European Parliament
2024-2029

TEXTS ADOPTED

P10_TA(2026)0403

Towards an EU strategy to protect and strengthen the international justice system and its institutions, mechanisms and partners

European Parliament resolution of 25 Novembre 2026 ‘Towards an EU strategy to protect and strengthen the international justice system and its institutions, mechanisms and partners’ (2026/2004(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and in particular Articles 2, 3(5), 21, 23, 36 and 37 thereof,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 208, 212, 220 and 221 thereof,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,

– having regard to the International Bill of Human Rights,

– having regard to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946,

– having regard to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,

– having regard to the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ),

– having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),

– having regard to all international ad hoc tribunals and hybrid/internationalised courts established by the UN,

– having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

– having regard to the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection

of the Profession of Lawyer adopted on 12 March 2025,

– having regard to the Trust Fund for Victims created in 2002 by the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC, in accordance with Article 79 of the Rome Statute,

– having regard to the Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European Union on cooperation and assistance of 10 April 2006[1],

– having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2026 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union's policy on the matter – annual report 2025[2],

– having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2026 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2025[3],

– having regard to its resolution of 16 June 2026 entitled 'Countering transnational repression – towards an EU strategy to protect Europe's sovereignty and democratic values'[4],

– having regard to the criminal proceedings initiated on 20 March 2023 by the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation against ICC officials on the basis of alleged 'illegal prosecution',

– having regard to the judgments delivered in absentia in December 2025 in Moscow against the Prosecutor and eight judges of the ICC,

– having regard to the decision of 21 May 2023 by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation to place the ICC Prosecutor on the federal wanted list,

– having regard to the US National Emergencies Act (NEA) of 1976 and the US International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977,

– having regard to Executive Order 14203 of 6 February 2025 of the current US Administration entitled 'Imposing Sanctions on the ICC', adopted pursuant to the IEEPA and the NEA, which prohibits any material assistance, sponsorship or provision of financial, material or technical support for, or goods or services to, a designated person,

– having regard to the implementation measures adopted in 2025

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1 OJ L 115, 28.4.2006, p. 50, http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2006/313/oj.
2 OJ C, C/2026/3690, 5.8.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/3690/oj.
3 OJ C, C/2026/3689, 5.8.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/3689/oj.
4 Texts adopted, P10_TA(2026)0203.

under Executive Order 14203 by the current US Administration, including successive designation rounds of ICC officials, including asset freezes, travel bans and restrictions on access to financial and digital services,

– having regard to the coercive measures adopted by the current US Administration on 9 July and 4 September 2025 affecting UN mandate holders, as well as Palestinian organisations cooperating with the ICC,

– having regard to the launch on 13 July 2026 of a campaign by the current US Administration to ‘dismantle the ICC’s threat to American sovereignty’, and to the decision of the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control of 18 August 2026 to designate two additional ICC officials, including the President of the ICC,

– having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom[5] (the Blocking Statute Regulation), as amended,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 November 2023 on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries[6],

– having regard to the judgment of the Court of Justice of 21 December 2021 in Case C-124/20, *Melli Bank Iran* v *Telekon Deutschland GmbH*[7],

– having regard to the establishment of the Core International Crimes Evidence Database (CICED) in 2022 and the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (ICPA) in July 2023 within Eurojust,

– having regard to Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of 21 March 2011 on the International Criminal Court and repealing Common Position 2003/444/CFSP[8],

– having regard to the action plan adopted by the European Council on 12 July 2011 to follow up on Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of 21 March 2011 on the International Criminal Court and repealing

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5 OJ L 309, 29.11.1996, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1996/2271/oj.
6 OJ L, 2023/2675, 7.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2675/oj.
7 ECLI:EU:C:2021:1035.
8 OJ L 76, 22.3.2011, p. 56, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2011/168/oj.

