;

AT. whereas the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria found direct involvement of Russian Federation aircraft in attacks on civilian areas; whereas these attacks targeted, inter alia, markets, hospitals, schools, camps for internally displaced persons and other civilian targets, and resulted in the death and injury of civilians, including women and children; whereas numerous international organisations, investigative bodies and independent experts have pointed to similarities in the methods used by the armed forces of the Russian Federation in Syria and during the aggression against Ukraine, in particular regarding attacks on civilians, civilian infrastructure and medical facilities; whereas the lack of effective accountability for crimes committed in Syria may have contributed to the perpetuation of a sense of impunity and the repetition of similar violations of international law in Ukraine; whereas the commanders responsible for Russian military operations in Syria include General Aleksandr Dvornikov, commander of Russian forces in Syria from 2015 to 2016, who was nicknamed the 'Butcher of Syria' and whose actions during the Syrian civil war were the subject of numerous accusations of brutal warfare; whereas General Aleksandr Dvornikov was subsequently appointed to lead Russian military operations during the aggression against Ukraine, replicating the brutal methods of operation previously used by Russian forces in Syria, including attacks on civilian areas and infrastructure;

EU strategy on Syria

1. Welcomes the fall of the brutal Assad regime as a historic opportunity for the Syrian people to build a free, democratic,

inclusive, sovereign and peaceful Syria; commends the bravery, dignity and resilience demonstrated by the Syrian people and pays tribute to the countless victims of the Assad regime; welcomes the Syrian transitional authorities' engagement with the EU and the wider international community;

2. Calls for the EU to seize this occasion to support a Syrian-led political transition, including institutional consolidation, without which there can be no lasting stability, and to provide comprehensive assistance to Syria in implementing its national recovery strategy; welcomes the announcement by the Presidents of the Commission and the European Council in January 2026 of a new political partnership with Syria;

3. Reiterates its call on the Commission and the VP/HR to develop a stand-alone comprehensive, coherent and long-term EU strategy on Syria with clear objectives, timelines and benchmarks, in coherence with its comprehensive Middle East Strategy; stresses the need for the strategy to promote an inclusive governance model that ensures the participation of all segments of Syrian society, including minorities, women, young people and civil society actors; underscores that this strategy should also aim to support the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, the protection of human rights, equality of citizenship, the rule of law and dignity for Syrians, as well as reconstruction efforts; calls for a calibrated strategy that considers European security interests, including counterterrorism, border security, the fight against organised crime and drug trafficking, the protection of religious and ethnic minorities and the countering of the destabilising influence of Russia and Iran; calls on the Commission to align EU funding streams with such a strategy and thus enable a triple nexus approach;

4. Underlines that EU political engagement, financial assistance, reconstruction support, the suspension of sanctions or resumption of institutional cooperation should continue to be reversible, benchmark-based and strictly conditional on a genuine, pluralistic and inclusive Syrian-led political transition process, with measurable progress on the rule of law, constitutional reform, security-sector reform, counterterrorism cooperation, humanitarian access, anti-corruption safeguards, the respect of international human rights standards, the protection of religious and ethnic minorities, transitional justice and accountability for serious crimes, as well as a commitment to peaceful neighbourly relations, regional cooperation and full compliance with Syria's obligations under international law;

5. Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to establish a monitoring mechanism to continuously assess progress against these clear benchmarks, and to report to Parliament on a regular basis – at least annually, or whenever there is a significant deterioration on the

ground – on the implementation of the EU-Syria Cooperation Agreement, the use of EU funds, progress on the political transition, any risks relating to the misappropriation of assistance, the role of armed groups within state structures and the continued applicability of restrictive measures; underlines that any cooperation should also reach vulnerable communities, without discrimination, and be channelled through reliable partners, subject to strict monitoring and due diligence, ensuring that no funds, resources, or benefits are directly or indirectly diverted to, or reach, former regime networks, designated terrorist organisations, including Daesh and other listed terrorist entities, or associated networks or proxies operating on behalf of foreign hostile actors, or any internationally sanctioned individuals or entities;

6. Welcomes the Council decision to restore the full application of the EU-Syria Cooperation Agreement, and further welcomes the first EU-Syria High-level Political Dialogue held on 11 May 2026, which marked the formal normalisation of diplomatic ties following the collapse of the Assad regime, and an important step towards strengthening bilateral relations between the EU and Syria;

7. Takes note of the exchange of views in the Foreign Affairs Council on 16 November 2026, which led to an agreement to proceed with the 2008 EU-Syria Association Agreement and to simultaneously work on a new mandate for a forthcoming revision to be negotiated;

8. Deeply regrets that many Syrian civil society actors remain sidelined from playing a meaningful role in Syria’s transition; calls, therefore, for the EU strategy on Syria to include significant engagement with Syrian civil society organisations and independent media;

Consolidating Syrian sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity

9. Reaffirms its unwavering support for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria and rejects any attempts to undermine, partition or alter the country’s internationally recognised borders or to fragment Syria into spheres of influence controlled by militias or external powers; calls on all regional actors to respect Syria’s territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty in full compliance with international law, and to immediately cease all attacks and incursions on and the occupation of territory by military forces and proxy structures that risk undermining peace, security and stability in Syria;