Common Position 2003/444/CFSP,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 November 2015 on EU's support to transitional justice,

– having regard to the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, adopted in June 2004 and updated in 2008, and to its resolution of 16 March 2023 on the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders[9],

– having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 entitled 'European economic security strategy' (JOIN(2023)0020),

– having regard to the Agreement on the Establishment of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, including the Statue of the Special Tribunal of 25 June 2025 between Ukraine and the Council of Europe (CoE),

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 January 2025 on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2025,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 30 January 2026 on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2026,

– having regard to the EU action plan on human rights and democracy 2020-2024, extended until 2027,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 November 2025 entitled 'EU Strategy for Civil Society' (COM(2025)0790),

– having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 12 November 2025 entitled 'European Democracy Shield: Empowering strong and resilient democracies' (JOIN(2025)0791),

– having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 June 2025 entitled 'An international digital strategy for the European Union' (JOIN(2025)0140),

– having regard to the UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,

– having regard to the 2026 Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures,

– having regard to the judgment of the Court of Justice of 11 June 2026

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9 OJ C, C/2023/409, 23.11.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/409/oj.

in Case C-81/24, *LH* v *OTP banka d.d., formerly Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor*[10],

– having regard to the Constitution of the International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO-Interpol), in particular Article 2 thereof, which requires the organisation to act in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

– having regard to the EU Visa Code[11] and handbook,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0281/2026),

A. whereas the EU's commitment to supporting international justice is embedded in its external action policies and objectives, which aim to uphold human rights, the rule of law, and the rules-based order; whereas key actions include financing and defending the ICC through existing legal instruments, financing actions related to accountability through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, strengthening transitional justice, providing aid for investigations and reparations for victims, supporting Eurojust as well as UN-backed investigative mechanisms, partnering with civil society organisations and strengthening judicial cooperation with non-EU countries; whereas the Blocking Statute Regulation is a first important legal tool through which the EU can protect actors established within its jurisdiction from the extraterritorial impact of foreign sanctions; whereas the Blocking Statute Regulation should be updated to address current and emerging challenges effectively;

B. whereas international justice encompasses independent and impartial courts, tribunals and investigative mechanisms established under international law, including the ICC, the ICJ, UN-backed mechanisms and international, hybrid or internationalised courts, mandated to fight impunity for the most serious violations of international law, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and the crime of aggression;

C. whereas the ICC plays a unique and indispensable role in ensuring accountability for the gravest crimes under international law; whereas its mandate is of particular importance at a time marked by

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10 ECLI:EU:C:2025:666.

11 Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code), (OJ L 243, 15.9.2009, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2009/810/oj).

the increasing relativisation of fundamental values, the spread of disinformation aimed at undermining international justice and the rules-based international order, and the emergence of new cross-border threats, including transnational repression, which seek to intimidate victims, witnesses and judicial actors beyond national borders; whereas the EU should therefore reaffirm its unwavering support for the ICC and recognise its particular role in safeguarding international justice and the rule of law;

D. whereas Articles 3 and 21 TEU require consistency between the EU's internal and external action from both Member States and EU institutions; whereas failure to support international justice mechanisms and to comply with international obligations would undermine the coherence, credibility and unity of the EU's external action;

E. whereas the transatlantic partnership and close cooperation among democracies remain a cornerstone of the EU's external action; whereas dialogue and diplomatic engagement are essential tools for addressing disputes over the international justice system, alongside efforts to reduce dependencies that leave the EU vulnerable to extraterritorial coercion;

F. whereas the EU's trade and association agreements, and the political dialogue they establish, provide an effective and non-coercive framework for promoting the universality and integrity of the Rome Statute, for ensuring respect for the international justice system and the rule of law and for deepening cooperation with non-EU countries;

G. whereas supporting the ICC and building networks to promote the universality and integrity of the Rome Statute is a specific action under the EU human rights and democracy action plan 2020-2027;

H. whereas all Member States are parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; whereas the EU is one of the Court's strongest institutional supporters, and the ratification of the Rome Statute remains a criterion for accession to the EU; whereas the objectives of Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP on the International Criminal Court are to promote the widest possible participation of the EU in the ICC, advance universal support for the Rome Statute, preserve the integrity of the Rome Statute, and support the independence of the ICC, its effective and efficient functioning and cooperation with the Court; whereas it calls on the Member States to provide technical and financial assistance to enable participation in, and implementation of, the Rome Statute, and to conclude ad hoc arrangements and agreements to enable the effective functioning of the ICC;

I. whereas, according to the binding assistance obligation arising from the Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the

European Union on Cooperation and Assistance, the EU and the Court agreed to facilitate the proper discharge of their respective responsibilities and to cooperate closely on matters of mutual interest in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and in compliance with the provisions of the EU Treaties and the Statute; whereas, in order to fulfil this obligation of cooperation and assistance, the parties agreed to establish appropriate regular contacts between the Court and the EU Focal Point for the Court;