10. Remains concerned about the continued military intervention and aggression by Turkish forces and Turkish-backed armed groups in Syria, and calls on Türkiye to immediately cease its military operations and to withdraw its forces from Syrian territory; expresses serious concerns regarding the situation of Kurdish communities in areas under Turkish military control, including

deadly attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure in Kurdish-majority cities and provinces along the border between the two countries; recalls the patterns of interference that have marked Türkiye’s involvement in Syria and highlights the considerable economic, political and administrative leverage it holds over wide areas across northwestern Syria, notably in Afrin and Idlib; underlines the importance of integrating these areas into Syria’s new administrative set-up and warns that further consolidation of exclusive Turkish control over these regions would undermine any efforts to strengthen Syria’s political cohesion and unity;

11. Expresses concern that Israel is occupying a part of Syria’s territory; calls for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 497 (1981) and for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Syrian territories occupied or expanded into since the fall of the Assad regime, including the former UN buffer zone, in accordance with international law; urges the Israeli authorities to withdraw plans to transfer thousands more Israeli civilians into the occupied Syrian Golan Heights and to halt abuses being carried out in areas of southern Syria occupied by its forces, including the seizure of homes and demolitions;

12. Welcomes the agreement reached between the Syrian transitional authorities and the Kurdish-led SDF in January 2026 and recognises that the subsequent dissolution of the latter, as announced in August 2026 following its integration into the Syrian army as four divisions, constitutes a milestone event carrying profound implications for Syria’s pluralistic transition and future; urges all parties to continue implementing the agreement in a timely manner and in good faith, including by safeguarding the long-standing role of women in leadership positions within Kurdish political and security structures, paying particular attention to the anticipated integration of the Kurdish Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) into the Syrian security forces under the Ministry of Interior; reiterates its call for the full realisation of the civil and educational rights of Kurds; urges all parties and regional actors, including Türkiye, to refrain from actions that could undermine its durable application and calls on the international community to raise any violations of its key provisions with the Syrian transitional authorities;

13. Praises the Syrian transitional authorities for revoking the lease agreements with Russia for the Tartus base commercial pier and Khmeimim airfield, effectively marking the end of their use as Russian military bases, while noting with regret that this development will not translate into a complete end to the Russian military presence on Syrian territory; expresses concern over Russia’s persistent efforts to restore its former influence over Syria; highlights that, in recent months, dialogue between the Syrian and Russian Governments has intensified considerably, featuring frequent high-level exchanges and visits; notes that Russia has

brought forward proposals for economic and humanitarian cooperation, such as rehabilitating Syrian energy infrastructure and increasing material and food assistance as a means to gain a foothold in the country's reconstruction and clout vis-à-vis the Syrian leadership; expresses great concern over how the security component has gradually become an integral part of these exchanges, entailing, among other measures, the potential provision of basic capabilities in the air defence, aviation and naval domains; condemns Russia for granting Bashar al-Assad and his family political asylum, and for continuing to host them, thus shielding them from justice and accountability processes, as well as for obstructing justice by actively interfering in international investigations and vetoing UN Security Council resolutions aimed at addressing the Assad regime's war crimes, as well as those of Russia;

14. Expresses concern that despite announcements from the Syrian transitional authorities in May 2025 that the banknotes of the new Syrian currency would be printed in the United Arab Emirates and Germany, they are reportedly being printed in Russia by the Russian company Goznak; highlights that Goznak is under EU sanctions for being involved in the production of blank Russian passports for citizens of occupied regions in Ukraine; underlines that, should these reports be confirmed, relying on a sanctioned printer would risk undermining progress towards the reintegration of the Syrian currency into the global financial system;

15. Welcomes the fact that the collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria in December 2024 dealt a severe blow to Iran's regional network, effectively disrupting the land corridor that underpinned Tehran's regional influence, logistical connectivity and former use of Syria as a launchpad for military operations throughout the region and as a hub to prop up its proxies, in particular Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen; expresses deep concern that Iran may be attempting to exploit governance vacuums and actively seeking to infiltrate new administrative structures, preserve its remaining intelligence assets and utilise underground smuggling networks to reconstitute its regional influence; commends the Syrian transitional authorities' clear rebuke of Iranian influence and its commitment to counter any attempts to reactivate Iranian cells and networks across the country, as well as the increased reinforcements, surveillance and patrols along the borders with Lebanon and Iraq that the Syrian transitional authorities have put in place in recent months;

16. Encourages the Syrian transitional authorities to pursue the peaceful delimitation of maritime boundaries with neighbouring states in accordance with international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); welcomes the prospect of concluding a maritime delimitation agreement with the Republic of Cyprus as a contribution to regional stability, energy cooperation and good

neighbourly relations in the Eastern Mediterranean; stresses that any future bilateral agreements concluded by Syria, including in the fields of energy cooperation or resource exploitation, must be fully consistent with international law, including UNCLOS;

Humanitarian and economic challenges

17. Recognises the immense challenges the Syrian transitional authorities face in reconstructing the country; expresses concern over the impact of current regional instability on Syria; recalls that, according to World Bank estimates, Syria's reconstruction needs range between USD 141 and USD 343 billion; underlines the importance of devoting adequate resources to restoring critical infrastructure, providing housing and managing rubble; encourages the Syrian transitional authorities to ensure that reconstruction funds are distributed equitably across all regions of Syria on the basis of assessed humanitarian and infrastructure needs;