J. whereas as a court of last resort, the ICC is fully integrated into the judicial system of all State Parties to the Rome Statute in accordance with the principle of complementarity;

K. whereas the credibility and effectiveness of international criminal justice depends on its independence and impartiality; whereas Articles 36-47 of the Rome Statute guarantee such judicial autonomy; whereas political institutions should avoid prejudging ongoing judicial proceedings or replacing the role of independent courts;

L. whereas Article 89 of the Rome Statute obliges its parties, including the EU Member States who have signed the Rome Statute, to comply with requests for arrest and surrender of suspects with arrest warrants; whereas ICC States Parties must comply with their Rome Statute obligations to ensure accountability; whereas a non-cooperation and non-execution of arrest warrants from a State Party would not only obstruct the ICC's ability to hold perpetrators accountable but would also deny victims' access to justice, weaken public trust in international justice and encourage impunity;

M. whereas 68 UN member states, including the United States, Russia and Israel, are not parties to the Rome Statute;

N. whereas coercive measures imposed by countries that are not parties to the Rome Statute are targeting individuals, including EU citizens, and entities working on international accountability mechanisms, such as ICC judges and prosecutors, including the ICC President, UN mandate holders and civil society organisations; whereas such measures threaten accountability processes and jurisdictional independence and have an extraterritorial impact in the EU and other international institutions;

O. whereas the current US Administration has adopted measures under Executive Order 14203 affecting individuals and organisations cooperating with the ICC and other international justice mechanisms, including several ICC judges, as well as UN mandate holders; whereas such coercive measures undermine the international justice system, its independence, its institutions and mechanisms, including their ability to carry out their mandates effectively;

P. whereas such coercive measures, when they have extraterritorial application, are incompatible with international law and the rule of law and constitute a serious threat and unjustified interference with the strategic autonomy of the EU and its Member States, undermining the EU's interest and democratic values and requiring a proportionate and coordinated European response and countermeasures;

Q. whereas a number of civil society organisations documenting international crimes face coercive measures because of their cooperation with the ICC or with non-governmental organisations cooperating with the ICC or with UN mandate holders; whereas civil society organisations and victims' groups are an essential part of the international justice architecture; whereas organisations operating in contexts where serious international crimes have been, or continue to be, committed increasingly face political attacks and an erosion of financial support;

R. whereas human rights defenders, journalists and lawyers working on accountability for international crimes are particularly exposed, facing multiple and mutually reinforcing risks arising from foreign coercive measures, strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), intimidation, harassment and digital surveillance; whereas the chilling effect of such cumulative pressures extends beyond the individuals directly designated, discouraging broader civil society engagement with international justice mechanisms;

S. whereas such coercive measures impair their ability to collect, preserve and transmit evidence, have a chilling effect on civil society organisations, witnesses, victims and legal practitioners cooperating with international justice mechanisms, jeopardise accountability processes and victims' rights, and endanger their lives, and undermine the ICC's ability to work towards the recognition, prosecution and punishment of the most serious international crimes and, in so doing, to combat impunity;

T. whereas victims of the most serious crimes under international law have the right to truth, justice and reparations, which must remain central to any EU strategy on international justice; whereas unilateral foreign coercive measures, including through overcompliance by financial institutions, risk impairing the ability of the Trust Fund for Victims and of other reparation mechanisms to operate effectively;

U. whereas banks, insurers, payment and digital services providers face the risk of fines and exclusion from markets if they maintain or establish relations with the ICC or entities and individuals designated under such coercive measures; whereas this has led to overcompliance by private operators in order to mitigate their exposure to risk; whereas overcompliance and extraterritorial effects

manifest themselves in the disruption of essential services to individuals and organisations;

V. whereas in the Jenec case C-81/24, the Court of Justice of the European Union found that EU law cannot be interpreted as requiring credit institutions to automatically refuse to open a payment account with basic features with a person included under any designation on the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) specially designated nationals and blocked persons list (SDN list);

W. whereas the extraterritorial impacts of such measures within the EU are amplified by the structural dependence of global, financial, digital and technological systems on non-European infrastructure and service providers; whereas such dependencies create vulnerabilities that may affect the continuity and autonomy of EU action;