18. Expresses serious concern about the severe humanitarian situation in Syria with over 15,6 million, or 6 out of 10 Syrians, requiring humanitarian assistance at a time when increasing numbers of internally displaced people and refugees are returning home, particularly in the north and north-east of the country, including predominantly Kurdish urban areas such as Kobani, Afrin and Qamishli; expresses further concern that millions of people, including in the aforementioned areas, continue to face repeated disruptions to essential public services, extensive damage to critical civilian infrastructure and systemic challenges, including mass displacement, food insecurity and severely restricted access to healthcare, education, potable water and sanitation;

19. Expresses concern over the recent flooding of the Euphrates River, which has severely disrupted humanitarian access and emergency referrals, leaving riverside communities partially isolated from critical services; notes that persistent bureaucratic and administrative obstacles further hinder the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance;

20. Notes the role of the EU and its Member States as the largest donors of humanitarian aid and early recovery support to the Syrian population; underlines that the EU and its Member States have stood by the Syrian people, delivering over EUR 41 billion in humanitarian, development and stabilisation assistance since 2011, which represents the largest contribution by any donor; highlights that this support has reached Syrians both within the country and across the region, helping to alleviate the devastating impact of conflict and displacement; calls for the EU and its Member States to sustain humanitarian assistance and early recovery support in Syria, with a particular focus on civilian protection, the resilience of local

communities and support for Syrian civil society, independent human rights organisations and local peace-building initiatives;

21. Welcomes the announcement in January 2026 of a comprehensive EU financial support package of approximately EUR 620 million for 2026 and 2027; welcomes, furthermore, the fact that the Commission has since announced the mobilisation of EUR 150 million from the EU financial cushion for Syria for the next two years to support the political transition, socio-economic recovery, job creation and capacity building; notes that EU support, other than humanitarian aid, should be deployed in a gradual, conditional and reversible manner; highlights the ninth Brussels Conference held on 17 March 2025 entitled ‘Standing with Syria: meeting the needs for a successful transition’, which mobilised international pledges in support of Syria’s transition and recovery amounting to EUR 5,8 billion, including a EUR 2,5 billion EU commitment for 2025-2026, targeting humanitarian aid and economic stabilisation within Syria and neighbouring host nations;

22. Urges the Syrian transitional authorities to ensure full, safe, rapid and unhindered access for humanitarian and development actors throughout the country, and to guarantee the protection of humanitarian workers, civilians and civilian infrastructure in line with international humanitarian law; urges the removal of all administrative, political and security obstacles impeding humanitarian relief operations;

23. Calls on the Syrian transitional authorities, with the assistance of the international community, to work towards creating the necessary political, security and legal conditions for the safe, dignified, informed and voluntary return of refugees in line with obligations under the Geneva Conventions; stresses, in that context, the importance of ensuring the delivery, without discrimination, of basic services by state and local authorities, including healthcare, electricity, education, water supply and support for local livelihoods; stresses, furthermore, that any returns must be free from discrimination and forced recruitment, arbitrary detention or persecution;

24. Welcomes the role of ‘go-and-see’ visits, which allow Syrian refugees to visit Syria without losing their legal status, or equivalent mechanisms, as a key safeguard for informed and voluntary return decisions; calls on the Member States and non-EU countries to replicate this initiative, with full procedural safeguards; insists that no refugee can be expected to make an irreversible return decision without access to reliable, up-to-date and area-specific information on conditions in the area of intended return; urges all host countries, particularly Syria’s immediate neighbours and EU Member States, to guarantee that such exploratory travel does not result in the automatic revocation of international protection or legal stay;

25. Recalls that over 400 000 Palestinian refugees are residing in Syria, some of them displaced multiple times, and notes the role of UNRWA in providing humanitarian, education, health and protection services to these Palestinian refugees in Syria; remembers the siege of the Yarmouk camp between 2013 and 2015 by factions affiliated with the Assad regime, which itself was supported by Iran; stresses that continued EU support for UNRWA is essential to maintaining stability and ensuring humanitarian assistance and recovery in Syria;

26. Calls for the EU and its Member States to sustain humanitarian and development aid efforts and to continue to provide sufficient financial, technical and operational support for neighbouring countries hosting Syrian refugees, notably Lebanon, Jordan, Türkiye and Iraq;

27. Takes note of the lifting of EU economic sanctions on Syria as a step towards supporting the country's peaceful transition and socio-economic reconstruction; recalls that any suspension or lifting of restrictive measures must remain conditional on Syria's fulfilment of its international obligations and commitments to abide by key democratic criteria in its reconstruction and reform efforts, must be reversible and must be subject to continuous assessment;

28. Encourages Syria to undertake the necessary reforms to ensure a safe and predictable investment climate, which the EU will support through its upcoming EUR 15 million 'Technical Assistance Hub' designed to strengthen the capacities of Syria's institutions and allow the Syrian transitional authorities to access technical expertise from the EU and development agencies; reiterates the importance of wider reforms aimed at building a sovereign state with a transparent and functioning public sector underpinned by all relevant accountability mechanisms, including transparent procurement, independent auditing, anti-corruption safeguards and protection of housing, land and property rights; highlights the need for measures aimed at preventing and combating corruption and cronyism; stresses additionally the need to focus on Syria's regulatory ambiguity, security risks, outdated financial systems and unreliable energy infrastructure; calls for the EU and its Member States to provide capacity-building assistance and know-how;

29. Considers the rebuilding of Syria's key sectors such as energy, water, transport, telecommunications, banking and housing infrastructure, as well as the diversification of the country's energy sources, the strengthening of its food security including by rehabilitating domestic production, and the development of regional partnerships, along with the implementation of institutional and regulatory reforms to encourage the mobilisation of the private sector, to be priorities in the wider reconstruction effort; highlights the importance of preventing strategic dependencies on hostile actors in the reconstruction of Syria; calls for particular attention to

be devoted to the management of the oil and gas fields in northeastern and northwestern Syria, and to a just and fair allocation of the resources and proceeds thereof, particularly in the light of the dire economic situation in the region;

30. Notes recent developments in offshore energy exploration initiatives in Syrian waters and stresses that the responsible development of Syria's natural resources, notably its significant potential for renewable energy, especially solar and wind, could support economic recovery, strategic reconstruction and the role of the Eastern Mediterranean as a diversified energy region; underlines that Syria's energy reconstruction should enable responsible European participation, including the possible reactivation of lawful investments and operations by European companies, in full compliance with EU law, applicable sanctions, transparency, environmental standards and human rights due diligence, and should benefit the Syrian people;

31. Calls for EU-supported projects to prioritise resilience, transparency, local ownership, the protection of critical infrastructure and compatibility with regional stability, and for reconstruction programming to be independently monitored;

32. Commends the assistance provided thus far by several Gulf states, including through multilateral Arab and Gulf development agencies such as the OPEC Fund for International Development and the Arab Gulf Programme for Development; calls for the EU to closely coordinate with its partners in the Gulf and the broader region in ensuring that assistance and support to Syria are provided in an effective and coherent manner;

Security, border control and the fight against terrorism

33. Expresses grave concern about the continued presence of Daesh and other terrorist organisations in Syria and about the exploitation of fragile security environments by criminal networks; emphasises that the resurgence of Daesh in Syria would pose an existential threat not only to Syria, but to the entire region, as well as to Europe; emphasises, furthermore, that this would deal a fatal blow to all reconstruction efforts and would endanger the entire Syrian population, including vulnerable ethnic and religious communities such as Christians, Yazidis and Kurds;

34. Calls for strengthened political, military and intelligence cooperation between Syria's transitional authorities, the EU and its Member States, the Global Coalition against Daesh and like-minded partners with the aim of stepping up their efforts in the fight against terrorism; welcomes the Syrian transitional authorities' renewed commitment to countering terrorism within the framework of the Global Coalition; deeply regrets the abrupt and uncoordinated

withdrawal of the US military from the Syrian territory, which risks creating a security vacuum detrimental to counterterrorism efforts and regional stability; urges the Member States to step up their intelligence gathering on Daesh's activities in Syria and the region, and to assist the Syrian transitional authorities in their efforts to dismantle existing networks and prevent fighters from regrouping;

35. Emphasises that, without the invaluable help of Kurdish units, the Global Coalition against Daesh would not have succeeded in significantly weakening Daesh and stripping it of the territory it controlled; pays tribute to the thousands of Kurdish fighters, including women, who lost their lives in the struggle against Daesh and who endured systematic oppression; recalls and applauds the courage and resolve of the Kurdish women who have bravely led the fight against Daesh and have been forced to endure unfathomable brutality at the hands of Daesh;

36. Expresses particular concern over the still very volatile security situation in and around the various camps and detention centres in northeastern Syria, which increases security risks for Syria, the region and Europe; highlights the fact that, over the years, coalition-backed SDF control of these camps guaranteed a certain degree of stability and security in a region plagued by chronic turmoil and violence; calls on the Syrian transitional authorities to do their utmost to ensure effective and efficient control of the camps;

37. Stresses that the continued presence of EU nationals among Daesh detainees places a direct responsibility on the Member States and that failure to address this issue undermines both regional and European security;

38. Notes the ongoing process of integrating armed groups under the authority of the Syrian transitional authorities; reaffirms that the presence of foreign fighters and members of designated terrorist organisations within Syria, including in the Syrian security services, heavily undermines the credibility and legitimacy of Syria's institutions and represents a major obstacle on the path to an open and democratic Syria free from any radical or fundamentalist tendencies; stresses that the integration process must exclude individuals responsible for serious violations of international law, guarantee the rights and security of ethnic and religious communities, and ensure that all armed structures are brought under accountable, civilian and national command; calls on the Syrian transitional authorities to implement a comprehensive security-sector reform with clear command responsibility that ensures civilian oversight, and with rigorous vetting to remove individuals responsible for serious human rights violations, while ensuring that this process follows internationally recognised standards of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; calls on

the Commission and the Member States to support these efforts through technical, capacity-building and financial assistance;

39. Notes, with concern, that more than 100 suspected chemical weapons sites remain in Syria; acknowledges Syria's closer collaboration with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; calls for the dismantling of all chemical stockpiles and production facilities, and for the ratification of the CWC by Syria without delay;

40. Highlights that Syria is among the world's most heavily mine-contaminated countries; expresses alarm at the rising number of victims, including children, who have been killed or injured by mines and other explosives – a problem that is worsening as people start to return; commends efforts by international and local organisations to identify, mark and clear explosive ordnance; calls on the Commission and the Member States to urgently support demining efforts jointly with specialised actors and the Syrian transitional authorities; expresses serious concerns regarding the recent cuts by major donors to humanitarian demining budgets; calls on the Syrian transitional authorities to sign and ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Ottawa Treaty;