X. whereas the need to mitigate, counter or neutralise these impacts is urgent, as they weaken investigations, witness protection, legal counselling and evidence gathering and preservation, have chilling effects, including self-censorship, and result in reduced cooperation with accountability mechanisms;

Y. whereas the broad complex of existing EU support instruments for international justice should be assessed to identify and close efficiency and coordination gaps such as the absence of a dedicated EU strategy and to ensure the full and consistent use of all instruments;

Z. whereas in its resolution of 21 January 2026 on human rights and democracy in the world and the EU's policy on the matter (annual report 2025), in its resolutions of 24 February 2026 on four years of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine[12] and of 30 April 2026 on ensuring accountability and justice in response to Russia's continued attacks against the civilian population in Ukraine[13], in its report of 29 April 2026 on the Commission's 2025 Rule of Law report[14], Parliament reaffirmed its full support for the ICC as an essential pillar of the international justice system, stressed that its independence and impartiality must be safeguarded against political pressure and coercive measures, called for full cooperation with the ICC, and underlined the crucial role of civil society organisations;

AA. whereas international accountability efforts, including the establishment of the ICPA and CICED within Eurojust, demonstrate the effectiveness of coordinated responses to strengthen

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12 OJ C, C/2026/4002, 19.8.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/4002/oj.
13 Texts adopted, P10_TA(2026)0161.
14 Texts adopted, P10_TA(2026)0147.

international justice mechanisms;

AB. whereas all permanent members of the UN Security Council bear responsibility for international peace and security under the UN Charter; whereas accountability for the crime of aggression cannot presently be pursued before the ICC due to jurisdictional limitations;

AC. whereas the swift entry into force and effective functioning of the Convention establishing the International Claims Commission for Ukraine requires a sufficient number of ratifications and adequate financial contributions;

AD. whereas the Blocking Statute Regulation, as amended, was adopted to protect EU economic operators, natural and legal persons within the EU against the extraterritorial application of legislation of non-EU countries;

AE. whereas Parliament and some Member States have repeatedly called on the Commission to activate the EU Blocking Statute to protect the ICC;

AF. whereas the Annex to the Blocking Statute Regulation has not been updated to reflect the most recent developments;

AG. whereas, while the Blocking Statute was designed to protect EU economic operators, natural or legal persons, its activation would manifest the EU's determination to preserve the integrity of its legal order against the extraterritorial effects of measures taken by non-EU countries; whereas activating the Statute would also represent a powerful symbol of support given by the EU to international justice, its operators and partners;

AH. whereas the most effective and durable protection lies in reducing the structural dependencies that give foreign coercive measures their extraterritorial reach; whereas the EU's economic security framework offers existing instruments through which structural financial, digital and technological dependencies can be reduced, thereby diminishing the extraterritorial reach of foreign coercive measures and strengthening the EU's competitiveness and innovation base, by making full use of existing tools, funding and legal frameworks;

AI. whereas the EU has adopted Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries, which provides a key framework for discouraging and fending off unjustified foreign interference, strengthening the EU's economic security, while remaining committed to an open and competitive economy;

Developing an EU strategy to strengthen the international system of justice and to protect European and Member States' sovereignty

1. Welcomes the awarding of the 2026 Sakharov Prize to the ICC and its officials in recognition of their vital contribution to upholding international law, promoting justice, and combating impunity for the gravest international crimes, particularly in light of the 9 October 2026 designation of the ICC itself under Executive Order 14203;

2. Recalls that respect for the protection and enforcement of international criminal justice through both defensive and positive actions are clear objectives of EU external action and constitute a legal obligation for the EU's Member States under Article 21 TEU;

3. Notes that the EU has developed important legal, diplomatic, operational and financial instruments to support the international justice architecture, UN-backed investigative mechanisms, CoE- and UN-backed special tribunals, judicial cooperation initiatives and the ICC;

4. Firmly condemns all unilateral foreign coercive measures, applied or threatened, targeting international multilateral judicial institutions and UN mandate holders, as well as human rights organisations cooperating with them; condemns, in particular, pressure, campaigns and coercive measures directed at third countries with the aim of compelling them to withdraw from or cease cooperation with the ICC;

5. Recognises the crucial role played by the ICC Judges in safeguarding human rights, upholding the rule of law and promoting justice; stresses that the imposition of coercive measures against magistrates seeks not only to impede the independent exercise of their mandate, but also undermines the climate of trust necessary for citizens' effective access to justice and erodes confidence in the rule of law;

6. Considers that such measures and their extraterritorial application are unjustified and contrary to international law and the rule of law, constitute undue serious interference with European sovereignty and the jurisdiction of the EU and its Member States, thereby threatening the EU's legal order and strategic autonomy, and have exposed significant gaps and inadequacies in the EU's capacity to protect international justice stakeholders;

7. Calls on the Commission, the Member States, the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) to use appropriate diplomatic, political and, where necessary, legal channels to address, revoke or counter third-country unilateral coercive measures that undermine international justice mechanisms, EU and Member States' strategic interests and autonomy or produce unjustified extraterritorial effects within the EU, with a view to ensuring that

any coercive measures affecting the EU are met with a coordinated, proportionate European response and counter measures;

8. Calls for a comprehensive assessment of the existing EU tools to support international justice in order to identify and close gaps, such as the absence of a dedicated comprehensive EU strategy, including the lack of protection mechanisms for affected stakeholders, insufficient regulatory clarity and operational safeguards against overcompliance by private operators, and limited financial predictability for international accountability actors;

9. Calls on the Commission and the VP/HR, in partnership with Council and Parliament, to propose a comprehensive EU strategy to respect, protect and strengthen the international justice system and its institutions, mechanisms and partners against unilateral foreign coercive measures and other forms of interference while ensuring the full, consistent and coordinated use of existing EU instruments, avoiding any unnecessary additional administrative burden;

10. Reaffirms the paramount necessity of complete judicial independence and impartiality within international courts, considers Articles 36, 40, 41, 46 and 47 of the Rome Statute to be robust guarantees for ICC magistrates in this regard;

11. Calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to convene a structured expert roundtable bringing together civil society, the Member States, EU institutions and international organisations to inform the design of this strategy; calls on the Member States to fully cooperate with the Commission on the implementation of any future EU strategy on international justice;

12. Calls on the VP/HR to propose to the Council, as possible actions under the EU strategy on international justice, new initiatives to better safeguard the independence and effective functioning of the ICC, such as measures to update and strengthen legal and operational support ties between the EU and the ICC, and to recommend, pursuant to Article 22(1) TEU, that support for the ICC be recognised as a strategic interest of the EU;

13. Calls on the Commission to present a detailed annual report to the European Parliament on the implementation of the strategy, including an assessment of the impact of foreign coercive measures on European operators and a transparent analysis of the European funds allocated to supporting international justice, thereby ensuring efficiency, traceability and sound financial management of public resources;

14. Calls on the Commission to adopt an action plan that is integrated with the strategy in order to address the consequences of the extraterritorial application of unilateral foreign coercive measures, in particular by enabling affected entities and individuals to retain

access to IT providers, bank accounts, insurance and health coverage, while taking due account of the operational and administrative capacity of small and medium-sized enterprises in the European financial and tech sectors, and mitigating the risks of fragmented national policies and external dependencies; calls, in this regard, for the exhaustive deployment of institutional instruments and existing structural mechanisms currently at the EU's disposal while stressing the need for strengthened interservice cooperation for a consistent EU response and for better articulation with other EU policies or strategies in fields such as economic security or cloud systems;

15. Urges the Commission to activate the EU Blocking Statute as an immediate instrument to counteract the extraterritorial effects of foreign unilateral coercive measures; regrets that the EU Blocking Statute has not yet been activated, despite reiterated calls by Parliament and civil society; urges, to that end, that the Annex to the Blocking Statute Regulation be updated without delay to include the relevant unilateral foreign coercive measures and to protect EU economic operators, natural or legal persons, from their impact, and to duly inform Parliament and the Council thereof;

16. Acknowledges that the Blocking Statute was designed to protect EU economic operators, natural or legal persons, engaged in trade and capital movements, and stresses the need for an impact assessment of its effectiveness and of its consequences for EU economic operators in order to establish efficient protection measures;

17. Considers that, in addition to its activation, the Blocking Statute Regulation needs to be made genuinely operational and be recast to effectively address current and emerging challenges, including overcompliance by private operators, to allow for a more rapid and targeted response; calls on the Commission to bring forward the necessary proposals to this end;