41. Notes that, for many years, the production and smuggling of Captagon was one of the main sources of funding for the Bashar al-Assad regime, and also a source of income for terrorist organisations including Hezbollah and other groups supported by Iran; reaffirms its appreciation of the Syrian transitional authorities' efforts to fight the smuggling of weapons through Syrian territory and build their own counternarcotics capacities; calls for these efforts to be further enhanced, including by tackling money laundering and organised crime networks operating through Syrian territory; notes with concern, however, that the smuggling networks linked to the former regime, Hezbollah and other regional entities have transferred part of their activities to neighbouring countries;

42. Calls on the Syrian transitional authorities to strengthen border control and management capacities, including through improved coordination, training and monitoring systems, in order to prevent illicit cross-border flows of weapons, foreign fighters and contraband goods, while ensuring that border security measures do not restrict humanitarian access or freedom of movement for civilians; underlines the importance of regional cooperation in addressing shared security threats, including terrorism, Hezbollah's logistical networks, smuggling and cross-border organised crime; calls for more robust EU and US support for these efforts, among other things, through the development of confidence-building measures and information-sharing mechanisms with the relevant authorities in Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan;

Human rights, civic participation and inclusive tolerance

43. Reiterates its call on the Syrian transitional authorities to act decisively towards a credible, inclusive, sustainable and democratic Syrian-led political transition in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) and aimed at national unification; reiterates, furthermore, its call to resume meaningful constitutional negotiations and to engage in reforms that guarantee pluralism, the rule of law, judicial independence, transparency, full respect for fundamental freedoms, including women's rights, and religious freedom, as well as the participation of all components of Syrian society in decision-making and public life, without discrimination; stresses that the credibility of the Syrian transition will be judged on its ability to guarantee equal citizenship, religious freedom, property rights, local security and political representation for all communities;

44. Calls for these rights to be enshrined in the future Syrian Constitution through an inclusive, participatory and Syrian-led constitutional process; reiterates that political commitments need to be underpinned by concrete steps, transparency and accountability mechanisms;

45. Takes note of the fact that Syria selected the representatives of the first post-Assad Syrian People's Assembly in October 2025; regrets its framing as a democratic milestone while the structure of appointments, vetting and appeals ensured that every stage of the process was controlled by the President and reproduced existing power structures; calls, therefore, on the Syrian transitional authorities to establish the necessary political, legal and security conditions for the organisation of free, fair, transparent and inclusive democratic elections reflective of the cultural, religious and ethnic diversity of Syria's society as soon as conditions allow, conducted in accordance with international standards and under appropriate international observation, and enabling all Syrian citizens to freely determine the future of their country;

46. Acknowledges the holding on 12 July 2026 of the inaugural session of the People's Assembly, constituted of 133 elected members and 70 members directly appointed by the transitional President, and the subsequent beginning of its parliamentary work for an initial term of 30 months;

47. Strongly condemns all acts of targeted violence against civilians, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, forced displacement, gender-based violence and damage to civilian infrastructure including places of worship, directed against Syria's ethnic and religious communities, including Alawites, Druze, Kurds, Christians and other vulnerable communities, which have been taking place since early 2025;

48. Calls on the Syrian transitional authorities to guarantee freedom of religion or belief for all Syrians and to implement structured mechanisms for the protection and representation of Syria’s diverse religious and ethnic communities, including Christians, Druze, Alawites, Kurds, Yazidis, Ismailis and other communities; stresses that Syria’s religious and cultural diversity constitutes an essential component of the country’s heritage and calls for specific measures to protect them from discrimination, persecution and forced displacement; calls for the prompt and independent investigation into and prosecution of attacks against civilians and places of worship motivated by religious or ethnic hatred;

49. Expresses concern over the safety of Syria’s Christian communities, including Syriac Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Apostolic, Armenian Catholic, Armenian Evangelical, Chaldean Catholic, Apostolic Catholic Assyrian, Maronite, Latin Catholic, Syriac Catholic, Melkite Greek Catholic, Baptist, Anglican Episcopal, Presbyterian, Evangelical and Pentecostal communities, which continue to be exposed to documented intimidation and violence from multiple actors; strongly condemns the brutal terrorist attack of 22 June 2025 against the Greek Orthodox Mar Elias Church in Damascus, which claimed 25 lives and injured over 60 people, leaving Christians across Syria deeply shaken and afraid; also condemns the attacks in Suqaylabiyah, as well as the brutal attack on the Melkite Greek Catholic Archbishop of the Diocese of Homs, Hama, Nabk and Yabroud on 14 November 2026 in his church in Homs, which was looted; demands that the Syrian transitional authorities take the necessary steps to ensure the safety and protection of Syria’s Christian communities; recognises the climate of fear and uncertainty in which Christians in Syria have been forced to live for decades; underlines the fundamental importance of preserving and cherishing the historical contributions of Christian and other communities to Syria’s rich religious and cultural heritage, including through the protection of churches, monasteries, cemeteries, religious heritage sites and clergy; calls for Syria’s emerging political architecture to be fully reflective of this diversity, and for the equal participation of these communities in political, constitutional and administrative reconstruction efforts to be ensured;