Respecting, protecting and strengthening international justice institutions and mechanisms

18. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to continue supporting the effective domestic and international implementation of the Rome Statute;

19. Recalls the obligation of Member States as States Parties to the Rome Statute to cooperate fully with the ICC, including with respect to the execution of its decisions and arrest warrants; condemns the failure of certain State Parties to enforce some of these warrants; calls on the Council and the Commission to ensure compliance by Member States;

20. Welcomes the vote by the Hungarian National Assembly on 27 May 2026 to reverse Hungary's withdrawal from the Rome Statute with

immediate effect, thereby remaining a State Party to the ICC as formally notified by the Government of Hungary to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 29 May 2026;

21. Reaffirms the centrality of the Rome Statute to the international justice system; calls for the EU and its Member States to promote its universality and full and consistent implementation; calls on the European Council and the Member States to work towards its explicit inclusion in the EU *acquis* and to explore ways of strengthening the EU's political and financial support for the ICC; calls on the Council and the Member States to anchor such support structurally within the EU's external action, including by reflecting it consistently in the EU's policies, agreements with third countries, accession processes, political dialogues and parliamentary diplomacy;

22. Stresses that the EU's trade and association agreements, and the political dialogue and human rights framework they establish, offer effective and non-coercive means of promoting the universality and integrity of the Rome Statute and full cooperation with the international justice system; calls for these frameworks to be used consistently to that end;

23. Stresses that the ICC's legal professionals play an essential role in ensuring accountability for the most serious crimes of concern to the international community; emphasises that they must be protected against any form of reprisal, intimidation or undue interference and be able to perform their functions independently and without fear;

24. Calls for predictable, adequate and long-term support for the ICC and other international justice institutions and for continued support to victims and accountability actors, including by increasing and sustaining voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund for Victims, which is eligible as Official Development Assistance;

25. Deplores the fact that coercive measures from non-EU countries and the credible threat of such measures against international justice actors divert institutional and human resources away from core work on investigations, the provision of legal services, prosecutions, witness and victim protection, and documentation, generate chilling effects, including self-censorship among institutions and civil society organisations, and endanger the chain of custody, integrity and admissibility of evidence collected for use in proceedings;

26. Commends international accountability practices, such as the Eurojust liaison prosecutors' system and CICED; calls for such instruments to be applied more broadly worldwide;

27. Calls on the Member States to make full use of the principles of universal jurisdiction and complementarity to investigate and prosecute core international crimes before national courts, and to

reinforce the EU Network for the investigation and prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (the Genocide Network) within Eurojust;

28. Stresses that there can be no lasting peace in any conflict without accountability of all parties and considers that recourse to national courts in other countries through universal or extraterritorial jurisdiction may help combat impunity for the most serious crimes; calls for the EU and its Member States to support independent investigations, evidence preservation and judicial proceedings, including through universal jurisdiction where applicable;

29. Calls on the Commission to consider updating Europol's mandate, in order to facilitate the swift and secure exchange of information concerning ICC arrest warrants, thereby supporting the swift transmission and execution of such warrants; calls for Europol's immunity system to be compliant with Article 27 of the Rome Statute;

30. Reaffirms the essential role of the UN in achieving international accountability and the responsibility of the UN Security Council under the UN Charter in maintaining international peace and security; reaffirms the need for a comprehensive UN reform, including of the UN Security Council, and recalls Parliament's position in this regard, notably concerning the limitations of the use of the veto when it blocks essential UN action, such as in cases of mass atrocity crimes; calls for the EU and the Member States to strengthen their support to international criminal jurisdictions and investigative mechanisms established by the UN; calls for the EU and its Member States to counter coercive measures imposed against UN agencies and urges to take appropriate measures to safeguard the independence and effective functioning of the UN system;

31. Reaffirms that the UN remains the legitimate platform for international multilateralism;

32. Reaffirms the importance of establishing an international framework for the collection of evidence and the provision of reparations for damages, loss and injuries resulting from international crimes worldwide in order to safeguard global accountability, and urges the EU Member States to provide adequate financial contributions to all initiatives to this end;