50. Recalls the agreement reached between the Syrian transitional authorities and the Kurdish-led SDF in January 2026, which included the recognition of Kurdish as one of Syria’s national languages, the restoration of citizenship rights to all Kurdish Syrians and the recognition of Kurdish civil and educational rights; denounces the crimes perpetrated against Kurdish fighters by some elements within the Syrian security forces during the clashes in January 2026, including incidents of desecrated corpses, sexual violence and vandalism of burial grounds; deplores the fact that Syria’s Kurdish population has been the target of systematic oppression and violence

throughout the decades; calls on the Syrian transitional authorities to meaningfully and effectively include the Kurdish population in Syria’s transition process and state institutions; recognises the substantial political and cultural contributions of the Kurdish people and the critical role they are set to play in consolidating Syria’s new political architecture;

51. Calls for concrete measures to promote tolerance, social cohesion and intercommunal and interconfessional dialogue, including educational reforms, public awareness initiatives and support for grassroots efforts aimed at overcoming sectarian and ethnic divisions; expects educational reforms to include respect for all Syrians, irrespective of their faith, origin or gender; calls on the transitional authorities to further develop constructive relations with local administrations to ensure adequate delivery of services, notably education; stresses that the success of Syria’s path to genuine democracy hinges on the transitional authorities’ ability to promote a culture of open and transparent dialogue that includes all communities;

52. Underlines the importance of freedom of expression, of association and of peaceful assembly, as well as of media freedom; recognises the progress made in allowing civil society and independent media to establish a formal presence in Syria; calls, furthermore, on the transitional authorities to put an immediate end to the prosecution of journalists, bloggers, activists and others who express their opinion online; stresses the need to take urgent measures to ensure the safety and protection of journalists and media workers against threats, violence, killings, disappearances and arbitrary arrests; urges the transitional authorities to take serious and determined action against hate speech, incitement and discriminatory rhetoric online and offline; stresses that only the existence of a free press can guarantee transparency, democratic accountability and a vibrant public discourse essential to Syria’s reconstruction and political reforms; urges the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to regularly raise concerns regarding any setbacks with the Syrian transitional authorities;

53. Expresses concern over local authorities’ shift towards requiring prior authorisation for public human rights events, thus undermining freedom of assembly; calls on the Syrian transitional authorities to repeal laws and practices that restrict legitimate civic activity or curtail non-violent dissent, including in the digital sphere; calls, instead, on the authorities to actively foster a safe and enabling environment for civil society, independent journalists and human rights defenders by reforming legislation on non-governmental organisations and preventing judicial harassment; in this context, takes note of the presentation to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour on 16 October 2026 of the result of a consultation on the draft revision of the civil society law, the first version of which

regrettably maintains the regime of prior authorisation; calls on the Syrian transitional authorities and legislators to encourage, rather than restrict, the activities of civil society organisations;

54. Reaffirms that the full, equal, meaningful and safe representation and participation of women and young people at all levels of political decision-making strengthen social cohesion and are essential for both the political transition and long-term reconstruction to succeed, in line with the UN Women, Peace and Security agenda and UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000); notes that women remain under-represented in key transitional institutions and decision-making processes in Syria; calls, therefore, on the Commission to apply a gender-responsive approach by ensuring adequate financial support for Syrian youth-led and women-led organisations and initiatives; deplores the decisions taken at local and national level to limit women's freedom; calls on the Syrian transitional authorities to significantly enhance the effective representation and participation of women at national, regional and local levels of decision-making and institution-building; acknowledges that Assad's brutal dictatorship and the Syrian conflict have heavily impacted women and girls, notably at the hands of Daesh, and that women and girls represent half of all those in need of humanitarian assistance and face heightened risks of gender-based violence and poverty; calls, furthermore, for the suffering endured by children to be addressed;

55. Calls on the international community to support the Syrian transitional authorities in developing legislation that aligns with international standards on preventing and criminalising violence against women; stresses the fundamental importance of meaningfully integrating women into public life and the different areas of the Syrian economy and of supporting programmes aimed at fostering female entrepreneurship; believes that promoting women-run small and medium-sized businesses will be key in reinvigorating the Syrian economy as a whole and help restore the country's middle class;

56. Welcomes the recent establishment of the Syrian National Youth Forum and the upcoming development of a national youth strategy, and calls on the Syrian transitional authorities to ensure these efforts produce tangible outcomes;

57. Expresses concern that, in March 2026, the Syrian transitional authorities imposed a near-total ban on alcohol consumption in bars and restaurants, accompanied by major restrictions on its sale, justified on the grounds of preserving 'public decency'; is concerned that this justification may be used in a broader pattern of ambiguity by the transitional authorities regarding individual freedoms alongside the erosion of the cultural diversity of Syrian communities, particularly Christian communities;

58. Expresses concern about the unilateral changes made by the Syrian transitional authorities to educational materials and textbooks without any consultation, some of which promote intolerant, exclusionary or religiously rigorous interpretations that undermine the principles of inclusivity, pluralism, equality, freedom of religion or belief, and respect for the rights of women and minorities; calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to ensure that no EU funding directly or indirectly supports the implementation of educational programmes that are incompatible with EU values or UNESCO standards;

59. Calls on the Syrian transitional authorities to establish transparent and effective mechanisms for the restitution or, where appropriate, compensation of property, land, housing and other goods unlawfully seized during the civil war; stresses that this mechanism should benefit all Syrians without discrimination, including Christian communities and other minorities;

60. Calls for the permanent constitutional abolition of the death penalty in Syria and urges the Syrian transitional authorities to ensure that any future constitutional framework explicitly prohibits capital punishment;

Justice, accountability and judicial independence

61. Firmly believes that a credible transitional justice process, centred on victims and survivors, is essential for national reconciliation and sustainable peace, as well as for overcoming the collective trauma left by over half a century of brutal dictatorship, civil war and inhumane acts perpetrated by terrorist groups such as Daesh; stresses the importance of transitional justice based on the rule of law and implemented in accordance with internationally recognised standards and the fight against impunity, and of ensuring accountability for past serious human rights violations committed by all factions; stresses that these legitimate demands for justice and accountability should not translate into retribution and sectarian violence, as such actions would undermine the progress achieved thus far; calls on the Syrian transitional authorities to establish impartial, independent, transparent and meaningful processes to investigate all such acts and bring those responsible to justice, including by appropriately prosecuting military commanders and senior officials who ordered abuses or are liable as a matter of command responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity, and to take concrete measures to prevent the recurrence of such acts; encourages the Syrian transitional authorities to work closely with Syrian civil society organisations in developing the framework and processes for accountability and reparations; calls for the EU and its Member States to support truth, justice, accountability and reconciliation efforts;

62. Calls on the Syrian transitional authorities to implement core UN conventions and to accede to the optional protocols to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women;

63. Acknowledges the work of the Syrian National Investigation Committee in investigating massacres, violence and violations committed by various parties, and calls for the perpetrators to be held accountable in line with international law norms and standards; calls on Syrian officials to make the findings of the investigation committee available to the public; calls on the Syrian transitional authorities to provide all relevant UN bodies, including the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, with full and transparent access; calls for the EU and its Member States to actively support accountability and transitional justice mechanisms and to provide funding for accountability and transitional justice initiatives, such as those that strengthen judicial capacity, preserve evidence, protect witnesses and advance truth-seeking processes; calls for the involvement of victims, survivors and families in the design and implementation of these initiatives; calls also for the EU and its Member States to support Syria's comprehensive criminal law reform in line with international standards;

64. Takes note of the update provided by the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry in September 2026 and encourages the Syrian transitional authorities to publicly call for the renewal of its mandate in March 2027;

65. Welcomes the establishment of the National Commission for Transitional Justice and calls on the Syrian transitional authorities to ensure that it operates on a fully independent, impartial and adequately resourced basis, grounded in a clear and comprehensive legal framework that defines its mandate, jurisdiction, powers and procedural safeguards, in line with international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and ensuring the investigation and prosecution of violations and abuses committed by all parties to the conflict, including war crimes and crimes against humanity; encourages its closer collaboration with international bodies established during the civil war such as the IIIM, the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre and the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, in particular by facilitating their access to archival documents; calls for the EU to provide support for timely evidence collection, including by providing forensic equipment and expertise for the identification and analysis of mass graves and for the collection of survivors' testimonies;

66. Welcomes the report of the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, documenting serious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law in Suwayda in July 2025, as an important contribution to advancing justice and the search for accountability in Syria; welcomes, in that regard, the renewal of the International Commission's mandate for a period of one year; calls on all parties, including the Syrian transitional authorities, to swiftly and transparently implement the recommendations of the report;

67. Welcomes the Council decision of 18 May 2026[4] to extend targeted restrictive measures against individuals and entities linked to the former Assad regime until 1 June 2027 in view of the continued risk posed by networks associated with the former regime; welcomes, furthermore, in this context, the Council Decision of 28 May 2025[5] under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, adding individuals and entities within the Syrian transitional authorities responsible for serious human rights violations and abuses in Syria, including massacres and the arbitrary killing of civilians in Syria's coastal region in March 2025, especially members of the Alawite community; calls on the Council to maintain and impose more targeted sanctions on actors responsible for violations of religious freedom in Syria;

68. Urges the Syrian transitional authorities to swiftly ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, to accept the jurisdiction thereof retroactively through a declaration under Article 12 of the Rome Statute in order to hold accountable individuals responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed on Syrian territory since 2002, and to swiftly ratify the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance; underlines the urgent need for comprehensive domestic legislative reform to fully incorporate core international crimes into Syria's national legal framework and to increase training on the prosecution of such crimes;

69. Highlights the issue of missing persons, forcibly disappeared detainees and abducted civilians as a core political and humanitarian priority to be addressed for a successful transitional justice process; welcomes the work of the Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic (IIMP); acknowledges the work of the National Commission for Transitional Justice and the National

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4 Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/1105 of 18 May 2026 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria (OJ L, 2026/1105, 19.5.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2026/1105/oj).

5 Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1110 of 28 May 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses (OJ L, 2025/1110, 28.5.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/1110/oj).