33. Welcomes the continued progress towards establishing the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine under the auspices of the CoE; welcomes the Commission's accession to the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Management Committee of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine on behalf of the EU on 15 May 2026, following the adoption by the

Council of the relevant decision; looks forward to the submission by the Commission of a proposal enabling the EU to become a founding member of the Tribunal; welcomes the progress achieved towards operationalising the international compensation mechanism for Ukraine and urges the EU Member States to ratify the Convention establishing the International Claims Commission for Ukraine;

34. Recognises the key role that civil society organisations, human rights defenders, victims' groups, women-led organisations, independent journalists and lawyers play in documenting and gathering evidence of international crimes and providing legal services and expertise and support to victims and survivors, and in broader monitoring and advocacy efforts for international justice; calls on donors, the Commission and the Member States to ensure that adequate funding is made available to those doing accountability work, covering documentation, survivor support, campaigning for justice and providing specialised legal expertise, and to those facing coercive measures on account of such work; highlights the work of the consortium 'Global Initiative Against Impunity for International Crimes and Serious Human Rights Violations: Making Justice Work', and the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, co-funded by the EU, which aim to help end impunity through a comprehensive, integrated and inclusive approach to justice and accountability for serious human rights violations and international crimes;

35. Stresses the importance of ensuring that international justice mechanisms effectively investigate and prosecute gender-based crimes and conflict-related sexual violence; calls for the EU and its Member States to support survivor-centred approaches and the participation in and access to reparations of women and girls affected by international crimes;

36. Deplores the fact that stakeholders targeted by foreign coercive measures for their work on accountability face severe restrictions in daily life, including lack of access to their salaries, banking and financial services, insurance coverage and digital accounts, and limits on their mobility;

37. Strongly supports the work of the officials of the ICC who have been sanctioned by the current US Administration and commends their continued commitment to carrying out their judicial mandate despite such coercive measures;

38. Stresses that such organisations and individuals, including EU citizens, must be protected effectively against the extraterritorial impact of such coercive measures; notes the EU's dependency on foreign, notably US-based, digital payment service providers such as Mastercard, Visa and PayPal, which deepen the EU's structural vulnerabilities, including its ability to protect the financial activities of international justice institutions such as the ICC from foreign

sanctions; calls on the Commission and the Member States to reduce structural vulnerabilities by supporting the development of competitive, innovation-driven, market-led, resilient and autonomous European independent financial and digital infrastructure, including a sovereign European payment system; calls on the Council to swiftly implement the digital euro while preserving safeguards that allow EU citizens targeted by restrictive measures to open a digital euro account;

39. Calls on the Commission to set out a concrete roadmap for the EU's financial, digital and technological sovereignty, including secure European payment rails, euro-denominated clearing and correspondent-banking capacity, and trusted European providers of cloud, IT and insurance services, so that EU operators and persons cooperating with international justice can no longer be deprived of essential services through the extraterritorial application of foreign coercive measures; calls for this roadmap to set out clear milestones, governance and financing in order to protect not only international justice actors but also reinforce the autonomy and competitiveness of the EU's financial and technological base as a whole;

40. Calls for the EU to publicly continue supporting civil society organisations and institutions targeted by such coercive measures in order to allow them to continue their work; calls for the EU and the Member States where duly justified and in accordance with applicable legal requirements to make use of the flexibilities available under the existing Visa Code to facilitate temporary visa procedures for witnesses, human rights defenders and any individuals whose work is required by the ICC, as provided for by the Visa Code and handbook;

41. Disapproves of the fact that, driven by fear of reprisals, the extraterritorial reach of unilateral coercive measures is often amplified by overcompliance by private actors that either operate exclusively in the EU or within globally integrated financial and technological infrastructure;

42. Calls on the Commission to mitigate the legal uncertainty faced by private actors arising from foreign coercive measures by swiftly adopting clear and practical EU guidelines, best practices, national focal points and tailored technical assistance to address overcompliance, provide protection while reducing bureaucracy and compliance costs and draw on existing instruments; recalls that unilateral third-country restrictive measures cannot, in themselves, justify the refusal to open a payment account with basic features, as per the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 11 June 2026;

43. Recalls that this resolution is premised on full respect for sovereignty, constitutions and competences of the EU Member

States in accordance with the Treaties' principles of conferral and subsidiarity;

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44. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Member States, the Council and the Commission.