Commission for Missing Persons and calls on the Commission to make it a priority to support the institutions financially and with capacity-building for their staff, provided the institutions operate in line with international humanitarian law and international human rights law; invites the National Commission for Missing Persons and the Syrian transitional authorities to collaborate closely with the IIMP and the IIIM to give them full access to archives on missing persons, and to cooperate with families and civil society organisations; calls on the Syrian transitional authorities to ensure the urgent preservation of mass graves and documentation as vital evidence for the right to truth and future criminal accountability, and to support the digitalisation of archives; regrets the failure, to date, to conduct prompt, thorough and impartial investigations into cases of enforced disappearance and to ensure accountability for perpetrators;

70. Urges the Syrian transitional authorities to end practices of arbitrary detention and disappearances without warrants or judicial decisions; calls on the Commission to raise this issue in its exchanges with the Syrian transitional authorities, and insists that addressing this issue remains critical for justice, accountability and rebuilding trust;

71. Notes the initial steps taken towards judicial reform, such as the increase in judges' salaries in hopes of combating extortion and corruption, the dismissal of judges previously involved with the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party and the People's Assembly, and the referral for judicial investigation of judges who sat in the former Counter-Terrorism Court; expresses serious concern, however, about reports of politically motivated or unqualified appointments; calls for further reforms aimed at implementing the separation of powers, increasing transparency and strengthening judicial independence so as to ensure the judiciary is free from political and other interference and meddling; believes that these reforms should include merit-based appointments, guarantees for due process, the protection of judges and prosecutors from intimidation, and the exclusion of individuals implicated in serious abuses or lacking appropriate qualifications; insists on ensuring that judicial appointments meet international standards of competence, independence and impartiality, and that individuals credibly implicated in torture, enforced disappearance or other serious human rights violations are not excluded from accountability and justice processes;

72. Expresses concern about disruptions to judicial and administrative functioning in parts of Syria, including the suspension of legal proceedings in Suwayda; urges the Syrian transitional authorities to promptly restore access to justice and due process;

73. Calls for the investigation of the Daesh fighters transferred from Syria to Iraq who are suspected of having committed international crimes, in particular genocide, against the Yazidi minority in 2014

and other groups, and for them to be held fully accountable; stresses that such prosecutions must be conducted before competent courts, in full respect of international fair trial standards, due process guarantees and the principle of legality, and on the basis of reliable and admissible evidence, in accordance with applicable international legal standards; calls on the Syrian transitional authorities to investigate the atrocious crimes perpetrated by Daesh, notably against the Yazidi community;

74. Expresses its appreciation for the role of Syrian civil society in ensuring an inclusive and rights-based political transition process, as it effectively monitors and documents human rights violations, contributes to victim-centred transitional justice, promotes social cohesion and provides support to return movements that comply with international standards on safe, voluntary, dignified and informed return; reiterates the key importance of ensuring civic space across Syria; calls on the Syrian transitional authorities to simplify and ease existing registration and permit procedures for civil society actors, and encourages the Commission to ensure adequate political and financial support to Syrian civil society organisations through flexible and accessible programming; encourages the Syrian transitional authorities to work closely with Syrian civil society organisations in developing the framework and processes for accountability and reparations;

75. Acknowledges the first steps taken towards accountability since the fall of the regime, while deeply regretting the fact that very few perpetrators of grave human rights violations, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, including former rulers of Syria, in particular members of the al-Assad and Makhlouf families and associated individuals, have stood trial thus far for their involvement in the brutal repression against the Syrian people; welcomes the trial of Atef Najib, Bashar al-Assad’s first cousin and the former head of the political security intelligence agency in the southern city of Deraa, on charges of ‘crimes against the Syrian nation’; underlines that the Syrian transitional authorities are arresting other former regime officials, including former Syrian intelligence officer Amjad Youssef, who are expected to face judicial proceedings; welcomes the extradition by Lebanon in August 2026 of former General Adel Issa, the first of a former regime senior official; calls on the transitional authorities to ensure that all individuals against whom credible evidence of atrocities exists are brought to justice, irrespective of their affiliation, including General Aleksandr Dvornikov, the former commander of the Russian forces in Syria; reiterates its call for the EU to explore pathways to use frozen assets of the Assad regime for a trust fund for Syrian reconstruction, rehabilitation and compensation for victims;

76. Notes the trials of Bashar al-Assad and his brother Maher al-Assad held in absentia in August 2026 in Damascus, after a request for his

extradition was denied by Russia; notes, however, that the swift pace of the proceedings contrasted with the significance of this landmark moment in Syria’s transitional justice process; calls on the tribunal to publicly release the full sentencing decision; calls on Moscow to surrender Bashar al-Assad to the competent judicial authorities, including the Syrian transitional authorities or the competent international court or tribunal, with a view to trying him for crimes committed during a dictatorship that lasted over two decades; underlines that the crimes he is accused of committing include the use of torture, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, gross human rights violations and attacks against the civilian population using chemical weapons, which constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity; stresses that the victims of these crimes are entitled to truth, justice and redress;

77. Welcomes the declaration by the spokesperson of the Syrian Interior Ministry, Noureddine Al-Baba, on 3 June 2026, that the Syrian transitional authorities are ready to grant Sweden and other European countries access to the archives of Assad regime security agencies and military units, which are reportedly largely intact and accessible, including documents, witness testimonies, crime scenes and other evidence needed to prosecute individuals accused of committing crimes in Syria; encourages Member States to pursue those Syrian nationals responsible for crimes under the Rome Statute within their own territories under the principle of universal jurisdiction;

78. Calls for the EU and its Member States to support initiatives to collect, preserve and authenticate civil documentation records and housing, land and property records in all areas of the country, and to actively encourage the Syrian transitional authorities to implement the recommendations regarding pillage and housing, land and property rights outlined by the UN Commission of Inquiry for Syria;

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79. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the transitional authorities of Syria, and to have this resolution translated into and published in Arabic.